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1 Introduction 
From the viewpoint of development economics, missing or imperfect markets represent a 
crucial step in the understanding of the economic problems of developing countries. These 
missing or imperfect markets also lie at the heart of informal institutions, which are reactions 
to the market failures that arise because of legal, informational, or incentive constraints. These 
failures are often exacerbated by an unequal distribution of income or wealth. Another 
essential property of imperfect markets is that they are contagious: a market failure in some 
sector can lead to problems in other markets. For example, an incomplete credit market failing 
to provide each household facing a rewarding investment opportunity with a loan may lead to 
a failure in the market for whose infrastructure the investment was going to be made. One of 
these informal institutions designed to fill the loopholes in imperfect markets are share 
contracts. Instead of specifying a fixed payment, share contracts make the payment to a 
production factor dependent on the - mostly uncertain - outcome of the production process in 
which that production factor is involved. Share contracts in the agricultural sector of 
developing economies are best known for their use in combining the markets for land and for 
labour, but there is growing evidence that share contracts are also a common contractual form 
in the emerging informal markets for groundwater. The dissertation in hand deals with share 
contracts in both the market for land and the market for groundwater. 
It is a daunting undertaking to conduct research in the realm of share contracts in 
agrarian economies given the fact that the inquiry into the merits and drawbacks of share 
tenancy contracts compared to fixed-rent leasehold tenancy started as early as in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century with Adam Smith (1776) and John Stuart Mill (1848), 
followed by a steady growing literature investigating the efficiency implications of share 
contracts and the reasons for their existence. A large part of this literature is summarized in 
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Singh (1989), Otsuka et al. (1992), and Hayami and Otsuka (1993). But with that matters 
seem to have not been settled because since then a new strand of literature has emerged, 
offering new explanations for the choice of sharecropping tenancy contracts.1 This literature, 
however, the recent one as well as the older one, considers only land-tenancy and labour-
employment contracts which 'are alternative arrangements to combine the two primary factors 
of production in agrarian economies', as Hayami and Otsuka (1993) put it. This approach 
leaves out of consideration that there is a third 'primary' factor of production, namely water, 
which for a long time might have been not especially worth considering in the context of 
contract theory, since the inter and intra village allocation of this factor of production was 
governed by collective action rather than by contracts between private parties. But this has 
changed nowadays, since the use of groundwater for irrigation purposes is steadily replacing 
the use of surface water from the notoriously ill-maintained and therefore unreliable canal 
systems. Apart from the canal systems being in bad condition, the fact that more and more 
farmers are growing more water-intensive crops also leads to an increasing demand for 
groundwater, since the canal water supply does not meet this demand. The equipment needed 
to gain access to groundwater is available to farmers who have the necessary liquidity or 
access to credit. Since the access to groundwater makes those farmers partly independent of 
the canal system, they face a smaller incentive to engage in the collective maintenance of it. 
That in turn leads to a further decay of the surface irrigation system, making more farmers 
dependent on groundwater irrigation. On account of the fact that normally part of the 
households in a village cannot invest in the necessary equipment due to lack of liquidity and 
                                                 
1 To cite a few more recent references: Basu (1992), Sadoulet et. al. (1994), Sengupta (1997), 
Ray (1999), Ghatak and Pandey (2000), Ackerberg and Botticini (2001), Ray and Singh 
(2001), Dubois (2002). 
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credit-constrainedness, water has become a factor of production the access to which is no 
longer exclusively determined by rules set by the village collective. It is now rather a factor of 
production which is owned privately by some of the households and the allocation of which 
therefore requires contracting between private parties. Strictly speaking, there is now a mixed 
regime of access to water: For one part of their seasonal irrigation needs, farmers still rely on 
surface water, for the other part, they have to rely on their own wells or on other farmer's 
wells. 
 This is where the second and the third chapter of this dissertation set in: The 
contractual forms under which groundwater is traded between households turn out to be the 
same as those employed to allocate the two other 'primary' factors of production, land and 
labour. The two main contractual forms to combine groundwater with land and labour are that 
the farmer who needs additional irrigation pays the seller either a fixed rate per unit of water 
he receives or a prespecified share of his output on the field irrigated by the seller's well. The 
mainly observed contractual forms combining land and labour are, first, a fixed payment in 
cash or kind from the tenant to the landlord, second, a share of the output produced on the 
tenancy paid by the tenant to the landlord, or, third, a fixed wage rate paid by the landlord to 
the hired workers working on his fields. At this place, we will not go into the details under 
which circumstances what kind of contractual form is chosen in land and labour transactions, 
the interested reader is referred to the literature cited above. But there is one obvious 
difference between the principal-agent relationship in land-tenancy and labour-employment 
contracts and the principal-agent relationship in groundwater contracts. Agency theory2, on 
which the treatment of land and labour contracts is based, considers the choice of an optimum 
contract between a principal (the owner of a resource) and an agent (the user of the resource) 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Arrow (1985), Hart and Holmstrom (1987), Levinthal (1988). 
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and it is assumed that 'an agency problem arises when the agent's action (e.g. work-effort) is 
not directly observable by the principal and the outcome is influenced not only by the agent's 
action but also by uncertain factors outside the agent's control' (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993, p. 
3). Things are different for groundwater contracts. First, the owner of the resource, the 
wellowner, is under none of the contractual forms interested in monitoring the user's (the 
water buyer's) actions, since under a fixed rate contract his payment is in any case 
independent of the buyer's actions and in the case of a groundwater share contract, as matters 
stand, the contract is only negotiated when the buyer has already supplied all other inputs, so 
that the wellowner can observe the condition of the crop before entering the contract and 
personally applying his resource to the crop. Second, in the case of groundwater transactions 
it is the wellowner's (the resource owner's) actions which are observable for the buyer but 
which are not enforceable by the buyer. Thus, there is a reversal of roles between the resource 
owner and the resource user, the user of the resource having to provide incentives to the 
owner of the resource. The role of groundwater is therefore, with some reservations, probably 
best compared to the role of labour in tenancy contracts. 
 More detailed information on the pattern of contract choice in so-called informal 
groundwater markets is presented in chapter 2, which contains the results of a field study on 
groundwater transactions conducted by myself during January and February 2001 in Tamil 
Nadu, India. The main reason which led me to undertake the study was the perception that the 
existing empirical literature on informal groundwater transactions, which is cited in the first 
section of chapter 2, is mostly based on studies which are on a rather aggregated level and 
therefore fail to provide a satisfactory detailed depiction of the pattern of groundwater 
transactions and of the associated payment modes at the household level. But since these 
empirical details are vital for a theoretical investigation of the determinants of contract choice, 
information on such questions as the following was gathered in the study: At which point in 
 9
time during the cultivation period the contractual form is chosen? Is there any connection 
between the remaining number of days in the cultivation season for which a farmer needs 
water and the contractual form chosen? Is it the wellowner who dictates the contractual form 
and the terms of the contract, or do the parties bargain over the terms of the contract? Once 
the contract has been chosen, who then decides how much groundwater will be supplied, and 
how much of the other inputs such as labour, fertilizer etc. will be employed in the production 
process? Does a contract with a wellowner assure a supply of groundwater, or is there no way 
of ensuring that the seller will deliver the amount of water agreed upon in advance? The 
answers to these question are of particular interest if one wants to shed some light on the fact 
that fixed rate payments and sharecropping arrangements coexist in some local water markets, 
but not in others. In addition, chapter 2 presents descriptive statistics for some characteristics 
of the sample households and for some variables related to their groundwater transactions. 
The household characteristics include landholdings in the different categories of land, 
wellownership, and the amount of money invested in irrigation equipment. The variables 
related to the groundwater transactions are, for example, the number of buyers and sellers 
transacted with in the season under consideration, the fixed rate or cropshare paid or received 
for groundwater, and the number of days for which water was bought during the season. 
Comparisons regarding these characteristics and variables are made between the three 
household categories sellers, buyers, and non-transactors, and between the two sub-categories 
of buyers, cash-buyers and share-buyers. These descriptive statistics let one gain some insight 
into the factors determining whether a household sells water, purchases water, or is inactive in 
the informal water market. 
 In chapter 3, I come back to the empirical facts set out in chapter 2 in order to build up 
a model capable of explaining the choice of different contractual forms in informal 
groundwater markets. This task is definitely worth undertaking, since on the one hand, the 
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only two existing theoretical papers on the issue, Jacoby et al. (2001) and Kajisa and Sakurai 
(2000), investigate price discrimination and monopoly power in informal groundwater 
markets as well as the individual-level determinants of groundwater prices, but they do not 
address which are the determinants of the choice of the contract form. On the other hand, the 
literature on tenancy and labour contracts mentioned above offers a variety of explanations 
why different contract forms coexist in the same market for land and labour, but it is clear that 
none of the models employed in these contributions can be used to predict contract choice in 
informal groundwater markets, since the assumptions made in these models are not 
necessarily compatible with the facts in existing informal groundwater markets. 
 Among the different approaches taken to explain the existence of sharecropping 
arrangements in the tenancy market, the model in chapter 3 is most closely related to those 
contributions which use a bargaining approach to explain the parameter values of individual 
contracts.3 In the context of informal groundwater transactions it seems reasonable to assume 
that the terms of the groundwater trade are the result of bilateral bargaining between the buyer 
and the seller. Empirical evidence suggests neither that all bargaining power rests with the 
water seller , which would permit the latter to set the terms of the contract, nor that complete 
markets for groundwater exist in which all participants take the price as given. According to 
the empirical observations set out in chapter 2, for example, the bargaining power of each 
party depends on the amount of water available from the surface irrigation system in the 
period of the contract, on the expected amount of rainfall, and on the number of other 
potential buyers or sellers. 
 Following the pattern suggested by empirical evidence, I model the process of 
contracting between a risk averse wellowner who faces constant marginal costs for the 
                                                 
3 Bell and Zusman (1976), Zusman and Bell (1989), Quiggin and Chambers (2001). 
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extraction of groundwater and a risk averse farmer who is in need of additional irrigation as a 
three-stage game. At the first stage, during the growing season, both parties observe the state 
of the farmer's crop and bargain over the contractual parameters, namely, a cropshare, a fixed 
payment per unit of water, and an unrestricted transfer payment. In the second stage, nature 
chooses the amount of rainfall, which is observed by both parties. In the third stage, the 
wellowner chooses the amount of groundwater he wants to apply to the farmer's crop, where 
the amount of groundwater the wellowner delivers can be observed by the farmer, but the 
farmer cannot compel the wellowner to deliver a certain amount of water. Under these 
assumptions it is shown that the contractual parameters are chosen in such a way that the 
wellowner always chooses the efficient amount of groundwater and that there is always 
efficient risk sharing, regardless of incentive considerations. If the utility functions of both the 
buyer and the seller exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, the optimal cropshare as well as 
the optimal fixed payment per unit of water are functions of the coefficients of absolute risk 
aversion of the two parties. For the case where both parties have utility functions of the 
logarithmic type, I can show how the contractual parameters are influenced by factors such as 
the buyer's and the seller's incomes from sources other than the contract, the marginal costs of 
producing the groundwater, and the distribution function of the amount of rainfall in the 
production period. 
 In a way, chapter 3 makes also a contribution to the literature on cost-sharing 
arrangements in the context of sharecropping contracts. Braverman and Stiglitz (1986) show 
that the resolution for the seeming paradox of the irrelevance of cost-sharing is an asymmetry 
of information concerning the optimal input use between the landlord and the tenant. Under 
the assumptions of my model, in contrast, cost-sharing arises because of the risk aversion of 
the contracting parties combined with the unenforceability of the input in question, whereby 
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cost-sharing is feasible because the supply of the respective input is observable by both 
parties. 
Two central results in chapter 3, the efficient supply of groundwater by the wellowner 
and the related result of efficient risk sharing between the buyer and the seller, can be only 
derived because the input supplied by the water seller is assumed to be perfectly observable 
(observable at low costs) by the water buyer. This assumption is quite realistic, since there is 
no reason why a farmer should be unable to observe the amount of groundwater supplied by 
someone else to his one or two field plots. In the case of tenancy and labour contracts, 
however, it is not so clear whether the work effort of a hired labourer or a share tenant can be 
costlessly monitored by the landlord. Consequently, there are essentially two types of models 
dealing with contract choice in land and labour markets. Under the assumption of 
prohibitively high costs of monitoring the tenant's activities, the so-called 'Marshallian' 
approach, the theory predicts that the choice of a sharecropping contract will result in an 
inefficiently low amount of variable inputs applied to the rented land by the tenant, compared 
to the amount of variable inputs employed on owned land or on plots leased in under a fixed 
rent contract. If, in contrast, the landlord is able to effectively monitor the tenant's activities, 
as is assumed under the so-called 'monitoring ' approach, then the efficient amount of variable 
inputs per unit area can be stipulated in the contract, and there are no incentive problems to be 
dealt with, so that the cultivation of a plot under a share lease causes no inefficiencies 
compared with ownership cultivation or cultivation under a fixed rent lease. Since the 
predictions of the theory concerning such issues as the reasons for the existence of 
sharecropping arrangements and the efficiency of sharecropping depend crucially on the 
assumption whether perfect monitoring is possible or not, and since it cannot be settled 
theoretically which of the two modelling approaches does more justice to the real world, it is 
essential to take a closer look at the empirical evidence. 
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In this context, the aim of chapter 4 is to make a contribution to the existing literature in this 
field in the following respects. First, we reestimate Shaban's (1987) model, using data from a 
survey of 14 villages in Andhra Pradesh, India. A novel feature of these data is that, for each 
sharecropping contract, they contain the accompanying cost-sharing rules, so that we do not 
have to rely on village dummies if we aim to measure the effect of the contractual 
arrangement on input and output intensities. In an important extension of Shaban's model, we 
include crop dummies into the analysis. If one wants to compare an owner-sharecropper's 
performance on his owned and on his sharecropped plots, one has to average over the inputs 
and the output on all his sharecropped and on all his owned plots, with the side-effect that one 
also averages over different crop types. But this seems to be undesirable, since it is natural to 
assume that different crop types are produced with different technologies, as was already 
mentioned above. This fact would not cause a problem if all types of crops were grown in the 
same proportions on owned and sharecropped land. But if, as in this dataset, some crops are 
more extensively grown on sharecropped plots than on owned plots and vice versa, then not 
controlling for the crop type will lead to a distortion of the estimation results. In the light of 
this argument, Shaban's technique of using village dummies in order to control for the effect 
of share tenancy seems to be questionable, since instead of reflecting only the different cost-
sharing rules across the villages, these dummies could just as well reflect different 
distributional pattern of crop types on owned and sharecropped plots between different 
villages. Indeed, we find that at least part of the differences between input intensities on 
owned and sharecropped land can be ascribed to different crops grown on these two 
arrangements. 
 We then extend our analysis of the differences between input intensities on owned and 
sharecropped plots to the class of owner-fixed-rent tenants in order to investigate whether 
there are also differences between input intensities under the latter pair of arrangements, and 
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if there are differences, whether part thereof can be ascribed to the effects of tenancy, or 
whether the total differences can be explained by plot-specific factors or by different cropping 
patterns on owned and leased-in land. In this case, too, we find that different cropping 
patterns are one reason for different input intensities. 
 There is, however, a fundamental difficulty. If we employ indicator variables in 
the estimation for whether or not a crop is grown on a particular plot of a particular 
household, we encounter the problem that this set of crop dummy variables is not 
exogenously given, but is rather the result of an endogenous choice. If the choice of crops is 
endogenous and if the factors which determine it enter into the error terms in the estimation of 
the equations for the input differences (all unobserved household heterogeneity which 
influences owned and leased-in plots differently), then not controlling for the endogeneity of 
crop choice will lead to inconsistent estimates for the parameters in the input-difference 
estimation. This presumption is confirmed by the data at least for the class of owner-
sharecroppers: In the model which assumes that the crop variables are exogenous, the 
estimated coefficients for the crop dummy variables are highly significant, whereas the 
coefficients for the cost share variable are not significant at all. By contrast, in the model 
which takes into account the endogeneity of crop choice, the influence of the crop dummy 
variables becomes less significant, whereas a statistically significant influence of the cost 
share variables can now be detected. 
 Chapter 5 summarizes the results and gives a short account of future research. 
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2 How Informal Water Markets Function: Empirical Evidence from 
South India 
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2.1 Introduction 
Water is, besides land and labour, one of the essential factors in agricultural production. If 
there are regular rainfalls during the cultivation season and if, in case that there is a period 
without rainfall, there are enough perennial streams, ponds, or groundwater resources, the 
farmers can afford – either because they are wealthy enough or because they have access to 
credit - to buy and run the necessary irrigation equipment, and if they can insure themselves 
against crop losses, then these farmers do not face any extraordinary economic situation 
which would be worth considering. But in a number of developing countries where 
agriculture is monsoon-dependent, a farmer who wants to avoid crop losses caused by the 
failure of ill-maintained public irrigation systems, or by the lack of rainfall, is often driven to 
participate in an informal market for irrigation water, the reasons being missing or incomplete 
credit markets and the absence of perennial streams or ponds. The term 'market' is somewhat 
elastically in this context, for what is observed are personalized contracts where both parties 
often have few or no alternative partners to contract, rather than auction markets in a clearly 
defined good which is traded at a common price. The good in question is groundwater (the 
contractual units are either hours of irrigation, area irrigated, or number of irrigations) 
extracted by farmers who own a well and a pump-set. Describing and explaining the different 
payment modes associated with these groundwater transactions - especially the coexistence of 
fixed rate payments and share contracts under which the buyer gives a share of his crop output 
to the water seller in exchange for the water received – will be one of the main tasks of this 
chapter. 
There are numerous contributions dealing with the phenomenon of informal 
groundwater 'markets' in developing countries, all but two of them (as far as I can determine)4 
                                                 
4 The exceptions are Jacoby/Murgai/Rehman (2001) and Kajisa/Sakurai (2000). 
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of a purely empirical nature.5 Those dealing with India "(a) provide an idea of the magnitude 
and value of Indian water trading, especially at the national level, (b) outline the technical and 
institutional environment within which Indian water markets are operating, (c) describe their 
major economic and institutional features, (d) evaluate their efficiency, equity, and 
sustainability implications, and (e) suggest the legal and institutional changes needed to make 
them an efficient institutional option for groundwater management" (Saleth, 1998). In my 
opinion, however, none of these contributions provides a satisfactory detailed depiction of the 
pattern of groundwater transactions and of the associated payment modes at the household 
level. Most of these studies are at a rather aggregated level and therefore fail to provide the 
information that is necessary to set up a model capable of explaining the choice of different 
contractual forms. 
This was the main reason which led me to undertake the study whose results are 
presented here. My aim was to gather information on such questions as: At which point in 
time during the cultivation period the contractual form is chosen? Is it the well owner who 
dictates the contractual form and the terms of the contract, or do the parties bargain over the 
terms of the contract? If the contract has been chosen, who then decides how much 
groundwater will be supplied, and how much of the other inputs such as labour, fertilizer etc. 
will be employed in the production process? Does a contract with a well owner assure a 
supply of irrigation water, or is there no way of assuring that the seller will deliver the amount 
of water agreed upon in advance. The answers to these questions are of particular interest if 
one wants to shed some light on the fact that fixed rate payments and sharecropping 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Saleth (1998), Meinzen-Dick (1998), Satyasai et al. (1997), Janakarajan 
(1993), Shah (1991). Empirical Studies focusing on groundwater trade in Tamil Nadu's 
agriculture are Janakarajan (1991a, 1991b, 1994). 
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arrangements coexist in some local water markets, but not in others. Since the same payment 
modes can be found in the markets for tenancies, we will also have to investigate the question 
whether the reasons for the choice of a share contract are the same in both markets. To put it 
in another way, can the existence of sharecropping arrangements in both cases be attributed to 
the same form of market incompleteness, such as a missing insurance or credit market, or by 
the incompleteness of the groundwater market or the tenancy market itself. These are the 
questions to which the descriptive material in this paper can help provide an answer. 
What this chapter cannot do, however, is to calculate the exact price of one unit of 
water under the various contract forms and then compare them in order to identify risk 
premiums or monopoly markups. This is done in the studies of Jacoby et al. (2001) and Kajisa 
and Sakurai (2000). Due to the limitations of the data, no attempt will be made to provide an 
econometric analysis of contractual choice in informal groundwater markets or to test 
corresponding models thereof. Such an attempt has been made by Satyasai et al. (1997). 
Further, we do not assess the extent of the trade in groundwater - the number of buyers and 
sellers involved and the total monetary value of the water traded – as found in Saleth (1998) 
and Janakarajan (1993). Nor is there an account of the degree to which groundwater is 
overexploited and the related lowering of the water table in the study area. Two older studies 
concerned with these issues are Bhatia (1992) and Moench (1992). 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 describes the study 
area, section 2.3 the sample. Section 2.4 presents some summary statistics of trade in 
groundwater in the sample villages. In section2.5, we comment on the details of some 
groundwater transactions in the sample villages. Section 2.6 wraps up the chapter. 
2.2 The study area 
During January and February 2001, 4 of the 7 villages forming a civil village or village 
panchayat in Nanguneri Taluk, Tirunelveli District, Tamil Nadu, were studied with special 
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emphasis on informal groundwater transactions. The panchayat is located in a rather drought-
prone area, and is surrounded by 7 rain-fed tanks, which provide the surface irrigation water 
for the so-called wetland. These tanks are filled during the monsoon season, and in years of 
good rainfall, they are a reliable source of irrigation water until the end of February. From the 
tank, the water reaches the fields through a system of small canals. The second category of 
cultivable land is the so-called dryland, which has no access to tank water, and depends 
wholly on rainfall and groundwater irrigation. The third category is the second priority land, 
which has access to irrigation water only every second year from a nearby river, and which 
has no access to tank water and well irrigation. In the alternating year, another village 
panchayat has the right to take water from the nearby river for irrigation purposes. 
In connection with the rotation of rights to water from the river, the farmers told us an 
interesting story, which reminds one of the state of affairs described by Wade (1979 and 
1982). Despite the agreement with the government over the release of water every second 
year, the farmers complained that they had to bribe the government officials responsible for 
the distribution of the waters between the two panchayats in order to receive the water they 
were entitled to. There was strong competition between the villages in the canal system to 
have the canal outlets opened in their favour. The higher the bribe payments, the higher were 
the chances that the gate would be opened for the village at the time when the farmers needed 
the water the most. This competition for the river water gave rise to a well-organized 
institutional arrangement: Guards who had to take care that the river dams were not broken by 
farmers of other villages in order to steal water, and the choice of two farmers assigned to 
collect the money from all other farmers which was needed to pay the bribes and to pay for 
the services of the guards. For each 0.8 acres of second priority land a farmer cultivated, he 
had to pay a contribution of 50 rupees. Thus, once again, an inefficient – though 'fair' - 
distribution system set up by the government has been replaced by an illegal system based on 
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bribes, leading to a more efficient distribution of the water, since the bribes are very likely to 
reflect the willingness to pay of the groups of farmers. But the revenue from this 'water 
auction' does not accrue to the government and can be employed in the operation and 
maintenance of the canal system, instead it remains in the pockets of the government officials. 
Thus, auctioning off the rights to the river water each day or each week or creating a market 
for water rights would get the government some revenues and distribute the river water more 
efficiently. 
The 540 acres of wetland belonging to the 4 villages studied depend on 2 of the 7 
tanks. The total area of dryland is 600 acres, but cultivable dryland, including the land of 
second priority, amounts to only 100 acres. These villages comprise 390 households, of which 
86 are registered as landowners and 95 are registered as landless agricultural labourers. For 
some odd reason, there was no information on the remaining households in the VAO's 
(Village Administrative Officer) records, but he told us that not all landowners or landless 
labourers might have been registered. Other occupations are, for example, shopkeeper, beedi 
rolling, shepherd, miller, and trading in agricultural products. Of the 86 wells owned by 
households, 22 are located in the wetland areas and 64 in the dryland. It is not clear, however, 
how many households are well owners, because often 2,3, or even 4 households share 
ownership in a single well. 
2.3 The sample 
Since the main purpose of this field study was to gain a more detailed insight into the exact 
nature of the single groundwater contract rather than to survey many households6 in order to 
obtain a data set with which it would be possible to estimate models of contractual choice in 
                                                 
6 This, by the way, would not have been possible with only one interviewer in the space of 
two months. 
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the context of informal groundwater markets, we did not employ a special sampling method, 
but instead tracked down farmers who were available and ready to answer our questions. 
Concerning the choice of the village panchayat to be studied, we were looking for 
villages in which groundwater was sold at a fixed rate as well as under sharecropping 
arrangements. An interesting general pattern was discovered while travelling through 
Tirunelveli district in search of a suitable study village: In all of the villages where we 
stopped to make a short inquiry into the local arrangements, there were active groundwater 
markets; but in the villages which had access to the Tambraparni Irrigation System (which 
depends on the perennial Tambraparni river), farmers reported that there existed no 
sharecropping arrangements at all, and that all groundwater transactions were made in the 
form of a fixed payment per hour. In the villages which only had access to a rain-fed tank 
system, however, share contracts were found to be very common. This pattern seems to be 
related to the fact that a perennial river is a more reliable source of irrigation water than a 
rain-fed tank system, especially as far as the length of the period for which surface water is 
available for irrigation is concerned. This implies that in the villages located in the river-fed 
irrigation system, only a modest volume of groundwater is traded as a substitute for the 
surface water, whereas in the tank-dependent villages, farmers often have to rely on the 
informal groundwater markets for one-third of the cultivation season. We will discuss this 
issue in greater detail in the next section. 
Since one of our primary aims was to study sharecropping arrangements in informal 
groundwater markets, we chose 4 villages in a rather drought-prone area irrigated by a rain-
fed tank system, where a large number of such contracts were found. For a household to be 
selected into the sample, it had to own land, lease in land, or both. On this basis, 49 
households were chosen from the total of 390 households. Also, one man was interviewed 
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who worked as an 'irrigator' for a landlord who was selling groundwater from his wells to a 
number of farmers. 
2.4 Irrigation and informal groundwater transactions in Nanguneri Taluk 
Traditionally, the irrigation water for these 4 villages comes from 2 rain fed-tanks, and 
reaches the fields through a system of small channels. The access to canal water of the single 
field is regulated by outlets. The order and the frequency with which each plot receives water 
is determined by rules made by the village collective.7 The farmers reported that in the past, 
the tanks had been a reliable source of irrigation water from October until March, and that at 
present, in years of good rainfall it is still possible to receive tank water until March, but that 
nowadays the tank already dries up at the end of January in years of bad rainfall, as happened 
in the season in which this study was conducted. The reasons for this development are the 
following: The first is that the system of canals and the dam of the tank are increasingly ill-
maintained, which leads to losses of water through breaches in the dam or because the water 
seeps away through the unlined channels. The second lies in the fact that many farmers grow 
more water-intensive crop varieties than hitherto, so that the same amount of water is 
sufficient only for a shorter period. 
 The main cropping season in our villages is from mid-October until the end of 
February or the beginning of March. In this season most of the farmers cultivate paddy (rice), 
a crop which needs a constant supply of water, and which is very sensitive to the water regime 
in the field. If the surface water resources in the tanks are used up by the end of January, 
farmers face the problem of supplying their crops with enough water for another 30 days. The 
farmers who own wells and pump sets will extract groundwater themselves, whereas the other 
                                                 
7 There is an own literature on how the distribution of surface water is regulated in such 
villages, but we will not address this issue here. 
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farmers either have to wait for rain – which may or may not come – or gain access to other 
farmers' groundwater resources through purchases of irrigation water. This kind of access to 
irrigation is restricted by the fact that another farmer's well must be located not to far away 
from the farmer's own field, and that this well must have the capacity to serve more than the 
well-owning farmer's own crops. 
 In our sample, 39 out of the 50 households are well owners. Of these 39, 28 have one 
or more wells (max. 4 wells), whereas 11 farmers own only a share of a well (the minimum 
share is 0.25). For example, owning a share of one-fourth of a well means that the share 
owner is entitled to one-fourth of the well's capacity and that, on the other hand, he has to bear 
one-fourth of the operation and maintenance costs. Five of the farmers owning more than one 
well are also owners of a share of a well. There are 8 farmers who own wells in both the 
wetland and the dryland areas. 
 
Table 1 Pattern of well ownership (number of households) 
 only share of a well at least one well total 
only in wetland 2 10 12 
only in dryland 9 10 19 
in wetland and 
dryland 
0 8 8 
total 11 28 39 
 
The total number of wells (or, more appropriate, the number of shares of well 
capacities) owned by the sample households is 48.91 (including share wells), of which 23.25 
are located in the wetland, and 25.66 are located in the dryland. Of the 30 households owning 
wetland plots, 20 are owners of a well or a share of a well located in the wetland; of the 34 
sample households owning plots in the dryland, 27 are owners of a well or a share of a well 
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located in the dryland.8 In the wetland owned by the sample households, there are 0.29 wells 
per acre, whereas in the dryland, there are 0.25 wells per acre. Thus, although, the dryland has 
no access to tank irrigation, the number of wells per acre on the different kinds of cultivable 
land is approximately the same. An interesting fact is that in only a few cases is water from 
dryland wells traded. The farmers told us that normally only farmers who own a well in the 
dryland cultivate their dryland plots, because no surface irrigation water other than rainfall is 
available in the dryland9, and because the capacity of one well is not sufficient to irrigate 
more than the holdings of the well owner himself for a whole season. The exclusive 
dependence on uncertain rainfall and on groundwater irrigation is also the reason why only 
less water-intensive crops like vegetables, chillies or cotton are normally cultivated in the 
dryland, but some farmers manage to cultivate paddy or even banana on their dryland plots. It 
was reported that farmers with adjacent plots sometimes exchange some irrigations (in 
alternating years or season), but that usually there is no water trade against money. However, 
in our sample there are at least three farmers who own only a well in the dryland, and are 
selling groundwater.10 
There are 7 households in the sample which reported selling water in this season, and 
15 households which reported buying water in this season; two households of the latter 
                                                 
8 A 2χ -test for equal proportions is not appropriate, since the categories are not mutually 
exclusive, i.e. farmers may own land in both the wetland and the dryland areas. 
9 The farmers who own dryland plots, but no well in the dryland, cultivate their dryland plots 
only in years of good rainfall. 
10 Since we do not have detailed information on whether a farmer is selling water from his 
wetland well or his dryland well, we can conclude that there is water trade in the dryland only 
in the cases were the seller has a well only in the dryland. 
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reported selling sometimes water, too, both but not necessarily in the same cropping season 
(in this season, they were active only on the demand side). 
 
Table 2 The terms on which water is traded (number of households) 
 seller buyer 
only fixed rate per hour (cash) 0 6 
only share contract 1 6 
fixed rate per hour and share 
contract 
6 2 
fixed payment in kind - 1 
total 7 15 
 
 Six of the seven households selling groundwater have both kind of contracts with 
different buyers at the same time, whereas only two household buying groundwater have both 
kind of contracts with different sellers at the same time. We will describe this latter cases 
among others below in greater detail. The average number of buyers served by each seller is 
8.71 (std.dev. 7.91), the minimum is one buyer and the maximum is 20 buyers. The average 
number of sellers from which a buyer receives water is 1.20 (std.dev. 0.78), the minimum is 1 
and the maximum is 4.11 The fact that sellers have different kinds of contracts with different 
buyers in the same season indicates that the payment mode is related to the characteristics of 
                                                 
11 The inconsistency between the fact that each seller in the sample on average has 8-9 clients 
and the fact that in the sample 49 cultivating households there are only 15 buyers, can be 
explained by the fact that, according to statements of respondents, we have by far the two 
biggest water sellers of the whole village panchayat in our sample. Leaving these two aside, 
the average number of buyers served by each seller is 4.20 (std.dev. 2.17), with the minimum 
being one buyer and the maximum seven. 
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each pair of transactors, and that there is no market with a uniform price and a standardized 
product. 
Table 3 and Table 4 show information on the differences in well and land ownership 
between buyers, sellers, and non-transactors. 
 
Table 3 Well ownership (number of households) 
 sellers buyers non-transactors total 
owns wells only 
on wetland 
1 6 5 12 
owns wells only 
on dryland 
3 6 10 19 
owns wells on 
both wetland and 
dryland 
3 0 5 8 
owns no well 0 3 7 10 
total 7 15 27 49 
 
 
Table 4 Land ownership (number of households) 
 sellers buyers non-transactors total 
owns only 
wetland 
0 5 7 12 
owns only 
dryland 
2 3 11 16 
owns land in 
wetland and 
dryland area 
5 7 8 20 
owns only second 
priority land 
0 0 1 1 
total 9 15 27 49 
 
The strongest differences between sellers and buyers concerning their well ownership are, 
firstly, that 3 of the buyers do not own a well, whereas, of course, all sellers own a well, and, 
secondly, that 3 of the sellers own one or more wells in both the wetland and the dryland, 
whereas this is the case for none of the buyers. Comparing this with the pattern of land 
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ownership it is interesting that 7 of the buyers own both wetland and dryland, but none of 
them owns wells on both kinds of land. The respective numbers are not so far apart for the 
sellers where 5 own both kinds of land, but only 3 own wells on both kinds of land. Thus, 
there is a first indication that there may be gains from the groundwater trade. For the non-
transactors, well ownership does not match land ownership in all of the cases, too, in that 
sense that there are to few wells compared with the respective landholdings. But for some 
reason to be investigated later in section 2.5, they did not participate in the groundwater 
market. Since a lot of cells have expected counts less than 5, we used Fisher's exact test to test 
the hypotheses of equal well and land ownership patterns between the three categories of 
households. The hypothesis cannot be rejected for both tables. 
 In the following, we will present some further tables which will underline the 
differences and similarities between buyers, sellers, and non-transactors concerning their 
endowments with wells and land. 
 
Table 5 Well ownership (average number of wells per household) 
 sellers 
(n=7) 
buyers 
(n=15) 
difference 
(sellers-buyers) 
non-transactors 
(n=27) 
on wetland 0.86 (0.90) 0.55 (0.78) 0.31 (0.82) 0.33 (0.51) 
on dryland 1.07 (0.73) 0.31 (0.48) 0.77 (0.57) 0.50 (0.62) 
on all land 1.93 (1.37) 0.86 (0.70) 1.07 (0.95) 0.84 (0.81) 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
 The average number of wells per seller or buyer, broken down by land type, is set out 
in Table 5. On all land, the average for sellers is more than twice as high as that for buyers. 
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According to the t-test, the difference is found to be significant at the 5% level12. Comparing 
the average number of wells per household on wetland, the difference is positive but not 
statistically significant, whereas on dryland, the difference is positive and significant at the 
1% level. One would expect that in the market (wetland or dryland) with the stronger 
difference in the relative endowments, there would be more trade in water than in the other 
market, but if one believes the statements of the farmers, this is not the case. For the non-
transactors, the average number of wells per household on all land equals that of the buyers, 
whereas the average number of wells per household on wetland and dryland is exactly the 
reverse to that in the buyers' case. 
 More convincing in this context may be the average number of wells per unit of land, 
which is reported in Table 6 for the different categories of land. 
 
Table 6 Well ownership (average number of wells per acre) 
 sellers buyers difference 
(sellers-buyers) 
non-transactors
wetland 0.15 (0.11) 
n=5 
0.23 (0.26) 
n=12 
-0.07 (0.23) 0.26 (0.23) 
n=15 
dryland 0.33 (0.20) 
n=7 
0.28 (0.40) 
n=10 
0.05 (0.33) 0.26 (0.25) 
n=19 
total own land 0.24 (0.09) 
n=7 
0.35 (0.33) 
n=14 
-0.11 (0.28) 0.28 (0.18) 
n=23 
total land 
(including leased-
in land) 
0.22 (0.09) 
n=7 
0.27 (0.27) 
n=15 
-0.05 (0.23) 0.22 (0.19) 
n=27 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
                                                 
12 If the variable is not normally distributed, it remains the case that the t-test is robust, but 
caution is still needed in interpreting the results. 
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It is interesting that the differences are negative for all land categories except dryland, that is, 
the buyers seem to own on average more wells in the respective land categories than the 
sellers. One would expect it to be the other way round. But none of these differences is 
significantly different from zero at any conventional significance levels using an unpaired t-
test13. Thus, where the average number of wells to land ratio is concerned, there is no 
evidence of a difference between the endowments of buyers and sellers. The number of wells 
to land ratios of the non-transactors are not remarkably different from those of the two other 
categories. Another feature of well ownership which has a bearing on the availability of 
irrigation water is the depth of the wells. The deeper the well, the greater is normally the 
amount of groundwater which can be extracted from it. In Table 7 we report the average well 
depth and the average well depth per unit of land. Since households may own more than one 
well, the average depth of these wells is used in the computations. 
 
Table 7 Average well depth and well depth per unit of land (in feet) 
 sellers 
(n=7) 
buyers 
(n=15) 
difference 
(sellers-buyers) 
non-transactors 
(n=27) 
average depth 74.89 (57.16) 32.80 (21.71) 42.09 (36.19) 
[t-value 2.54] 
34.18 (23.51) 
average depth of 
the deepest well 
87.86 (62.95) 32.20 (21.05) 55.66 (38.71) 
[t-value 3.14] 
35.22 (24.73) 
average depth 
per acre of total 
land 
10.60 (9.11) 10.96 (9.76) -0.37 (9.57) 
[t-value –0.08] 
12.57 (13.60) 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
It can be seen from Table 7 that the average well depth for the sellers in our sample is almost 
twice the average well depth on the buyers' side. The difference is significant at the 5% level. 
                                                 
13 Non-parametric tests yield the same results. 
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The difference is even larger and significant at the 1% level if one compares the means of the 
deepest wells of sellers and buyers. But if one compares the average well depth per acre of 
total land of buyers and sellers, one finds a negative difference, though one that is not 
statistically different from zero using an unpaired t-test. One explanation for the fact that the 
sellers have on average deeper wells as the buyers, but that the well depth to land ratio is not 
on average higher for the sellers than for the buyers, is that the capacity of a well may be an 
increasing function of its depth. This would explain why the sellers have 'surplus' 
groundwater, which they can sell to other farmers with a similar well depth to land ratio. We 
do not have data on capacity, nor do we have detailed and complete information on the 
groundwater extracting devices used by sellers and buyers. But it is clear that a deeper well 
requires a more powerful extracting device to make efficient use of its capacity. Again, the 
figures of the non-transacting households are very similar to those of the buyers. Thus, it will 
have to be explained why this group does not participate in the market by looking at some 
cases in detail in section 2.5. 
 Some farmers reported that they leave a fraction of their land uncultivated due to 
foreseeable shortages of irrigation water. Table 8 shows the ratio of uncultivated land to the 
number of wells owned by buyers, sellers, and non-transactors. Only the buyers owning a 
well were used in computations. 
 
Table 8 Uncultivated land (acres) per well 
 sellers 
(n=7) 
buyers 
(n=12) 
difference 
(sellers-buyers) 
non-transactors
(n=20) 
acres of 
uncultivated 
land/well 
0.18 (0.31) 1.52 (1.08) -1.34 (0.89) 
[t-value –3.17] 
1.17 (1.42) 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
 31
The difference between the sellers' and the buyers' uncultivated land per well is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. That is, there is strong evidence that the buyers have more 
difficulties than the sellers to supply their holdings with sufficient irrigation water from their 
own wells. The non-transactors, on average, leave approximately the same amount of land per 
well uncultivated as the buyers. 
 Table 9 gives an overview of the different kinds of landholdings of buyers, sellers, and 
non-transactors. 
 
Table 9 Average landholdings of buyers, sellers and non-transactors (in acres) 
 sellers 
(n=7) 
buyers 
(n=15) 
difference 
(sellers-buyers) 
non-transactors
(n=27) 
own land 9.57 (6.42) 3.74 (4.12) 5.84 (4.93) 
[t-value 2.59] 
3.26 (3.45) 
leased-out land 0.86 (2.27) 0.10 (0.39) 0.76 (1.28) 
[t-value 1.29] 
0.34 (1.02) 
leased-in land 0.14 (0.28) 0.42 (1.02) -0.28 (0.86) 
[t-value –0.70] 
0.92 (2.10) 
uncultivated land 0.54 (0.92) 1.38 (1.30) -0.85 (1.20) 
[t-value –1.55] 
1.43 (2.35) 
total land 9.71 (6.31) 4.15 (4.12) 5.56 (4.88) 
[t-value 2.49] 
4.18 (3.49) 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
The differences in Table 9 are significant at the 5% level for the categories 'own land' and 
'total land': The sellers own on average more land than the buyers, this pattern not being 
changed by the leasing in of land. If the landholdings of a household can be seen as a proxy 
for the household's wealth, and wealth in turn can be seen as a proxy for the household's risk 
aversion, then the buyers in the sample tend to be on average more risk averse than the sellers, 
and the non-transactors are approximately as risk averse as the buyers. Concerning the leasing 
in and out of land, there seems to be no difference between sellers and buyers, that is, the 
tenancy market does not seem to work in favour of a more efficient water allocation. The 
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question arises, why do the farmers with the low capacity wells not lease out their land to 
farmers with high capacity wells, instead of leaving the land uncultivated? Or, equivalently, 
why are the farmers with high capacity wells not willing to lease in the land of the farmers 
with low capacity wells? One explanation could be the availability of other production 
factors, such as labour. If the sellers with their larger own holdings are short of family labour 
or face high costs for hired labour, then they will not cultivate additional land, but will rather 
prefer to supply their surplus water and let the buyer supply the labour. Also, the groundwater 
deals seem to be less risky for the sellers than potential tenancy contracts: The tenancy 
contracts are made at the beginning of the cultivation season, which means that the well 
owner does not know at that moment how much groundwater he will need for his own 
holdings. The groundwater contracts, in contrast, are more flexible, since in most cases they 
are made during the season and, as the season proceeds, the well owner gains more 
information concerning his groundwater needs. 
 The figures for buyers and non-transactors in Table 9 are again very similar, apart 
from the fact that the non-transactors, on average, seem to lease in and out slightly more land 
than the buyers. 
 
Table 10 Average costs of irrigation equipment 
 sellers buyers difference 
(sellers-buyers) 
non-transactors 
operation and 
maintenance 
costs 
(rupees/year) 
2625 (3018) 
(n=7) 
1723 (980) 
(n=12) 
903 (1959) 2000 (1753) 
(n=20) 
investment in 
wells and 
pumpsets 
(rupees) 
124,286 
(185,802) 
(n=7) 
41,455 (55,591) 
(n=11) 
82,831 (121,973) 69,367 (57,374) 
(n=18) 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
 33
In Table 10, the average costs per year for the operation and maintenance of the wells 
and the pumpsets and the average initial investment in the irrigation equipment are set out. 
Especially the interpretation of the figures for the investment in irrigation equipment deserves 
some caution, since some of the farmers inherited their well and therefore could not give an 
exact number for the well's value. None of the differences in Table 10 is significant at any 
conventional significance level, but the sign of the differences is positive in both cases as one 
would expect, indicating again that the sellers are on average wealthier than the buyers. Also, 
a higher investment in irrigation equipment should enhance the groundwater extracting 
capacity, so that there is a higher amount of water that can be sold. The non-transactors seem 
to have invested a higher amount in their irrigation equipment on average than the buyers, 
which could be one reason why they do not have to participate in the groundwater market (on 
the demand side). 
 Having examined the differences between the endowments of buyers and sellers, we 
now turn to a comparison of the two different categories of buyers. In the following, we will 
investigate the differences in the endowments of buyers who pay a fixed cash amount per 
hour of irrigation water and buyers who pay a share of their crop output after the harvest.14 In 
the computations, we will take into account only the buyers who exclusively pay in one of the 
two payment modes to obtain stronger results. Thus, we have six cash buyers and six share 
buyers (two were doing both and one was paying a fixed payment in kind). 
Let us consider first the land holdings of the two categories of buyers in Table 11. 
 
                                                 
14 It does not make sense to do this comparison for the sellers, too, since all except one of the 
sellers in our sample reported offering both kind of contracts. 
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Table 11 Average landholdings of the two buyer categories 
 fixed payment in cash 
(n=6) 
share 
(n=6) 
difference 
(cash-share) 
total own land 4.61 (6.17) 2.78 (2.05) 1.83 (4.60) 
wetland 0.79 (0.84) 2.58 (2.18) -1.79 (1.65) 
dryland 3.9 (6.56) 0.28 (0.43) 3.63 (4.65) 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
For total own land, the difference is positive but not statistically different from zero. The 
difference between the wetland holdings of the cash buyers and the share buyers is negative 
and just significant at the 10% level. The corresponding difference between the dryland 
holdings is positive but not significant. Thus, there is at least a hint, even if not significant, 
that farmers with larger dryland holdings more frequently have fixed-payment groundwater 
contracts, whereas farmers with larger wetland holdings seem more frequently to have share 
contracts. A reason for this may be that in most cases, the crops grown on dryland do not need 
a regular supply of water, whereas mostly water-intensive crops like paddy, which are also 
very sensitive to water shortages and therefore need a constant water supply ,are grown on 
wetland. In this case, the farmer with the larger dryland holdings will normally need only a 
few 'turns'15 of groundwater, whereas the farmer with the larger wetland holdings will 
eventually need groundwater for one third of the cultivation season. 
Consider, therefore, Table 12, which shows the average number of groundwater 'turns' 
bought by the different categories of buyers and the average number of sellers from whom 
they bought water during the season in which this study was conducted. 
 
                                                 
15 The farmers reported that one 'turn' is normally the delivery of three hours of groundwater a 
day produced with a standard pumping device 
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Table 12 Average number of turns and average number of sellers 
 fixed payment in cash 
(n=6) 
share 
(n=6) 
difference 
(cash-share) 
average number of 
turns 
7.5 (3.15) 38.17 (24.92) -30.67 (17.76) 
average number of 
sellers 
1.5 (1.23) 1.00 (0.00) 0.5 (0.87) 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
The result is very clear for the average number of turns bought by the two categories of 
buyers: the difference is negative and significant at the 5% level. That is, buyers and sellers 
who trade with each other in high volume during the season seem to opt for sharecropping 
contracts, whereas those who do so on a small scale seem to prefer the fixed payment in cash 
(which is normally paid per hour of irrigation water received). The reasons given by the 
buyers and sellers for their respective choices of the payment mode will be listed and 
discussed in the next section. The other difference, the number of sellers from whom the two 
categories of buyers bought water, is positive, but not significant. It is interesting that each of 
the share-buyers purchased from a single seller, whereas the cash-buyers on average bought 
their groundwater from more than one seller. Especially if a farmer has only a single plot for 
which he needs additional irrigation, it lies in the nature of a share contract that there can be 
only one water seller. If, as in the case of the cash-buyers, the payment is not related to the 
output of the buyer, the only restriction on the number of sellers is the availability of sellers, 
which in turn is determined by the distance of other farmers' wells from the potential buyer's 
fields and the groundwater supply of those wells. Also, it is said by some farmers that a 
sharecropping contract with a seller means an assured supply of water, whereas a farmer who 
buys water against a fixed rate probably has to deal with several sellers to cover his water 
needs. Since we do not have adequate data, we are not able to determine whether the 
contractual form depends on the number of potential sellers available, i.e. whether the 
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contractual form depends on the degree of competition between sellers, or whether it is rather 
determined by other factors (some of them already mentioned above) and then in turn 
determines the number of sellers. 
 In Table 13 the well ownership patterns of cash- and share-buyers are reported. 
 
Table 13 Well ownership of both types of buyers 
 fixed payment in cash share difference 
(cash-share) 
number of wells per 
acre 
0.42 (0.37) 
(n=6) 
0.11 (0.12) 
(n=6) 
0.32 (0.27) 
total well depth per 
acre (in feet) 
17.90 (10.51) 
(n=6) 
6.79 (8.52) 
(n=6) 
11.11 (9.57) 
number of wells per 
acre wetland 
0.29 (0.34) 
(n=4) 
0.10 (0.17) 
(n=6) 
0.19 (0.25) 
number of wells per 
acre dryland 
0.31 (0.41) 
(n=5) 
0.14 (0.20) 
(n=2) 
0.17 (0.37) 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
 The first two differences in Table 13, which are statistics based on the total number of 
wells a farmer owns, are both positive and significant at the 10% level. That is, cash-buyers 
seem to own on average a larger number of wells per acre than share-buyers, and the sum of 
the depths of their wells per acre seems to be on average higher than that of the wells of the 
share-buyers. These findings go with the finding above, that cash-buyers buy a smaller 
number of groundwater 'turns' than share-buyers, since the number of irrigation devices per 
unit of land is a factor which determines to what extent a farmer has to rely on the informal 
groundwater market. 
 The other two differences, average number of wells per acre of wetland and dryland, 
respectively, are also positive but not significantly different from zero. At least, the direction 
of these differences is as expected, the cash-buyers owning on average more wells per acre in 
both wetland and dryland. The number of observations in these two cases is smaller than in 
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the case in which we take into account all wells, since not all buyers own both wetland and 
dryland. 
 It should be mentioned at this point that all the comparisons made for the both 
categories of buyers are not very meaningful for the sellers, since in our sample all sellers 
trade groundwater with several buyers using both payment modes. 
 Another interesting question in comparing the two categories of buyers is to ask which 
of the contracting parties chose the mode of payment. Table 14 is a frequency table which 
displays the answers to this question. There seems to be a remarkable difference between the 
answers of the cash-buyers and that of the share-buyers. Four of the share-buyers reported that 
it was the seller which dictated the payment mode, whereas only two of the cash-buyers 
reported to have no say in the choice of the payment mode. Also, one of the share-buyers told 
that it was the 'system' which dictated the payment mode. This statement rather lets one 
assume that in this case, too, the seller left the buyer with no choice concerning the terms of 
the contract. On the other hand, four of the cash-buyers reported that they bargained with the 
water seller over the terms of contract, i.e. that both had a say in the choice of the payment 
mode, but none of the share-buyers reported to have bargained with the well owner over how 
to pay for the groundwater. Of all buyers, only one share-buyer told us that he chose the 
payment mode himself. 
 
Table 14 Who chose the payment mode (number of households) 
 fixed payment in cash 
buyer 
share buyer total 
seller 2 4 6 
buyer 0 1 1 
bargaining (both) 4 0 4 
'system' 0 1 1 
total 6 6 12 
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To see whether these differences find statistical support, we employed Fisher's Exact Test for 
equal proportions, all cells in Table 14 having expected counts less than 5. The hypothesis of 
equal proportions between the cash-buyers and the share-buyers is rejected at the 10 % level. 
Thus, it seems that the buyers who ended up with a contract which specifies a fixed payment 
per hour had more often a say in the choice of the contractual terms than the buyers did, 
which ended up with a share contract. This leads one to conclude that the share-buyers in our 
sample had little or no bargaining power at all, whereas the cash-buyers had at least enough 
bargaining power so that they were not from the beginning nailed down to a certain payment 
mode. The situation of the different categories of buyers seems to be reflected in their 
bargaining power: A farmer who needs 30 days or more of groundwater irrigation is 
dependent on the groundwater deliveries of his seller, since otherwise he may well lose his 
entire crop; in contrast, the farmer who needs only some occasional 'turns' during the season is 
in a better position to bargain with the seller, since he will not lose his entire crop without 
these purchased turns and therefore might decide to do without purchased groundwater and 
accept a lower yield instead. 
Before we turn to some detailed case studies in the next section, we report some 
summary statistics for the terms of payment in Table 15. 
 
Table 15 Summary statistics for the terms of payment (by method) 
  mean std dev min max 
fixed payment 
per hour (n=7) 
(in rupees) 
27.86 6.36 20.00 40.00 buyers 
share (n=7) 0.50 0 0.50 0.50 
fixed payment 
per hour (n=7) 
(in rupees) 
27.86 9.94 20.00 50.00 sellers 
share (n=8) 0.50 0 0.50 0.50 
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The average amount per hour of groundwater paid by the buyers paying in cash is exactly the 
same as the average amount per hour of groundwater received by the sellers selling 
groundwater against a fixed rate (note that we do not confine the comparison to matching 
pairs of sellers and buyers), the standard deviation being slightly higher in the latter case. The 
relatively small standard deviation in both cases and the perfect correspondence of the 
average prices on both sides of the market can be interpreted as evidence for a well 
functioning groundwater market with a uniform price, at least in the segment where water is 
traded in form of a few 'turns' per season and against a fixed cash payment. In the market 
segment for groundwater share contracts the picture is completely homogeneous: all share-
buyers and all share-sellers reported that their share of the crop output was fifty percent16. 
Thus, as often mentioned for tenancy contracts in the literature, the fifty-fifty sharing rule 
seems to be adopted under a wide variety of circumstances. In our sample, for example, there 
is no difference between the crop share paid by a buyer who receives groundwater irrigation 
for thirty days and that by a buyer receiving two months of groundwater irrigation, even 
though a longer period of additional groundwater irrigation does not mean that the maximum 
attainable crop output thereby increases. The effect of thirty days more irrigation coverage is 
only that the crop does not fail as it would without the supplementary irrigation. Considering 
these facts, one may ask whether sellers subsidize their buyers this way or whether they make 
profit using the sharing rule. One possibility is that most sellers have a pool of buyers with 
whom they trade groundwater against a crop share. Some of these buyers then will receive 
water for only one month, whereas others will receive water for two months. Given that 
output does not differ too much between the different buyers, the seller will get approximately 
                                                 
16 It should be mentioned here that in all cases, no input costs were shared. That is, the only 
contribution to production by the seller is groundwater. 
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the same amount of output as if he had demanded different shares from his buyers. Given a 
mixed pool of buyers, always applying the same sharing rule could be a method for the seller 
to diversify risk. Also, a common 'rule' saves on transaction's costs and hard feelings about 
asymmetric treatment. 
 
2.5 Some qualitative features of informal groundwater transactions 
In the following, we will use some representative cases in order to illustrate how actual 
groundwater contracts in our sample villages are entered into and actually function. This will 
help us to complete the picture we already have gained from looking at the summary statistics 
above. The section will start with a description of the share-buyers' situation, followed by a 
description of the terms faced by the cash-buyers, a description of the sellers' situation and a 
summary of the reasons households gave for not participating in the groundwater trade. At the 
end of this section, we will address the issue of how groundwater contracts are interlinked 
with tenancy contracts in the sample villages. 
2.5.1 The share-buyers' views 
Buyers often have a share contract in one season and in another a fixed payment arrangement, 
depending on the supply of tank water. In this subsection, we will examine some cases of 
buyers who had a share contract in the survey period. 
 One farmer told us that he normally approached a nearby well owner at the beginning 
of the cultivation season in order to agree with him on eventual groundwater deliveries later in 
the season. In normal years, he needed ten to fifteen days of groundwater irrigation, and the 
well owner - on whom he was dependent, since there was no other farmer's well near enough 
to his fields – offered him only a share contract. But he added that he would not have been 
able to pay in cash for this amount of water. He claimed that, in general, a well owner who 
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was not a friend, a relative, or the buyer's employer, would have forced the buyer into a share 
contract, even if the latter expected to need only three or four days of groundwater irrigation. 
 Another buyer who owns a well himself has to buy water, since the capacity of his 
well is not always sufficient. He asks the owner of a nearby well for water at the moment he 
needs it. If this is early in the season, the seller will offer a share contract, but if it is for two 
turns at the end of the season he will pay in cash. He said that sometimes, when groundwater 
became very scarce at the end of the season, the water rates rose and that therefore he 
preferred to have a share contract in the case of a bad water situation. He also claimed, that 
under a share contract there was an incentive for the seller to deliver the water at the right 
time. In his opinion, the water situation decided which party had the greater bargaining power 
in negotiating of the terms of the sale. He once had been forced by the well owner into a share 
contract, although he had needed water for only three or four days, because the well owner 
had claimed that the water in his well had been very scarce. Shortly after the contract had 
been made there had been a heavy rainfall so that there had been no further need for 
groundwater irrigation, but he still had had to pay the full crop share. This buyer also 
mentioned that besides the crop share, the well owner demanded services such as field labour 
in exchange for the groundwater from him. 
 A further buyer said that she normally approached the well owner only when she 
needed the water, not before she starts cultivation. It happened in the past that she suffered 
heavy crop losses because she asked for water too late. This year, she handed the land over to 
the well owner after 30 days of self-cultivation. For the remaining 60 days of the cultivation 
season, the well owner was responsible for the irrigation of the land, all other inputs having 
been applied by her before. She also said that it would be impossible for her to pay in cash for 
60 days. 
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 Two other share-buyers gave very similar reasons why in their opinion share contracts 
are in use. First of all, for most of the buyers, it is not possible, except for a few days, to pay 
the cash rates charged by the sellers, since they are lacking liquidity. The share contract is a 
means for farmers to save their money invested in cultivation in seasons in which they need 
groundwater for a month or more. Without the possibility to enter a share contract, they would 
either have to leave their land uncultivated or let themselves in for a gamble for rain which 
they are going to lose with high probability. Also, under a share contract, if the crop failed in 
spite of the additional groundwater applied or because the well owner did not deliver enough 
groundwater, one would not lose the cash payments that would have been made already under 
a contract specifying fixed cash payments per unit of groundwater. On the other hand, sellers 
choose share contracts because these contracts mean secure earnings from water trade, even if 
their buyers do not need much water because there is enough rainfall during the remaining 
time of the season. 
 Another explanation of how it is decided whether the buyer pays in cash or a share of 
his output was given by a farmer who was presently receiving groundwater from a well 
owner. He said that the well owner reserves the right for himself to decide at the end of the 
season which payment mode to employ. He claimed that the well owner chooses the cash 
payment if the market price for paddy is low, and the share payment if the market price for 
paddy is high. This story sounds quite incredible, since it would mean that there is no 
bargaining power at all on buyer's side, who in this case is not one of the poorest farmers. 
2.5.2 The cash-buyers' views 
Cash-buyers are often those farmers who own a well themselves but need 3 or 4 additional 
irrigation turns, either because their well has not enough water or because some of their land 
is more easily served by the well of another farmer. In the latter, the groundwater is often not 
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traded against money, but the farmers exchange water from their wells, sometimes in the 
same season, sometimes in consecutive seasons. 
 One farmer reported that, 30 days before the end of the cultivation season, he was 
looking for someone who was willing to sell water to him against a cash payment. He thought 
that he would need only four or five turns of water for three hours until the end of the season, 
but the well owner he had asked was only willing so far to deliver the water under a share 
contract. he, however, thought that a share contract would mean that he would pay too much 
for the little groundwater he would need until the end of the season. It was not clear from his 
statements from how many potential suppliers he could buy water, but it seemed there was 
some choice, since he mentioned that he was still looking for someone selling groundwater 
against cash. He also said that he only looks for groundwater sellers during the season, once 
he becomes aware that the tank water may not be sufficient. This farmer's account is an 
indication that the contract chosen might depend on the time during the season at which the 
potential buyer asks for water. For some farmers, it may be very clear early in the season that 
they will have to enter into a share contract if they want to avoid losing their crop. But for 
others it may be worth waiting as long as possible in order to not be forced into a share 
contract which would mean to pay a too high price for the groundwater. 
 Another farmer told just the opposite story. She owned a well only in the so called 
'dryland' (where, in her opinion, there is no water trade on a large scale), but she also 
cultivated two separated fields in the so called 'wetland'. For one of these fields, she was 
buying water for two or three further days against cash. For the other field, she thought that 
she would still need groundwater for one week or more, and therefore would prefer a share 
contract. But the well owner did not accept a share contract, since he was in urgent need for 
cash. She claimed that the crop is always secure under a share contract, because in this case 
the well owner himself is taking care of the irrigation of the crop. In the case of spot 
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purchases against cash, it may happen that one is refused a water delivery if groundwater is 
scarce, since the well owner gives priority to his share-buyers. 
 Another case which deserves attention is a farmer who received his four days of 
irrigation neither under a share contract nor in exchange for cash payments, but in exchange 
for the promise to plough the well owner's field in the next season supplying his own 
bullocks. This buyer said that he always received the amount of water he needed from this 
seller. 
 As the numbers from the descriptive statistics in section 2.4 already suggest, most of 
the cash-buyers purchase water for only a few days. But it seems to happen very often, as in 
the case illustrated above, that well owners try to force farmers who want to buy some 
groundwater turns against cash into share contracts. The reason is clear: The less groundwater 
the buyer needs under a share contract, the higher will be the profit of the seller at the end of 
the season. If the prospective buyer managed to persuade the well owner to sell him the water 
against cash, he still faces another problem: In the case of limited groundwater supply, the 
well owners will give priority to the irrigation of the fields of their share buyers, since they do 
not want to lose their investment because of crop failure. So it may happen to a cash-buyer 
that his demand is rejected by the well owner with whom he already has an agreement. 
2.5.3 The sellers' views 
Since most of the sellers sell water under both payment methods considered here, we do not 
differentiate between cash-sellers and share-sellers in this section. The accounts of their 
groundwater sales given by well owners often resemble each other in some major aspects, but 
they might differ in others. 
 Consider first a farmer who owned one well in the wetland and reported selling water 
to up to five farmers. He said that he was normally able to allocate about 50 % of his well's 
daily capacity to other neighbouring farmers by pumping during the day, having irrigated his 
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own plots during the night. Farmers who might need additional irrigation water during the 
cultivation season normally contacted him before the start of cultivation in order to be entitled 
to water later in the season. But the exact terms of the contract were determined only when it 
was clear how much water the buyer needed, since the method of payment depended on the 
amount of water demanded by the buyer. He claimed that the decision which payment mode 
to employ was that of the seller. If farmers had demanded water for half of the cultivation 
season, then he offered a share contract, whereas if they had demanded only about ten turns, 
he would have sold the water for 25 rupees per hour. The reasons he gave for this decision 
rule were the following: If the farmers had had to pay for half the season (i.e. for about 45 
days) the rate of 25 rupees per hour, their water costs would have exceeded their returns. 
Therefore, farmers would rather have left their land uncultivated than paying for 45 days of 
water in cash. In this case, his water would have remained partially unused, since the pool of 
farmers to whom he could sell water was limited. Thus, both parties would have been better 
off in this case if a sharecropping contract had been chosen. Further, the farmer said that in a 
share contract he was sharing only the output with the buyer and no costs; thus, water was his 
only contribution to cultivation. He also would have offered share contracts for crops other 
than paddy, but it was mostly for paddy that farmers needed supplementary irrigation water 
over such a long period. This farmer was using electric pump-sets to extract the groundwater, 
and due to some state regulation he was receiving free electricity. Thus, there are mainly only 
fixed costs for groundwater extraction, except the operating and supervision costs. 
 Also interesting is the case of the biggest water seller in our sample villages. He 
reported owning three normal wells and one very deep bore well, and selling water to a 
minimum of ten and a maximum of twenty buyers. He also received free electricity and sold 
about one half of his groundwater capacity to other farmers, applying the same rule as the 
farmer above for the choice of the payment mode: Farmers who needed groundwater 
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irrigation early in the season, shortly after transplanting, received the water against a share of 
the crop output, whereas farmers who needed water for some days at the end of the season 
normally paid in cash. He sometimes sold water against labour on his own fields. Especially 
worth mentioning is that he employs an 'irrigator', a man whose exclusive task is the irrigation 
of the well owner's and his buyers' plots. This irrigator told us that he received for his services 
one eighth of the yield of the well owner's fields and that for each of the well owner's share 
contracts he received one-fourth of the well owner's fifty percent of the buyer's yield, whereas 
he would have received nothing if the buyers had paid in cash. Since all potential buyers had 
to negotiate their contracts with him, he had a clear incentive to offer share contracts in most 
of the cases. 
 Another seller with a very deep well sells about one fourth of his groundwater to five 
other farmers. All of these farmers have a share contract with him. Concerning the payment 
method chosen, he said that there was no choice in the matter, since they would not have been 
able to pay for the whole amount in cash. On the other hand, he told us that farmers who paid 
him a 50% share of their paddy crops had often not enough paddy for themselves after having 
paid him so that they had to buy additional rice in the ration shop. Presumably, they were 
covering the remainder of their costs out of their 50%. He himself, in contrast, was able to sell 
paddy on the market. But if the buyers had paid him less than 50 % of their crop outputs, then 
the corresponding amount would not have been enough to cover his costs of the groundwater 
extraction. Therefore, the buying of groundwater for half of the season or so was only a 
temporary solution. He pays only a fixed fee per year for his electricity supply, so that there 
are also no other variable costs of groundwater extraction than his time and the wear and tear 
on the equipment. Thus, the statement that the proceeds from a sharecropping contract are just 
sufficient to cover the costs of the groundwater extraction seems to be questionable. In the 
case of this seller, the earnings from the groundwater sales may serve also to pay off the loan 
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which he took out for the installation of his bore well. Unfortunately, we do not have 
information on yields, prices, and input use, so we are not able to verify the claims made in 
this context by buyers and sellers. 
 The accounts of their water contracts related by three other sellers also show exactly 
the same pattern: They sell water both under share contracts and against fixed cash payments, 
the payment mode depending on the number of days for which the buyer needs groundwater 
irrigation. The present season was bad where the availability of tank water was concerned; 
therefore most buyers needed groundwater irrigation for one month or more. The farmers 
would rather have left their land uncultivated than to pay in cash for so many days of 
irrigation. Therefore, share contracts were very popular in the season under inquiry, in which 
mostly paddy was cultivated. The practice is for farmers to inform the sellers before they start 
cultivation that they may need water later in the season, but the terms of the contract are only 
negotiated when the farmer requests the first release of groundwater to his fields. 
2.5.4 The non-transacting households' view 
The reasons mentioned by households for their non-participation in groundwater trade are 
always the same: They do not sell groundwater either because their well's capacity is not 
sufficient or because there are technical restrictions on the groundwater transport. They do not 
purchase groundwater either because they get enough water from their own well or because 
they cannot buy groundwater due to the same technical restrictions on the groundwater 
transport. These technical restrictions are in the case of the potential sellers either that the 
fields of potential buyers are too far away or that the potential seller's fields and wells are 
situated lower than the potential buyer's fields. For potential buyers, the distance is an 
obstacle to groundwater trade, too, as well as landholdings that are situated higher than the 
wells and holdings of a potential seller. Some well owners told us that they would sell water 
but that they were surrounded by farmers with high capacity irrigation equipments who only 
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would buy water if their pumpsets broke down. So there would be merely an exchange of 
groundwater in emergencies, and no trading in groundwater. Many of the non-transacting 
farmers who had landholdings only in the dryland area claimed that they did not buy or sell 
water because in dryland, everyone was owning a well and therefore there was no need for 
water trading. But as mentioned earlier, in the sample there is some evidence of water trade in 
dryland. One farmer reported that he wanted to purchase water but that he could not due to a 
family argument with the owners of the only well within reach. 
2.5.5 Interlinking between groundwater transactions and tenancy contracts 
One question that comes to mind when considering the groundwater transactions in the 
sample villages is, why does the water only go from the well owner to the land owner, as 
apposed to the land going from the waterless land owner to the well owner for cultivation? 
When we asked several well owners for an explanation of this phenomenon, the answers we 
received were always the same: The well owners were not able to lease in land, since they had 
not even enough time to cultivate all of their own land, and since it was not easy to hire 
labourers in the local labour market. Therefore, the well owners with surplus water in their 
wells preferred to apply this water to land which had been already prepared with all necessary 
inputs, especially labour, instead of renting in this land and cultivating it entirely by 
themselves. 
 There are, however, some cases in our sample villages where the trading of 
groundwater and the leasing in and out of land are at least somehow interlinked. 
 One well owner who was also selling water to one other farmer under a share contract 
with a 50 % sharing rule, told us that he was leasing out land together with two wells to 
another farmer. The contract for this kind of lease was such that the party who provided the 
land and the wells received one third of the crop output and that the party who provided all 
other inputs received two thirds of the crop output. He (the well owner) also had to pay for the 
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maintenance costs of the two wells and pump sets. The pump sets were run with free 
electricity. It is surprising that the well owner receives a higher share of crop output under the 
contract where he only provides the water than under the contract where he provides both the 
land and the water. An explanation for this may be that under the groundwater contract the 
field to be irrigated comes under his supervision which requires some of his time, whereas 
under the tenancy-cum-water contract none of his time is required for cultivation. Another 
explanation could lie in the different bargaining positions the well and land owner holds when 
the two different contracts are negotiated. In the case of the pure groundwater contract he will 
normally be the owner of the scarce resource, groundwater, because the buyer will normally 
approach him in the middle of the cultivation season when most farmers are in urgent need of 
irrigation water. So he will be able to dictate the terms, all more so if he is the only one from 
whom the buyer can obtain water. The boot will be on the other foot if it is the other party 
which is the holder of the scarce resources, namely, labour in the tenancy-cum-water contract. 
This contract is negotiated before the start of the cultivation season and not in an acute 
scarcity situation. Thus, the prospective tenant will not be totally devoid of bargaining power. 
 Another farmer was leasing in land together with a well. He paid 50 % of his crop 
output to the land and well owner. The well, however, is used not only by the tenant, but also 
by the landlord himself. Also in this case, the tenant has to supply all inputs besides land and 
water, the well owner being responsible only for the maintenance of the well and the pump 
set. If the tenant needs money to invest in cultivation, he receives credit from the landlord 
which he has to repay in kind but without interest. 
 In yet a further case, a farmer was leasing in land together with a well. He provided all 
inputs other than land and water, and paid one third of his proceeds to the landowner. The 
well owner in turn has to look after the well and the pump set and to pay the land revenue. It 
was said by the farmer in question the choice of contract depended on the amount of tank 
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water available. In this case, the well and land owner left the choice to him, and he preferred a 
share contract, since tank water was very scarce in that season. He thought that the choice of a 
fixed payment would have been too risky, since groundwater was of inferior quality to tank 
water and therefore led to a much lower yield17. 
 One household was leasing out its entire holding to a farmer who owned a well. Land 
is the only contribution of the household. It was stated that as long as this tenant used only 
tank water in cultivation, he had to pay one-third of his proceeds to the landlord. But as soon 
as the tenant had to rely on groundwater from his own or from another farmer's well for one 
day or more, the landlord's crop share would be reduced to one fourth. Thus, there is again 
evidence that the terms of contracts change according to the scarcity of resources employed in 
cultivation. In two other cases under similar contracts, the landlord paid the cash rates for the 
additional groundwater bought by his tenant directly to the water seller because the water 
from the well leased-in together with the land was not sufficient. 
 Another household was leasing land in both directions, together with a well. The 
leased out land was 8 km away from the village. The household only had to look after the 
pump set, and received one third of the output. Their leased in land is located in the village. 
The contract for this land is for five years, the rent being an annual payment of 5000 rupees in 
advance, whether they cultivated or not. They claimed that the leased in land depended 
entirely on the well leased in together with it, and that they would lose the crop if this well did 
not have enough water. These seem to be high stakes, but this household also cultivated a lot 
of its own land in the village, a fact which would suggest that the household is rather wealthy 
and therefore may be not too risk averse. 
                                                 
17 It was told by several farmers that the worse quality of groundwater compared with tank 
water had a negative effect on crop yields. 
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 One farmer reported that he was leasing in land together with a well, paying one third 
to the land owner as usual. He also cultivated his own land, but only with tank water. If he 
wanted to use water from the leased-in well, he would have to pay one half of the output to 
the well and land owner. 
 The tenancy contract under which one third of the output goes to the land and well 
owner is very common in our sample villages. Only very few farmers reported that they were 
leasing under fixed rent arrangements. When asked for the reasons for the popularity of this 
contractual pattern, the answer most farmers gave was that due to the often insecure water 
situation in the villages, the risk of paying a fixed amount is felt by the farmers to be too high. 
One farmer said that he had switched to a share contract after his entire crop had failed due to 
water scarcity. Under that arrangement, he had paid a fixed rent of 5000 rupees per year. 
Several farmers told us that until the year before the study, the share for the land and well 
owner had been one half, but that in a panchayat-wide, concerted negotiation between 
landlords and tenants, that had been lowered, since the tenants had not been able to cover their 
input costs out of their share of the poor yields realised in recent years. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to empirically explain the functioning of groundwater contracts, 
using a South-Indian village panchayat as an illustrative example. One important conclusion, 
which can be drawn from looking at the summary statistics and especially at the case studies, 
is that water due to its overall scarcity and due to seasonal scarcities in the particular case is 
often the input according to the availability of which the contractual terms are set, even if it is 
another input originally contracted on such as land. This can be seen very clearly from the fact 
that the terms of the tenancy contracts in the villages were changed because the deteriorating 
water situation in the villages had an adverse effect on the farmers' yields. Concerning the 
contracts where groundwater is the input contracted on, it is the scarcity situation of the 
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particular buyer which determines his bargaining power vis-à-vis the seller and in that way 
the terms of the contract, too. 
 A noticeable characteristic of informal groundwater transactions in our sample villages 
is that the underlying contracts are in all cases negotiated for only one season, that is, there are 
no long-term contracts as they are often found in the market for tenancies. This is probably 
one of the biggest differences between groundwater and tenancy contracts. Also, from the 
example of groundwater transactions it can be seen in what a flexible manner the different 
payment methods are used to cope with the incompleteness of different markets at once: On 
the one hand, the share contract grants the groundwater buying farmer a loan which he would 
probably not obtain from a bank, whereas at the same time it serves as an insurance for the 
wellowner that he receives an income even if his groundwater extracting facilities, in which 
he has invested a lot of money, are not working at full capacity because of unexpected 
rainfall. In contrast to the choice of payment modes in tenancy contracts, the payment method 
used in a particular groundwater transaction is strongly related to the number of days which 
remain till the end of the cultivation season and to the believes of the farmers about the 
amount of rain to be expected during this period. The contractual terms in tenancy contracts 
are not handled that flexible; they are set before start of cultivation and are therefore not as 
perfectly adjusted to the state of nature as those in the groundwater contracts are. However, 
the risk sharing achieved by the use of sharecropping contracts seems to be a motive for the 
choice of this contract form in the market for tenancies as well as in the groundwater market. 
Another aspect common – but slightly different in each case - to share contracts in both 
markets are the incentives which this contract form provides. But instead of providing 
incentives for the supply of an input (normally labour) which cannot perfectly be monitored 
by one of the parties as in tenancy contracts, the share contract in groundwater transactions 
provides incentives for the supply of an input which can be monitored very easily but which 
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can also be sold alternatively by its owner in spot sales. Of course, the latter argument holds 
for the tenant's labour in tenancy contracts, too. 
 These are the conclusions which can be drawn by looking at the case studies in this 
chapter. However, in order to assess these results on a more general level, one would have to 
estimate a model of contract choice. The data set appropriate for this task should contain the 
following information which was not covered by the survey underlying this chapter: First of 
all it would be important to cover a larger number of households for a completed cultivation 
season. This would allow to gather data on such questions as: How much water was sold and 
purchased? How much inputs other than water have been applied to the crop? How much 
output was produced? What were the costs of extracting the groundwater? Information which 
is essential if one wants to assess the earnings and costs of farmers involved in groundwater 
transactions. Also required would be exact information on the area irrigated, on the time in the 
season when no more tank water was available, and on the time in the season when the farmer 
first bought groundwater from a wellowner, in order to find out how these facts influence the 
choice of the contract form. The number of well owners from whom a farmer could possibly 
buy water will also have a bearing on the contract choice. Further, data would be needed on 
household characteristics such as household wealth, number of family members working, 
assets owned, etc., since these characteristics would help to quantify the households attitude 
towards risk and since they provide information on the households endowment with 
productive assets. It would also be interesting to identify matching pairs of sellers and buyers, 
although the choice of a contract partner is more restricted than in the case of a tenancy 
contract due to the restricted transportability of groundwater. Finally, it would be useful to 
have a time series of several cultivation seasons and data from different areas to see how 
differences in rainfall and differences in agro-climatic and groundwater conditions influence 
contract choice in groundwater transactions. 
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Appendix: Questionnaire 
For well owners: 
1. How many wells do you own? What are the respective depths of your wells? Are the wells 
located in the wetland and/or in the dryland? 
2. How many pumpsets do you own? 
3. How many acres of land do you own? How many acres in the wetland, how many acres in 
the dryland? 
4. I) Do you lease out land? How many acres? If yes, how does your tenant pay for the 
leased-in land? 
II) Do you leave some land uncultivated? How many acres? Why? 
III) Do you lease in some additional land? How many acres? How do you pay for the 
leased-in land? 
5. What crop are you cultivating this season? 
6. How much money did you invest in your well(s) and in your pumpset(s)? 
7. What are the operation and maintenance costs of the well(s) and the pumpset(s) per year? 
8. Do you sell water to other farmers? 
If yes: 
i) Do you agree with them on the water deliveries at the beginning of the crop season, or 
do they come and ask you for water as they need it? 
ii) Do you can always fulfil the water needs of the farmers with which you agreed on 
water trade? 
iii) To how many farmers do you sell water? 
iv) What percentage of your pumping capacity do you sell to other farmers (percent of 
total running hours of the pumpset)? 
v) What is the maximum distance from your well to a buyer's field? 
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vi) How do the farmers pay for the water they receive from you? 
If cash: 
i) How many rupees per hour? 
ii) Who chose the contract form? 
If share contract: 
i) What is the share? 
ii) Do you share only the output, or also costs other than labour costs? 
iii) Who decides whether share contract or fixed payment? Why did you enter into a share 
contract? 
iv) Do you receive any other services from your buyers? 
v) Do you deliver any other inputs to your buyers? 
If not selling water: 
i) Why you don't sell water? 
 
9. Do you buy water from other farmers? 
If yes: 
i) From how many farmers do you buy water? 
ii) Do you agree with the well owners at the beginning of the crop season on the water 
deliveries you will need later in the season, or do you approach them at the time you 
need the water? 
iii) How many irrigation turns you will need during this crop season? 
iv) Do you get always the amount of water you need? 
v) What is the maximum distance of a seller's well to your field? 
vi) How do you pay for the water you receive? 
If cash: 
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i) How many rupees per hour? 
ii) Who chose the contract form? 
If share contract: 
i) What is the share? 
ii) Do you share only the output, or also costs other than labour costs? 
iii) Who decides which payment mode is chosen? Why did you choose a share contract? 
iv) Do you receive any other inputs from the well owner? 
v) Do you have to render any other services to the well owner? 
 
For farmers who do not own a well 
1. Do you own land? 
If yes: 
i) How many acres in wetland and in dryland? 
ii) Do you lease out land? How many acres? 
iii) Do you lease in some additional land? How do you pay for the leased in land? 
iv) Do you leave some land uncultivated? Why? 
If no: 
i) Do you lease in land? How do you pay for the leased in land? 
ii) What crop are you cultivating this season? 
iii) Do you buy water from other farmers? 
If yes: 
i) From how many farmers do you buy water? 
ii) Do you agree with the well owners at the beginning of the crop season on the water 
deliveries you will need later in the season, or do you approach them at the time you 
need the water? 
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iii) How many irrigation turns you will need during this crop season? 
iv) Do you get always the amount of water you need? 
v) What is the maximum distance of a seller's well to your field? 
vi) How do you pay for the water you receive? 
If cash: 
i) How many rupees per hour? 
ii) Who chose the contract form? 
If share contract: 
i) What is the share? 
ii) Do you share only the output, or also costs other than labour costs? 
iii) Who decides which payment mode is chosen? Why did you choose a share contract? 
iv) Do you receive any other inputs from the well owner? 
v) Do you have to render any other services to the well owner? 
If no: 
i) Why? 
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 3.1 Introduction 
It is a well-documented fact that informal markets for groundwater are active in a large part of 
the Indian agricultural sector18. These informal groundwater markets are normally found to 
emerge in situations where the traditional surface water irrigation systems such as tank 
irrigation fail to cover the water needs of all cultivating farmers. The good traded in these 
informal markets is groundwater extracted from the soil by farmers owning wells and pump-
sets19, and in exchange for his groundwater the respective wellowner receives either a share of 
the crop output produced with his water or a fixed payment per hour of irrigation, that is, we 
have a similar payment structure as it is often observed in the context of land transactions in 
rural areas. 
 So far, there is much empirical, but little theoretical work on informal groundwater 
markets. In many of the empirical papers cited above it is argued that informal groundwater 
markets may be a suitable institution for supplying small farmers who are not able to invest in 
an own well with necessary irrigation. This literature, however, also argues that the terms of 
such water contracts are often exploitative, especially when they take the form of 
sharecropping arrangements. Turning to the two existing theoretical papers on this issue, 
Jacoby et al. (2001) investigate price discrimination and monopoly power in informal 
groundwater markets in Pakistan's southern Punjab, testing whether tubewellowners price-
                                                 
18 See for example Saleth (1998), Meinzen-Dick (1998), Satyasai et al. (1997), Janakarajan 
(1993), Shah (1991). 
19 There is an open access regime for the groundwater resource, that is, every farmer who 
owns the necessary extracting facilities can appropriate as much groundwater as he wants. 
This issue will not be considered in this paper. 
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discriminate between their own share-tenants and other cultivators, and whether 
tubewellowners who face only the marginal costs of extraction as their shadow price of 
groundwater use more groundwater per acre on their own plots than their tenants and their 
other buyers use on their own plots. Since both price discrimination as well as different 
groundwater input intensities are found to be prevalent in the data, the authors conclude that 
there is evidence for monopoly power on the part of the tubewellowner, but they also find that 
monopoly power in the groundwater market has only limited effects on efficiency and equity. 
They do not address the issue of different contract forms in the groundwater market. Kajisa 
and Sakurai (2000) explore theoretically as well as empirically the individual-level 
determinants of groundwater prices using a bilateral bargaining framework and data from six 
villages in Madhya Pradesh, India. In their analysis, they take into account the fact that there 
are different payment modes and investigate whether the contract form has an effect on the 
price per unit of groundwater. They find that the price per unit of groundwater under a share 
contract will normally be higher than the unit price under an arrangement including a fixed 
payment due to a risk premium paid to the water seller for shouldering part of the production 
risk. They do not, however, address which are the determinants of the choice of the contract 
form, i.e. they do not answer the question why both contract forms coexist in the same 
groundwater market. 
On the other hand, the theoretical literature on contract choice in the related context of 
tenancy is extensive. Among the different approaches taken to explain the existence of 
sharecropping arrangements in the tenancy market, the present paper is most closely related to 
the contributions which use a bargaining approach to explain the parameter values of 
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individual contracts20, i.e. the papers by Bell and Zusman (1976), Zusman and Bell (1989) 
and Quiggin and Chambers (2001), rather than to assume that the terms of contracts are taken 
by all agents as given price-like parameters, as it is done for example in Bardhan and 
Srinivasan (1971) or in Newbery (1977), or that there is a principal-agent structure where the 
principal has all the bargaining power, and is consequently in a position to dictate the terms of 
the contract, as for example in Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) and Stiglitz (1974). In the context 
of informal groundwater transactions it seems reasonable to assume that the terms of the 
groundwater trade are the result of bilateral bargaining between the buyer and the seller. 
Empirical evidence suggests neither that all bargaining power rests with the water seller, 
which would permit the latter to set the terms of the contract, nor that complete markets for 
groundwater exist in which all participants take the price as given. For example, the 
bargaining power of each party depends on the amount of water available from the surface 
irrigation system in the period of the contract, on the expected amount of rainfall, and on the 
number of other potential buyers or sellers. If, moreover, both contracting parties are 
wellowners, bargaining power also depends on whether the seller of the present period's 
contract is a potential buyer in the next period. Finally, if two well-owning farmers contract, 
both of them may simultaneously be a seller and a buyer if each of them owns a field plot 
which cannot be irrigated with his own well but lies within reach of the other party’s well. 
In the context of tenancy, Bell and Zusman (1976) consider risk-neutral landlords and 
tenants and use the Nash-Bargaining-Solution and the assumption that there are non-tradable 
production factors to explain the existence of sharecropping, but in their analysis the agents 
cannot choose between sharecropping and fixed-rent contracts. In a framework of pairwise-
                                                 
20 A discussion of bargaining solutions in the context of rural contracts is given in Bell 
(1989). 
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bargained agency contracts between risk-averse landlords and tenants, Zusman and Bell 
(1989) derive in an illustrative example a result for the optimal cropshare, which is similar to 
that derived by us, under the assumption that there is no moral hazard. Consequently, no 
incentive problems arise. In another illustrative example, where incentive problems are 
introduced, the result for the optimal cropshare diverges from ours. 
In the present paper, the amount of the crucial input, groundwater, is assumed to be 
observable but not enforceable. Consequently, an incentive problem arises.21 Based on the 
author's own empirical observations in a south Indian village, the present paper addresses the 
question which factors determine the choice of the terms of trade in informal groundwater 
transactions between a wellowner and a farmer who is in need of additional water for 
irrigation. We will particularly be concerned with establishing under what circumstances a 
share contract is chosen rather than a fixed payment per hour. 
 We model the process of contracting between a risk averse wellowner who faces 
constant marginal costs for the extraction of groundwater and a risk averse farmer who is in 
need of additional irrigation as a three-stage game. At the first stage, during the growing 
season, both parties observe the state of the farmer's crop  and bargain over the contractual 
parameters, namely, a cropshare, a fixed payment per unit of water, and an unrestricted 
transfer payment22. In the second stage, nature chooses the amount of rainfall, which is 
observed by both parties. In the third stage, the wellowner chooses the amount of groundwater 
he wants to apply to the farmer's crop, where the amount of groundwater the wellowner 
delivers can be observed by the farmer, but the farmer cannot compel the wellowner to deliver 
                                                 
21 Stiglitz (1974) considers the trade off between risk sharing and incentives. 
22 Another paper in which contracts with three contractual parameters are considered, is 
Laffont/Matoussi (1995). 
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a certain amount of water. We show that the contractual parameters are chosen in such a way 
that the wellowner always chooses the efficient amount of groundwater and that there is 
always efficient risk sharing, regardless of incentive considerations. If the utility functions of 
both the buyer and the seller exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, the optimal cropshare as 
well as the optimal fixed payment per unit of water are functions of the coefficients of 
absolute risk aversion of the two parties. For the case where both parties have utility functions 
of the logarithmic type, we cannot derive an explicit solution, but we can show how the 
contractual parameters are influenced by factors such as the buyer's and the seller's incomes 
from sources other than the contract, the marginal costs of producing the groundwater, and the 
distribution function of the amount of rainfall in the production period. 
 The present paper makes also a contribution to the literature on cost-sharing 
arrangements in the context of sharecropping contracts. Braverman and Stiglitz (1986) show 
that the resolution for the seeming paradox of the irrelevance of cost-sharing is an asymmetry 
of information concerning the optimal input use between the landlord and the tenant. Under 
the assumptions of our model, in contrast, cost-sharing arises because of the risk aversion of 
the contracting parties combined with the unenforceability of the input in question, whereby 
cost-sharing is feasible because the supply of the respective input is observable by both 
parties. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section two we give a detailed 
description of the structure of informal groundwater transactions, in section three the model 
and the results are presented, and section 4 concludes the paper. 
3.2 The structure of informal groundwater transactions 
To motivate the structure of the model to be presented in section 3, we first present some 
empirical facts on informal groundwater 'markets' on the village level. Most of the 
information presented here comes from a field study conducted by the author in four villages 
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in Nanguneri District, Tamil Nadu, India during January and February 2001. For a more 
detailed discussion see Steinmetz (2001). 
An important point to be made at the beginning is that it is somewhat misleading to 
use the term 'market' (as normally defined) in this context, because what is observed in reality 
are personalized contracts between two parties where often both of them have only few or no 
alternative partners to contract with, rather than an arrangement for transacting in a clearly 
defined good which is traded at a common price, and with the possibility for each buyer to 
contract with each seller in the market and vice versa. 
The reason for informal groundwater transactions to arise is the undersupply of 
irrigation water from common sources such as rivers or rain-fed reservoirs (in south India 
known as ’tanks’), combined with the fact that not all farmers are owners of a well and a 
pumpset. In villages where water is rather scarce, it is normally the case that at some moment 
in time during the crop season the irrigation water available from the rain-fed tank will be 
used up, so that farmers have to rely on two other irrigation sources to complete their 
cultivation: rainfall and groundwater. A farmer who does not own groundwater-extracting 
facilities or whose well does not deliver enough water either has to rely entirely on rainfall, 
which is random in timing and amount, so that it may happen that the crop fails because of a 
lack of water, or he has to buy groundwater from another wellowner. In most cases, there will 
be only a few wellowners, or even only a single wellowner from whom a farmer can buy 
groundwater because the terrain and the distance between the farmer's field and the well 
impose technical restrictions on the trading of groundwater. 
Empirically, a typical crop and contracting cycle look as follows: At the beginning of 
the crop season, a farmer starts cultivation, knowing how much water for irrigation purposes 
he will get from the common tank, but not knowing if there will be rainfall again later in the 
season to complete cultivation without buying additional water. As the season proceeds, the 
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farmer waits for rain as long as it is possible without incurring the risk of a crop loss before he 
approaches a wellowner and attempts to bargain over the terms of the water sale. If they agree 
on a cropsharing arrangement, the area to be irrigated comes entirely under the control of the 
wellowner, who now decides how much water will be applied to the crop; if, however, a fixed 
rate per hour of irrigation is chosen, the field remains under the management of the farmer 
himself, who has to turn to the wellowner for every additional irrigation. An important point 
to note in this context is that in the case of a share contract, the wellowner always gets his 
share of the crop, even if he chooses not to apply a drop of water (because of sufficient 
rainfall) after the contract was agreed on. If, on the other hand, the contract is based on a fixed 
payment per hour of irrigation, the wellowner is paid only if he delivers the water. The 
situation is normally such that the farmer can observe the amount of water the wellowner 
delivers to his field, but that he cannot force the wellowner to deliver a certain amount of 
water because the wellowner may need the water for his own crop, he may have another 
higher yielding alternative use, or simply because his pumpset breaks down. 
Turning to the question which factors empirically determine the choice of the payment 
mode, we find evidence (see chapter 2) that the point in the cropping season at which the 
farmer approaches the wellowner offer of a contract plays an important role: If the contract is 
chosen early in the season, then, in most cases, both parties agree on a sharecropping 
arrangement, whereas if the farmer contacts the wellowner late in the season, asking only for 
a few irrigations, an agreement on a fixed payment per hour of irrigation is more likely to be 
the outcome of the bargaining. There are two immediate explanations for this. First, the 
farmer is liquidity-constrained and cannot afford to pay in cash for the obligations resulting 
from 60 days of groundwater irrigation. Secondly, he is risk averse: if the provision of 
groundwater irrigation has the effect that output becomes less random or even non-random, 
then a risk averse farmer is likely to prefer a share contract if he needs groundwater irrigation 
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for a long period, because in the case of a share contract, the payments he has to make do not 
vary much across the states of nature, whereas in the case of a fixed payment per hour, he has 
to pay much more if there is low rainfall than when there is high rainfall. That is to say, if a 
farmer pays a share of his output instead of a fixed rate, he can avoid severe income shocks in 
a situation where he has to buy groundwater for a long period. With this intuition in mind, we 
proceed in the next section with the exposition of the model. 
3.3 The Model 
In this section, we first set up a general model which enables us to derive some results which 
hold for a wide variety of cases. We then proceed by specifying the utility functions of the 
buyer and the seller, and the distribution of the amount of rainfall in order to make some 
statements concerning the factors influencing the contractual parameters. In the third 
subsection we briefly examine the case of only two contractual parameters. 
3.3.1 The General Model 
To model the process of contracting between a cultivating farmer and a wellowner described 
above, we assume that an output, q, is produced with only one input, namely water, where the 
total amount of water, W , is the sum of the amount of rainfall, R , in the period under 
consideration and the amount of groundwater, G , bought from the wellowner. In effect, we 
implicitly assume that all other inputs necessary in production, such as land, labour, canal 
water, and fertilizer, have already been chosen by the farmer at the moment when he has to 
decide whether to enter a contract with a wellowner or not. This implies, in particular, that we 
do not model the farmer's decision of how much land to cultivate, although this decision will 
certainly be influenced by the effects it will have on the terms of the groundwater contract. 
We also assume, for simplicity, that neither the farmer nor the wellowner has other parties to 
contract with. This is not an unrealistic assumption, since there are technical restrictions on 
trade in groundwater in form of the impossibility of transporting water over large distances. It 
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also excludes the possibility that either the seller or the buyer derive their bargaining power 
from the number of alternative contract partners they face. The bargaining positions in this 
case will depend only on the expected amount of rainfall. Let the production function ( )Wf  
be everywhere increasing, twice differentiable, concave, and satisfy the lower and upper 
Inada-conditions. Thus, we assume that there is never too much rainfall, so ruling out corner 
solutions for the quantity of groundwater applied by the wellowner. This rather restrictive 
assumption seems to be justifiable if one considers drought-prone areas such as the Nanguneri 
District in southern Tamil Nadu, where flood-like conditions and crop damaging rainfalls 
outside the monsoon period are a very unlikely event. Concerning the distribution of rainfall 
in the production period under consideration, we assume that there is a continuous distribution 
of rainfall on the interval [ , with a differentiable distribution function  and density 
function . Turning to the wellowner, we assume that the costs of extracting one unit of 
groundwater are constant and equal to c, and that there are no costs for transporting the 
groundwater from the well to the farmer's field. We will also neglect any problems caused by 
overexploitation of groundwater, although in reality this is an important cost factor which the 
farmers should take into account to guarantee an intertemporally efficient allocation of 
groundwater. 
]R,0 ( )RH
( )Rh
 Let both the buyer and the seller be risk averse with twice differentiable, concave 
utility functions defined over income,  and  respectively. We assume further that 
both the buyer and the seller have a perfectly certain source of income, yielding say 
v Y B( ) u Y S( )
Y B  and 
Y S , the level of which is such that both parties can always fulfil their obligations arising from 
a contract; for the farmer, Y B  is the non-negative income that he has from somewhere else 
and that is always sufficient to cover both non-water inputs and the payments for water that 
must be made before the harvest is in. This assumption could be problematic since in real 
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world scenarios the wealth (credit)-constraints that a farmer faces seem to have a significant 
influence on the choice of the contract form as mentioned above. 
 We model the process of contracting between the cultivating farmer and the wellowner 
as a three-stage game, assuming that the farmer can observe the amount of groundwater the 
wellowner delivers to his field, but that he cannot compel the wellowner to provide a certain 
amount of water, that is, the amount of groundwater to be applied to the crop cannot be 
stipulated in the contract. Since we do not model the case where the wellowner has an 
uncertain alternative use for his groundwater, we have to establish the unenforceability of the 
input by assumption. In the first stage both the farmer and the wellowner observe the state of 
the crop before they bargain over the contractual parameters, i.e. the wellowner's share of the 
crop output α  with , a fixed payment per unit of groundwater [α ∈ 0 1, ] β  paid by the farmer 
(with β > 0), and an unrestricted transfer payment γ . There is no such explicit transfer 
payment observed in reality, but we use γ  as an instrument to isolate the effects which only 
result from the necessity to transfer wealth. In real world contracts there are sometimes 
implicit transfer payments, for example, labour services done by the farmer on the 
wellowner's fields.23 In the second stage, after the farmer and the wellowner agreed on a 
                                                 
23 Braverman and Stiglitz (1986) also discuss whether or not to include an unrestricted 
transfer payment in the theoretical analysis (p. 648): "There is some debate about whether this 
case ( 0=γ ), or the case described in the next subsection, where γ  is set optimally, is the 
more relevant. Observed contractual relationships seldom seem to involve fixed transfers 
between the landlord and the tenant. On the other hand, there are several contractual 
provisions which may serve as a substitute; for instance, if the landlord provides a certain 
minimal level of the input, x, it is equivalent to 0<γ ; or if the tenant is required to purchase 
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contract form, nature chooses the amount of rainfall. In the third stage the wellowner observes 
the amount of rainfall, and then decides how much groundwater he wants to apply to the crop, 
that is, the wellowner chooses the amount of his input under certainty. 
 We solve the game described above by backward induction, employing the Nash 
Bargaining Solution to model the bargaining process in the first stage. We begin with the third 
stage where the wellowner chooses the amount of groundwater he wishes to apply, that is, he 
maximizes his income ( ) ( )S R G c Gα β= + + − + + SYγY f  with respect to the amount of 
groundwater supplied: 
 
  ( ) S
G
YGcGRf ++−++ γβα )(max       (1) 
which yields the first-order condition 
  0f cα β′+ − ≤ , .       (2) 0G ≥
Since we have ruled out by assumption above that there will be ever too much water in 
production, there will be no corner solution for the amount of groundwater applied by the 
wellowner, even if R R= , and therefore equation (2) will hold with equality. From this first-
order condition it is then immediately clear that the optimal groundwater contract has to be 
always such that c<β  since otherwise there will be unlimited demand for G. 
Define  as the amount of groundwater which maximizes the 
wellowner's income in each state of nature 
( ) arg maxo
G
G R Y≡ S
[ ]RR ,0∈ . Then, from (2), we have 
( ) ( ) ( ), ; , ;RW R Gα β α β+, ;0o oG Rα β= = R
                                                                                                                                                        
, that is, the wellowner chooses the amount of 
0>
certain inputs from the landlord at above market prices, it may be equivalent to a contract with 
γ ." 
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groundwater such that in each state of nature the same amount of water is applied to the crop, 
given a set of contractual parameters ( ),α β . From this it follows immediately that 
( ) (o )of W f R G= + , which means that the potential output uncertainty caused by stochastic 
rainfall is in fact eliminated by the wellowner's choice. This result is a consequence of the 
assumption that the costs of producing one unit of groundwater are constant and not random. 
<′′−′′
′′
cf
f
∂
0>′′c
It is interesting to note that the variability of the total amount of water the crop 
receives depends crucially on the behaviour of the marginal cost function given a certain 
distribution of rainfall. Consider the case where, in contrast to our model, the wellowner faces 
increasing marginal costs in extracting the groundwater, i.e. ( ) 00 >′ Gc  and ( ) 00 >′′ Gc . Then 
we can derive from the resulting first-order condition for an optimal amount of groundwater 
the comparative static result: 0
0
−=∂
∂
R
G . In our case with constant marginal 
extraction costs, the above expression becomes 01<−=
0
∂R
G . It is apparent that 1<′′−′′
′′
f
f
c
 
for all . Thus, in the case of constant marginal extraction costs, a change in the state of 
nature is completely offset by the change in the amount of groundwater chosen by the 
wellowner, whereas in the case of increasing marginal extraction costs, a change in the 
amount of rainfall is compensated for by the wellowner by less than the full amount. That is, 
in the case of constant marginal extraction costs, the variance of the total amount of water 
applied to the crop is zero, whereas in the extreme case of infinitely increasing marginal 
extraction costs, the variance of the total amount of water is the same as the variance of the 
rainfall distribution, since 0lim
0
=∂
∂
∞→′′ R
G
c
. The less convex are the extraction costs, the closer to 
one is 
R
G
∂
∂ 0 , and the smaller is the variance of the resulting distribution of the total amount of 
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water the crop receives. Since in the following we consider only the case of constant marginal 
costs, we cannot draw further conclusions from this result, but there is an obvious link to the 
empirical observations: In areas where the wellowners face stronger increasing marginal 
extraction costs because the groundwater table in their wells decreases more rapidly during 
the season, cropsharing contracts are found to be very common. If the ex-ante total amount of 
water is more risky, and therefore the ex-ante crop output is also more risky, then a risk averse 
farmer will rather prefer a payment mode which transfers part of the production risk to the 
wellowner. 
The corner solution where the wellowner applies no groundwater at all and the 
extreme case of crop failure because of too much rain are ruled out by the assumptions given 
above, so that in the following we will deal with interior solutions only. 
 Standard comparative static analysis yields 
  0
oW f
f
∂
∂α α
′= − >′′ , 
1 0
oW
f
∂
∂β α= − >′′      (3) 
 
Now consider the bargaining process at the second stage. If the farmer and the wellowner 
come to an agreement, the farmer's state-dependent income is 
( ) BRRB YGGRfY +−−+−= γβα )1( ; if there is no agreement, and the farmer has to depend 
entirely on rainfall, his expected disagreement payoff is ( )( )[ ]BYRfvE + . For the wellowner, 
we assume that in each state of nature he only earns his certain income Y S  if there is no 
contract with the farmer, that is his expected disagreement payoff in utility terms is ( )u Y S . 
 The outcome of the bargaining process is modelled by choosing ( ), ,α β γ  to maximize 
the product of the gains from cooperation, expressed in terms of expected utility: 
   ( ) ( )max ~ ~
, ,α β γ ∆ ∆V Y U Y
B S        (4) 
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   s.t. α ∈  [ ]0 1, , β ≥ 0 , 
where 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )(1 ) , ;B o o BV Y E v f W G R Y E v f R Yα β α β γ  B ∆ = − − − + − +  %  (5) 
and 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) , ;S o o SU Y E u f W c G R Y u Yα β α β γ ∆ = + − + + − % S
)R
  (6) 
To simplify notation, in the following we will write G  instead of G . It is 
important to note that the total amount of water applied to the crop in the optimum, W , is not 
random, only the optimal amount of groundwater chosen by the wellowner, , is random. 
Thus, in the following expectations are taken with respect to G . This non-randomness of 
 enables us to draw some terms, especially the comparative static expressions 
o ( , ;o α β
o
oG
o
oW
oW
α
∂
∂  and 
oW
β
∂
∂ , out of the expectations operator, as it is done for the following first-order conditions. 
The first-order conditions for the maximization problem are: 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( )(1 ) 0,       0o S BWf f E v U Y fE u V Y∂ α β α∂α ′ ′ ′− + − − ∆ + ∆ ≤ ≥   % %   (7) 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( )(1 ) 0,      0o o S o BW f E v E v G U Y E u G V Y∂ α β β∂β ′ ′ ′ ′   − − − ∆ + ∆ ≤ ≥      % %  (8) 
 
[ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) 0~~ =∆′+∆′− BS YVuEYUvE         (9) 
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We now identify the contract form which is chosen in the bargaining process by 
investigating the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Assume first that the contract contains only a fixed 
payment per unit of groundwater and no positive output share for the wellowner, that is α = 0  
and β > 0 . Then from (7) and (9) we have 0≤−′ βf , and from (8) and (9) we have 
( ) [ ] [ ]
o oE v G E u GW
E v E u
ββ
′ ′  ∂   − = −
o
f ′ ′ ′∂ . But this is not possible if there is no output sharing 
between the buyer and the seller. For if α = 0  we get from the first-order condition of the 
seller that β = c
oE G  
, which in turn implies that the second term on the right hand side of the 
above condition becomes , whereas for the first term on the right hand side we have 
[ ]
oG
E v
′   >′
o
E v
E G   (v f because )oGβ γ−′ −  and  are positively correlated.oG 24 From this it 
follows that the right hand side is strictly positive, whereas the left hand side will never be 
positive, which is a contradiction. So we must have α > 0 . Put it in another way, inspection 
of (1) reveals that from 0α =  and cβ =  it follows that S γ SYY = + , which is constant, the 
requirement that cβ =  arising from the need to ensure that the seller will sell any amount of 
water, since in this case there are no incentives for the seller arising from an output share. But 
since the buyer is also risk averse, it cannot be optimal that he bears all the risk alone. 
Next consider the case where α > 0  and β = 0 . Then from (7) and (9) we have 
0)1( =′− fα , and from (8) and (9) [ ] [ ]
o ou G
E u
′ ′E v G
E v
E     ≥ ′ ′ . That is, we have α = 1; but this 
together with the said weak inequality yields a contradiction, because in this case the left hand 
                                                 
>24 . [ ]( )( ) [ ] 0o o o oE v E v G E G E v G E v E G ′ ′ ′ ′     − − = −      
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side of the inequality is equal to oE G    whereas for the right hand side we have 
[ ]
o
o
E u G
E G
E u
′   > ′  ) because ( ocGu f γ′ − +  and G  are positively correlated. This yields 
the following proposition:
o
25 
β o > 0
1( −α 0=
[ ]
o ou G
E u
′ ′  
′
 
Proposition 1. If both the buyer and the seller are risk averse, the amount of 
groundwater delivered by the seller is observable, but not enforceable, and there are constant 
marginal costs of groundwater extraction, then the optimal contract is such that  
and . 
0 1< <α o
 
 What else can be said about the optimal contract? Consider again the conditions which 
must hold in the optimum: 
          (10) ) −′ oo f β
  [ ]
E v G E
E v
   =′        (11) 
together with (9) and the first order condition for the wellowner, , given the 
assumption that there will be never too much water in production. (10) combined with the 
first order condition for the seller yields the efficiency condition 
0=−+′ cf oo βα
cf =′  which means that as a 
consequence of the optimal contract the amount of groundwater is chosen by the wellowner in 
a way that the marginal product equals the marginal cost. This result follows from the fact that 
for the optimal contract we have 1 , or : Inserting this result in the − =α βo
o
c
( )1−α o c = β o
                                                 
25 Notice that 1=α  only if 0=β  because 0)1( =−′− βα f  for 0>α . 
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state-dependent income equations for the buyer and the seller, we obtain 
( ){ }1B o o oRY f cGα γ= − − − + BY  and { }B o o oR cGα γ SYY f= − + + , that is, the output 
produced with the groundwater delivered by the wellowner is shared between the buyer and 
the seller in the same proportion as the costs incurred by the wellowner in producing the 
groundwater. This result in turn is caused by the fact that the input in question, namely 
groundwater, is observable, and can be paid by means of a fixed payment per unit. Also, there 
is an instrument besides α  and β , namely γ , which serves to transfer utility from one party 
to the other, so this task has not to be shouldered by α  and β . Thus, in the theoretical 
examination of groundwater contracts that contract form turns out to be the optimal one, 
which is often empirically observed for tenancy contracts, but which in the related theoretical 
literature is explained by information asymmetries between the landlord and the tenant.26 In 
our model, cost-sharing is possible because the input is observable, and it is used to achieve 
an efficient input supply by the wellowner. 
[ ]
oG   ′
[ ]
oG
E v
′
′
Equation (11) states how the risk is shared between the two parties. One can think of 
[ ]
o
o
E v G
E G
E v
′   − ′   and 
o
E u
E G
E u
′ −   as the buyer's and the seller's risk premiums, 
respectively, since if both of them were risk neutral, 
E v    and [ ]
oE u G
E u
′  
′  would reduce to 
. Thus, the condition states that the contract should yield the same risk premium for 
the two parties. But this in turn implies that the risky income generated under the contract is 
optimally (efficiently) shared between the two parties. To see why, consider, for example, a 
oE G 
                                                 
26 See Braverman and Stiglitz (1986). 
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contractual arrangement under which [ ] [ ]
o oE v G E u G
E v E u
′ ′     < ′ ′ . This constellation means that an 
additional marginal unit of risky income will 'cost' the buyer less than the seller, which cannot 
be optimal. Therefore, it would increase efficiency to transfer risky income from the buyer to 
the seller until [ ] [ ]
o oE v G E u G
E v E u
′ ′    = ′ ′ . Optimal risk sharing is achieved in this case, because 
the necessity to transfer risk is unaffected by incentive effects. 
( )v Y B
 
 Proposition 2. Under the optimal contract, the output produced with the groundwater 
is shared among the buyer and the seller in the same proportion as the costs of groundwater 
extraction. The seller chooses the amount of groundwater such that ( ) cGRf oo =+′ ),( βα . 
Finally, risk is optimally shared between the two parties. 
 
 From (9) and (11) it is clear that the particular values of α ,β , and γ  depend on the 
parties' degrees of risk aversion. But since nothing more can be said about the characteristics 
of the solution in general, we now proceed to analyze particular utility functions. 
3.3.2 Exponential utility 
Assume that both the buyer and the seller have a utility function of the CARA (constant 
absolute risk aversion) form,  and e
B= − −aY ( )u Y eS S= − −aY  respectively, where a is the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion which for the beginning is assumed to be the same for 
both parties. Now, from (10), (11) and the first order condition of the seller, we can derive 
  
[ ] ( )
[ ] ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 0
0 0
exp exp
exp exp
R R
R R
a R Rh R dR a c R Rh R dR
a R h R dR a c R h R dR
β β
β β
 − − 
=
 − − 
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
.   (12) 
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From (12), proposition 3 follows immediately, on condition that the solution to (12) is 
unique.27 
 
 Proposition 3. If the buyer and the seller have identical utility functions satisfying 
CARA, the optimal contract is such that 
  α o = 1
2
,  β o c=
2
. 
 
Notice, that this result is independent of the distribution of the amount of rainfall. Since there 
are no wealth effects by virtue of CARA, the parameters which determine how the risk is 
shared under the optimal contract are independent of the risky income (and its determinants) 
realized under the contract. However, not independent of the rainfall distribution is the 
unrestricted transfer payment. Using (9) and the results from proposition 3, we can derive 
 
 Proposition 3a. If the buyer and the seller have identical utility functions satisfying 
CARA, the optimal unrestricted transfer payment is 
  ( ) ( )
0
1 ln exp
2
R
o af R h R dR
a
γ   = −    ∫ , 
where ( ) ( )
0
exp
R
af R h R dR − ∫  is the risky part of the buyer's expected disagreement payoff. 
Notice, that the optimal unrestricted transfer payment is not chosen to equalize the 
gains from cooperation, i.e. to achieve ( ) ( )BV Y U Y∆ = ∆% % S
                                                
, but it is chosen to equalize the 
gains from cooperation weighted by the marginal expected utilities, i.e. 
 
27 Conditions for the solution to (11) to be unique are stated in the appendix. 
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[ ] ( ) [ ] (SE v U Y E u V Y′ ′∆ = ∆%
( )BV Y U∆ = ∆%
)B%
)S
, since both parties are risk averse. Thus, the first-best 
outcome where  is not achieved by the contract due to the risk aversion of 
the parties. 
(Y%
Using the results from propositions 3 and 3a, the state-dependent incomes of the buyer 
and the seller under the optimal contract are: 
( ) ( )
0
1 1 ln exp
2 2
R
B o
RY f cG af R h R dRa
    = − − − +      ∫
BY  
( ) ( )
0
1 1 ln exp
2 2
R
S o
RY f cG af R h R dRa
    = − + − +      ∫
SY . 
That is, in the case of identical CARA utility functions, the output and the costs for the input 
in question are shared equally between the buyer and the seller, and as a consequence the 
seller delivers the efficient amount of groundwater. Now consider the expression for the 
optimal transfer payment, which can be positive or negative, and depends on the degree of 
risk aversion and on the risky part of the disagreement payoff of the buyer. The sign of this 
transfer payment will depend on whether 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0
exp exp
R R
af R h R dR af R h R dR   − = − −   ∫ ∫ ?1. The bigger the absolute value of this 
expression, the smaller is the buyer's expected utility in the alternative case where he has no 
contract with the seller. That is, the smaller the buyer's alternative expected utility, the higher 
is the transfer payment he has to make to the seller, or the smaller is the transfer payment he 
receives from the seller, depending on whether the absolute value of his alternative expected 
utility is bigger or smaller than one. If this alternative expected utility is equal to one, there 
will be no transfer payment. Considering the effect of change of the degree of risk aversion a 
on the transfer payment, thereby neglecting the indirect effect which is caused by changes in 
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the expected disagreement payoff of the buyer, we find that the absolute values of the transfer 
payments are the smaller the higher the degrees of risk aversion of the contracting parties. 
This can be interpreted as a risk premium which each party is willing to pay in order to avoid 
to bear all risk alone. The said risk premium is increasing in the degree of risk aversion. 
 To see how particular parameters influence the transfer payment, consider some 
comparative static results: 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
2
0
0
exp
1 1ln exp
2 2
exp
R
Ro
R
f R af R h R
af R h R dR
a a a
af R h R dR
γ  −  ∂  = − − −  ∂     − 
∫∫
∫
dR
 
The second term in this expression is always bigger than zero, whereas the sign of the first 
term again depends on whether the buyer's alternative expected utility is smaller or bigger 
than one in absolute terms. The smaller the buyer's alternative expected utility is, the more 
likely is the first term to be negative, and therefore the more likely is oγ  to be decreasing in a. 
The first term is the direct 'risk premium' effect of a on oγ  and the second term is the indirect 
effect which arises, because the degree of absolute risk aversion has a positive influence on 
the buyer's alternative expected utility. 
 To investigate the effect of a change in the rainfall distribution, assume, for example, 
that the amount of rainfall is uniformly distributed on the interval 0, R    which implies that 
the density function is ( ) 1h R
R
= . Differentiating oγ  with respect to R  we have 
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( )
( )
0
exp1 1 1
2 1exp
o
R
af R
R a R
af R dR
R
γ
   −∂   = − +∂   −   ∫
0 > , since 
( ) ( )
0
1exp exp 0
R
af R af R dR
R
   − − − >   ∫ . 
Thus, for a rainfall distribution with higher mean and higher variance which first-order 
stochastically dominates the other, the buyer has to make a higher transfer payment to the 
seller, or receives a smaller transfer payment from the latter, depending on whether oγ  is 
positive or negative. That is, a change in the distribution which makes the buyer better off in 
the case of no contract, results in a higher transfer payment from the buyer to the seller under 
the contract. This somewhat puzzling result is a consequence of the maximization of the 
product of the gains from cooperation. 
 Now consider the more realistic case in which the utility functions still exhibit CARA, 
but the buyer and the seller have different coefficients of absolute risk aversion. Let the utility 
functions be  and ( )v Y eB B= − −aY ( )u Y eS S= − −bY , respectively, where a and b are the 
coefficients of absolute risk aversion. Then, again, from (9), (10), (11), and the first order 
condition for the seller we can derive the following result: 
 
 Proposition 4. For CARA and different degrees of absolute risk aversion the optimal 
contract is such that 
  α o a
a b
= + ,  β
o b
a b
c= + . 
The intuition behind proposition 4, as well as behind propositions 3 and 3a, is, that the 
optimal contract requires production efficiency, that is ( )of W′ c= , and that, taking into 
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account the risk aversion of the two parties, α  and β  must be chosen accordingly. Therefore, 
from proposition 4 and (2), we have a bcf c
a b a b
′ + =+ + , as required. 
α β
B+
Notice that in this little more complicated setting an explicit solution for γ  cannot be 
derived. However, the expressions for  and  in the case of different degrees of risk 
aversion give a more detailed insight in the nature of the optimal contract than in the case of 
identical degrees of risk aversion. Consider first the expression for the optimal output share: 
The higher the degree of risk aversion of the buyer and the smaller the degree of risk aversion 
of the seller, the higher is the output share which the seller receives. At the same time, the 
fixed payment per unit of groundwater paid by the buyer is decreasing in the degree of risk 
aversion of the buyer and increasing in the degree of risk aversion of the seller. In general, the 
optimal contract is such that the less risk averse party bears a larger proportion of the costs of 
the ex ante random groundwater production while, ex post, the output is made certain by the 
wellowner's choice in the third stage. If the wellowner is risk neutral and the farmer is risk 
averse, the wellowner receives the entire crop output, carries all the costs of producing the 
groundwater, and there is a fixed payment between the wellowner and the farmer which 
serves as an instrument to transfer utility. In this case the transfer payment g must have a 
negative sign because otherwise the contract would not be attractive for the buyer. If on the 
other hand the farmer is risk neutral, and the wellowner is risk averse, the farmer receives the 
entire crop output and carries all the costs of producing the groundwater. Again utility is 
transferred through the fixed payment which now must have a positive sign. 
 Given the optimal contractual parameters in the setting with CARA and different 
degrees of absolute risk aversion, the state-dependent incomes for the buyer and the seller are: 
  ( )B oR b cGa b γ= − −+Y f  o Y
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and 
  ( )S oR a cGa b γ= − + ++ o SYY f . 
That is, in each state of nature the risky surplus is shared between the wellowner and the 
farmer in a proportion which reflects their respective degrees of absolute risk aversion: if the 
seller is less risk averse than the buyer, the seller receives a larger share of the risky surplus 
than the buyer and vice versa. Reallocations of utility resulting from the risk-sharing 
arrangement are dealt with by the unrestricted transfer payment. 
3.3.3 Logarithmic utility 
As we have shown above, in the case of CARA the cropshare depends only on the degrees of 
risk aversion of the contracting parties. Now consider the case of a utility function which 
exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) for both the seller and the buyer. More 
specifically, we assume that v Y  and ( ) YB B= ln ( )u Y YS = ln S . In this setting too, propositions 
1 and 2 remain valid and we only have to reconsider expression (11), which states how the 
risk is shared between the contracting parties. Again assuming a uniform distribution of R on 
[0,R ] , we can rewrite (11) as 
( )
( )
( )
( )
0 0
0 0
1 1
1 1
R R
B o S o
R R
B S
v Y G dR u Y G dR
R R
v Y dR u Y dR
R R
′ ′
=
′ ′
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
, 
which can be simplified to 
( )
( )
( )
( )
′
′
=
′
′
∫
∫
∫
∫
v Y RdR
v Y dR
u Y RdR
u Y dR
B
R
B
R
S
R
S
R
0
0
0
0
. 
Using logarithmic utility, integrating, and rearranging terms gives 
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( ) ( )( )( )
β α γ β α γ
β β
α β γ
α β γ
α β γ
α β γ
α β γ
α β γ
α
f Y c f Y
c
R
f c G Y
f c G R Y
f G R Y
f G Y
f c G Y
f c G R Y
S B
S
S
B
B
S
S
+ + + − − − +
− =
+ − + +
+ − − + +
− − − − +
− − − +




+ − + +
+ − − + +




−
( )
ln
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
ln
( )
( )( )
ln
( )
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
                     
f G R Y
f G Y
B
B
− − − +
− − − +




β γ
α β γ
( )
( )
0
01
. (13) 
One solution of (13) is characterized by the following condition: 
  ( )β α γ β β− − + + + − =( ) ( )1 c f c Y c YS 0B
o )
     (14) 
because, if equation (14) holds, the numerators of both the left hand side and the right hand 
side of equation (13) vanish. Since, in the optimal contract, we have , from 
(14) we can derive 
β αo c= −(1
γ α αo o B oY= − −( )1 SY . This together with the state-dependent incomes 
for the buyer and the seller leads to  
 
 Proposition 5. If the buyer and the seller have identical logarithmic utility functions 
and the amount of rainfall is uniformly distributed on 0, R   , the optimal contract is such 
that both the buyer and the seller receive a prespecified share of the total income which is 
generated under the terms of the contract in each state of nature, that is, Y Y  
and , where 
Bo o o= −( )1 α
Y YS o o o= α ( )Y f . c G R Y Yo o B= − − + + S
 
This result is in contrast to the findings of Propositions 3 and 4 where the optimal values of 
the cropshare and of the fixed payment per unit groundwater were determined independently 
of the transfer payment. The cropshare and the costshare depended only on the degrees of risk 
aversion; all other factors which play a role in the bargaining over the contract terms were 
captured by the transfer payment. In the special case considered in this section, in contrast, the 
cropshare and the costshare cannot be determined independently of the transfer payment, from 
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which it follows that, in this setting, we will be able to explain how the cropshare depends on 
the certain incomes and the distribution of the rainfall. Since we consider only linear 
contracts, the contractual parameters α , β , and γ  are not allowed to vary with the state-
dependent incomes of the buyer and the seller, which is the reason why both risk averse 
parties receive fixed shares of the random cake. 
Since Y Y Yo Bo S o= +  and since, in equilibrium, the coefficients of absolute risk 
aversion of the buyer and the seller are in this special case ( ) 1o oB B BRA Y Y=  and 
( ) 1 oSoS SRA Y Y= , respectively, we can write ( )( ) ( )α o
B Bo
B Bo S S o
RA Y
RA Y RA Y
= + . Strictly speaking, 
this is a tautology, stating for example that, if the cropshare is close to unity, the state-
dependent income of the buyer is very small, which in turn implies that his coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion is very high whereas the state-dependent income of the seller is 
relatively high, and his coefficient of absolute risk aversion is rather small, from which it 
follows that the right hand side of the expression is also near to 1. One can see from the above 
expression that also in the case of logarithmic utility functions the seller's optimal cropshare 
depends on the degrees of absolute risk aversion of the contracting parties, but since in this 
case risk aversion varies with income, the cropshare is not independent of factors which 
determine the conditions under which the contract is made. 
To characterize the solution for a, we substitute the results of proposition 5 for the 
state-dependent incomes of the buyer and the seller into the first-order condition for g to 
obtain 
( ) ( )
S
R
oo
R
B
R
oo
o
o
YdR
R
Y
dR
R
YRfdR
R
Y
ln1lnln
1)(ln1ln1ln
1
0
00
−+
+−+−
=− ∫
∫∫
α
α
α
α     (15) 
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Since there is no explicit solution for , we use comparative statics to identify the factors on 
which the optimal value of a depends. Notice, first, that it is obvious from equation (15) that - 
in spite of the fact that we have assumed identical utility functions for the buyer and the seller 
- a is not equal to one half unless both parties' disagreement payoffs are equal, which is not 
surprising, since 
α o
γ  is no longer a pure transfer instrument. Now denote the disagreement 
payoffs to the buyer and the seller by ( ) dR
R
YRfD
R
BB ∫ +=
0
1)(ln  and SS YD ln= , 
respectively, and the expected contract income at the optimum by [ ] ∫= R oo dRRYYE 0
1ln . Then 
(15) can be rewritten as 
ln (1 ) ln(1 ) (2 1) (1 ) 0o o o o o o o B o SR R E Y Dα α α α α α α − − − + − + − − =  D  (16) 
and the following comparative static results with respect to c, R , BY , and SY  obtained: 
 
[ ]
det
)12(
c
YE
c
o
∂
∂−−
=∂
∂ αα ä0 ‹ 
2
1 äa      (17) 
 
[ ]
det
)1ln()1(ln)1()12( ααααααα −−+−∂
∂−−∂
∂−−
=∂
∂ R
D
R
YE
R
Bo
   (18) 
 
[ ]
det
)1()12( B
B
B
o
B
Y
D
Y
YE
Y
∂
∂−−∂
∂−−
=∂
∂ ααα       (19) 
 
[ ]
det
)12( S
S
S
o
S
Y
D
Y
YE
Y
∂
∂+∂
∂−−
=∂
∂ ααα        (20) 
where [ ] SBo DDYER −−+−++= 2)1ln(ln2det αα
0det
 is the determinant of the Hessian of the 
related optimization problem. For the solution to be a maximum, the Hessian has to be 
negative semi-definite, that is, we have < . We further know that  
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[ ] ( )∫ <−−=∂∂
R
o
o
dR
R
RG
Yc
YE
0
0 011 , 
[ ] 01)(ln)(ln1
0
>

 −=∂
∂ ∫R ooo dRRRYRYRRYE , 
( ) ( ) 01)(ln)(ln1
0
>

 +−+=∂
∂ ∫R BBB dRRYRfYRfRRD
[ ]
, 
[ ] 01
0
>=∂
∂=∂
∂ ∫R oSoBo dRRYYYEYYE , 
( ) 0)( 10 >+=∂
∂ ∫R BBB dRRYRfYD  and  
01 >=∂
∂
SS
S
YY
D . 
At first glance, we can only say that (17), (18), (19), and (20) may have either sign 
depending on the optimal value of a. An interesting value of a at which to evaluate the above 
derivatives is 
2
1=α . It was said above, that this is an unlikely optimal value for a since this 
will hold only if both parties have the same disagreement payoff. But since 
2
1=α  is the value 
of the seller's cropshare which is the most frequently observed in real world contracts, we 
think that one can gain some further insights into the nature of groundwater contracts by using 
this evaluation point. Then we have: 
  0
5.0
=∂
∂
=α
α
c
, 
0
det
2
1
5.0
>∂
∂−
=∂
∂
=
R
D
R
B
α
α ,  
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Further, since , we have coo )1( αβ −=
0
2
1
5.0
>=∂
∂
=α
β
c
,  
0
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=α
β
R
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0
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>∂
∂
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. 
We can summarize these results in the following proposition. 
 
 Proposition 6. Consider a situation in which the output is shared equally between the 
buyer and the seller, and in which the rainfall is uniformly distributed on the interval 0, R   . 
Then the seller's optimal cropshare is 
(i) increasing in the buyer's certain income,  
(ii) decreasing in the seller's certain income, 
(iii) increasing in the upper bound of the rainfall distribution, 
and the optimal fixed payment per unit groundwater is 
(i) decreasing in the buyer's certain income, 
(ii) increasing in the seller's certain income, 
(iii) decreasing in the upper bound of the rainfall distribution. 
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 As far as 
R∂
∂α  and BY∂
∂α  are concerned, the above results hold for all cropshares where 
1
2
1 <≤α . For 
2
10 <<α , the sign is not clear. For SY∂
∂α  the above results hold for all 
cropshares for which 
2
10 ≤<α , whereas for 1
2
1 <<α  the sign depends on whether the effect 
on the contractual income or the effect on the disagreement payoff is more pronounced. 
How do these results compare to empirical observation? Concerning the amount of 
rainfall, in areas with a relatively high annual amount of rainfall, sharecropping contracts for 
groundwater transactions are rare, or non-existent, while the selling of groundwater against a 
fixed rate per unit is very common. On the other hand, in areas with relatively little rainfall 
over the year, farmers frequently rely on the use of share contracts as a mode of payment for 
groundwater transactions. In these areas, fixed rate payments are used only in a few cases, 
especially if the buyer is in need of only a small number of irrigations. As it was mentioned in 
section 3.2, it seems that this pattern can be explained empirically by the risk aversion and/or 
the wealth-constrainedness of the farmers. 
In the model considered in this section, however, at least for some optimal values of 
the cropshare, the results are just the opposite: For example, a 'better' distribution of the 
amount of rainfall leads to a higher cropshare for the seller (starting from a point where the 
cropshare is equal to one half). How can this be explained? The reasoning for the optimal 
cropshare of the seller to rise as R  increases goes as follows: a 'better' (first-order 
stochastically dominating) distribution of R raises the total income from the optimal contract 
and the bargaining power of the buyer by raising his disagreement payoff (or his non-
contractual income) while the bargaining power (the non-contractual income) of the seller 
remains unchanged. But that means that the seller's gains from cooperation will rise, whereas 
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the buyer's gains from cooperation will rise less than the seller's, remain constant, or may 
even fall. But at the same time, the optimality condition [ ] ( ) [ ] (S BE v U Y E u V Y′ ′∆ = ∆% % )  must 
hold. Therefore, the expected marginal utilities of both parties must be adjusted accordingly, 
which in this case requires Y  to rise and Y  to fall. Under the contract, this is achieved by 
lowering 
oB oS
α  and increasing β . But since in this case, other than in the case of constant 
absolute risk aversion, the transfer of wealth cannot be separated from the sharing of risk, the 
adjustment of α  cannot be done without taking into account another condition: The 
optimality condition in (11) states that for a contract to be optimal, there has to be efficient 
risk sharing, which means that the 'utility discount rates' of both parties must be equalized. 
Since in the case of a logarithmic utility function absolute risk aversion is not constant but 
rather varies with the level of income, the adjustment of α  required above leads to an 
imbalance between the two risk premiums: [ ] [ ]
o oE v G
E v
′ ′E u G
E u
      <′ ′ . To dissolve this imbalance, 
the seller's cropshare has to rise again. In the case that we consider here, where the starting 
point is 1
2
α o = , this rise is overcompensating the previous fall, resulting in 
0.5
0
R α
α
=
∂ >∂  The 
same argument holds for an increasing certain income of the buyer; for an increasing certain 
income of the seller, the argument goes the opposite way. In the case of CARA examined 
further above, the optimal cropshare is affected neither by certain incomes nor the distribution 
function for the amount of rainfall; for in that case, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is 
income-independent. 
 To summarize, we find that, in a model with two risk averse parties, an observable but 
not enforceable input and constant marginal costs for this input, the outcome implies an 
efficient supply of groundwater to the farmer's field. This is a consequence of the 
observability of the crucial input, namely groundwater, because in the case of a perfectly 
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observable input there are three instruments which can be used in a linear contract: an output 
share, a fixed payment per each unit of the input, and an unrestricted transfer payment. The 
combination of an output share and a fixed payment per unit of the input allows the choice of 
a contract in which the costs of extracting groundwater are shared in the same proportion as 
the output produced with this groundwater. As a consequence, the wellowner chooses the 
efficient amount of groundwater. Since, by assumption, we ruled out corner solutions for the 
amount of groundwater due to too much rainfall, all natural uncertainty is resolved by the 
time the decision to supply groundwater must be made. In this sense, there is never any 
'regret' about , only about oG ( ), ,α β γ . 
3.3.4 The case of only two contractual parameters 
An unrestricted transfer payment is not observed in real world contracts, at least not in an 
explicit monetary form. It is possible that such transfers are made in a different way, for 
example, by one party delivering services such as field labour or draught power to the other28; 
but transactions of this kind are rather seldom reported. As mentioned above, the existence of 
a transfer payment is crucial for the result that the optimal parameter values of α  and β  
depend on only the degrees of risk aversion of the seller and the buyer and do not contain any 
terms which are related to the provision of incentives or the need to transfer utility. Since, in 
reality, we observe no pure transfer payments, it is of some interest to characterize the 
solution for the model given if the set of contractual parameters chosen in the bargaining 
process is limited to a cropshare and a fixed payment per unit. 
                                                 
28 This services can be lump-sum transfers. It could be negotiated at the beginning of the 
season, for example, that one party may use the bullock pair of the other party for ten days. 
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Setting g equal to zero in the income equations for the buyer and the seller, we can 
employ the model developed above without other modifications. Again the product of the 
utility differences is maximised, but this time only with respect to α  and β : 
   ( ) ( )max ~ ~
,α β ∆ ∆V Y U Y
B S        (21) 
   s.t. α ∈  [ ]0 1, , β ≥ 0 , 
which yields the first-order conditions 
 
[ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )E v f G f U Y E u f V YW S B′ − + − −  + ′ ≤∂∂α α β α( ) ~ ~ ,1 0∆ ∆     ≥ 0    (22) 
[ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( )E v G f E v G U Y E u G V YW S B′ − − − ′
 + ′ ≤
∂
∂β α β β( )
~ ~ ,1 0∆ ∆     ≥ 0   (23) 
 
Consider first the case where α = 0  and β > 0 . From the seller's first-order condition 
we then have β = c , which in turn implies that ( )∆ ~U Y s = 0 . This cannot be optimal because 
every contract which splits the entire surplus in a way that both parties gain would yield a 
higher value of the product of the utility differences. Now assume that α > 0  and β = 0 . 
Then from (22) and (23) we have 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
∂
∂β α
∂
∂α α
G
f E G f
G
f f
E u G
E u
W
W
( )
( )
1
1
− −


− −
≥ ′ ′ . 
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Since, in this case, u' and G are positive correlated, the inequality 
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
E u G
E u
E G
′
′ >  holds
29. 
Now consider the condition 
[ ]
[ ]
∂
∂β α
∂
∂α α
G
f E G f
G
f f
E G
W
W
( )
( )
1
1
− −


− −
≥ , 
which would characterize the solution for a risk neutral seller. Substituting 
∂
∂α
G
 and 
∂
∂β
G
 from 
above, we get, after some manipulation, [ ]f
f
E GW
≥ , which is a contradiction because of the 
concavity of the production function. Moreover, if we have a contradiction for a risk neutral 
seller, we also have a contradiction for a risk averse seller because 
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
E u G
E u
E G
′
′ > . It follows 
that the optimal contract contains a positive cropshare and a fixed payment per unit. In this 
case, from (22) and (23) we have 
[ ] ( ) [ ]
[ ] ( ) [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
E v
G
f E v G
E v
G
f E v f
E u G
E u f
W
W
′ − − − ′
′ − − − ′
= ′′
∂
∂β α β
∂
∂α α β
( )
( )
1
1
.    (24) 
Equation (24) shows that in the absence of a fixed transfer payment, the other two contractual 
parameters depend on the terms reflecting the incentive effects of the parameters if an 
efficient use of water cannot be guaranteed.30 If, on the other hand, incentive problems are not 
to taken into account, i.e. if an efficient choice of the amount of groundwater by the 
                                                 
29 [ ]( ) [ ]( )[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]E u E u G E G E u G E u E G′ − ′ − = ′ − ′ > 0 . 
30 Efficiency would imply that ( )1 0− − =α βfW . 
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wellowner could be enforced, equation (24) reduces to 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
E v G
E v
E u G
E u
′
′ =
′
′ , which is the same 
optimality condition as in the model with a fixed transfer payment. In general, however, the 
equation ( )1− − = 0α βfW  does not hold in the case of only two contractual parameters, from 
which it follows that the solution for the cropshare and for the fixed payment per unit in this 
case will deviate from the solution in the case of three contractual parameters.31 
3.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to find an explanation for the fact that in some of the informal 
groundwater transactions observed in south-Indian villages the wellowner receives a share of 
the crop output in exchange for the groundwater delivered by him, whereas in other 
transactions the farmer keeps the entire crop output, and pays a fixed amount for each unit of 
groundwater the wellowner delivers. In a bargaining framework we showed that – depending 
on the shape of the utility functions of the buyer and the seller - important determinants of the 
choice of the contract form are the degrees of absolute risk aversion of the contracting parties 
in the case of exponential utility and factors that influence the contract-dependent as well as 
the contract-independent income of the parties, such as the distribution of the amount of 
rainfall, the marginal costs of groundwater extraction and the certain incomes of the buyer and 
the seller. Our results underline the fact that sharecropping arrangements in the context of 
informal groundwater markets, which in the empirical literature dealing with this 
phenomenon are often condemned as exploitative, are a powerful instrument to overcome 
inefficiencies which arise in a risky environment when there are incomplete or missing 
markets for the allocation of a scarce resource and for the allocation of risk, an imperfect 
                                                 
31 This is the usual story in the literature on tenancy contracts when a full division of the not 
perfectly observable labour among instruments cannot be attained. 
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water market, or a missing insurance market on the village level. Our results also show, that 
under certain conditions even productive efficiency can be achieved by the use of 
groundwater share contracts. 
 The analysis of this paper is an important first step in understanding the choice of 
contracts in an agricultural economy where water is scarce and opens an entire research 
agenda in the field of agricultural contracts. Future research has to address questions such as 
how the allocation of groundwater is related to the allocation of land. How does the 
availability of irrigation water influence a farmer’s decision to rent in or rent out land? What 
are the effects of an increasing density of wells in a village on the contract form chosen? How 
can the possibility of an overexploitation of the local groundwater resources be taken into 
account? What are the effects of wealth or credit constraints on the side of the water buyer? 
Most closely related to the research of this paper is the question how the timing of the 
farmer's decision on when to approach a wellowner for additional irrigation water can be 
endogenized and how this matters for the contract choice and for the efficiency achieved by 
the contract. The farmer's decision how long to wait before entering a contract potentially 
depends on his beliefs about the quantity of rainfall during the remainder of the growing 
season. If he decides to wait for future rainfall without entering a contract he has to take into 
account that the condition of his crop may worsen in the meantime because of a lack of water, 
which may negatively influence his future bargaining power. This timing consideration plays 
no role in the context of tenancy contracts, and addressing it may help to deepen the general 
understanding of how and under which circumstances share contracts can balance risk sharing 
considerations and incentive problems when markets are incomplete or missing. 
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 Appendix 
Conditions for a unique solution to (11): 
Using the condition which must hold in the optimum, ( )1
c
βα− = , we can write the state-
dependent incomes of the buyer and the seller under the optimal contract as 
  B of G
c
β γ = − − +  
BYY  and      (25) 
  ( )S of G
c
β  = − − + + +  
SYγY c .      (26) 
Employing the envelope theorem, the derivatives of Y  and Y  with respect to B S β  are 
  
B
oY f G
cβ
∂ = −∂ ?0 
DRS
CRS
IRS
⇔ 
 and     (27) 
S
oY f G
cβ
∂ = − +∂ ?0 
IRS
CRS
DRS
⇔ 
.      (28) 
In the case of CARA, (11) can be shown to depend only on β . The solution for β  will be 
unique, if the left-hand side of (11) is strictly increasing in β  and the right-hand side is 
strictly decreasing in β , or vice versa. 
[ ]
oE v G
E vβ
 ′ ∂    ′∂  
?0 ⇔ [ ] [ ]2B Bo oY YE v E v G E v G E v E v oWβ β β
   ∂ ∂′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ − +    
∂
∂ ∂ ∂   
?0 (29) 
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If we assume that the indirect effect, [ ]2 0oWE v β
∂′ >∂ , which arises because a change in β  
influences the seller's groundwater decision, can be neglected, then the sign of (29) depends 
on whether [ ] [ ]B BoYE v E v G E v G E v Yβ β
  ∂ ∂′ ′′ ′ ′′−  ∂ ∂  
0. This can be rewritten using (27) as 

?
[ ] [ ]( ) [ ] ( )2o o o of E v E v G E v G E v E v G E v G E v E v Gc o ′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′       − + −          ?0 (30) 
The first term of (30) is equal to zero, because for CARA [ ] [ ]
o oE v G E v G
E v E v
′ ′′     = ′ ′′ . Therefore, 
[ ]
oE v G
E vβ
 ′ ∂    ′∂  
?0  ⇔ [ ]
oE v G
E v
′  
′ ?
( )2o
o
E v G
E v G
 ′′  
′′  
.    (31) 
Since except for CRS, (27) and (28) will always have the opposite sign, for the risk premium 
of the seller we have 
 [ ]
oE u G
E uβ
 ′ ∂    ′∂  
?0  ⇔ [ ]
oE u G
E u
′  
′ ?
( )2o
o
E u G
E u G
 ′′  
′′  
.    (32) 
Thus, if [ ]
oE v G
E v
′  
′ <
( )2o
o
E v G
E v G
 ′′  
′′  
 BY∀  and [ ]
oE u G
E u
′  
′ <
( )2o
o
E u G
E u G
 ′′  
′′  
 , or if SY∀
[ ]
oE v G
E v
′  
′ >
( )2o
o
E v G
E v G
 ′′
′′  
 BY∀  and [ ]
oE u G
E u
′  
′ >
( )2o
o
E u G
E u G
 ′′  
′′  
 SY∀ , then the solution to (11) 
in the case of CARA is unique. 
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4 Different input intensities on owned and sharecropped plots: The 
consequences of imperfect monitoring, cost sharing, and endogenous 
crop choice 
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4.1 Introduction 
One of the crucial assumptions in most of the models dealing with the choice of contractual 
form in the market for tenancies in developing countries is whether the landlord can perfectly 
(costlessly) monitor the actions taken by his tenant. Under the assumption of prohibitively 
high costs of monitoring the tenant's activities, the so called 'Marshallian' approach, the theory 
predicts that the choice of a sharecropping contract will result in an inefficiently low amount 
of variable inputs applied to the rented land by the tenant, compared to the amount of variable 
inputs employed on owned land or on plots leased in under a fixed rent contract. If, in 
contrast, the landlord is able to effectively monitor the tenant's activities, as is assumed under 
the so called 'monitoring' approach, then the efficient amount of variable inputs per unit area 
can be stipulated in the contract, and there are no incentive problems to be dealt with, so that 
the cultivation of a plot under a share lease causes no inefficiencies compared with ownership 
cultivation or cultivation under a fixed rent lease. Since the predictions of the theory 
concerning such issues as the reasons for the existence of sharecropping arrangements and the 
efficiency of sharecropping depend crucially on the assumption whether perfect monitoring is 
possible or not (as well as on the assumptions describing the agents' risk taking behavior), and 
since it cannot be settled theoretically which of the two modelling approaches does more 
justice to the real world, it is essential to take a closer look at the empirical evidence. 
 This is far from being the first paper to investigate this question. An overview of the 
older existing literature is given by Hayami and Otsuka (1993), among the older contributions 
Shaban (1987) deserves special attention, and more recent work on the topic includes Raha 
(1991), Bell, Raha and Srinivasan (1995), and Acharya and Ekelund (1998). 
 In comparing the rates of difference in output per hectare of sharecropping from that 
of owner farming of 32 studies on the productive inefficiency of share contracts, Hayami and 
Otsuka (1993) find that the mean rate of difference for the studies where the comparisons are 
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made in terms of single-crop output is not significantly different from zero, whereas if the 
comparisons are based on total output per hectare, the mean of the rates of differences is 
significantly different from zero in a direction which supports the Marshallian hypothesis. 
They state that in the latter case the distribution of the rates of differences is highly irregular, 
the irregularity stemming from differences in the production function due to differences in 
crop mix between sharecropping and owner-farming areas. They conclude that '...the 
significantly lower average output value per hectare for share-cropping than for owner-
farming areas seems to reflect more of a difference in production functions than the existence 
of Marshallian inefficiency which refers to suboptimal labour input per hectare for the same 
production function'. The same argument holds for the comparisons of inputs. 
To test whether the monitoring or the Marshallian hypothesis is valid, Shaban (1987) 
compares a family's average input and output intensities on owned and sharecropped land32, 
an approach which controls for family-specific characteristics, such as management ability, 
access to non-traded inputs, risk aversion and prices of traded inputs and outputs. He 
regresses the differences of average input intensities on owned and sharecropped plots on 
plot-specific characteristics such as plot value, soil quality, and irrigation status, and on 
dummy variables for different villages. Using the plot-specific variables in the regression, he 
can test whether part of the differences in input and output intensities are attributable to these 
factors rather than the outcome of different incentives under owner cultivation and under 
share lease cultivation. The village dummies serve to proxy the variation in the cost-sharing 
rules across the villages, and thus have the function of capturing the effect on input and output 
differences which is caused by the contractual arrangement. Estimating a system of seemingly 
                                                 
32 This comparison was first proposed by Bell (1977). 
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unrelated regression equations, Shaban finds empirical support for the Marshallian thesis.33 
Acharaya and Ekelund (1998) employ the same method as Shaban for a different data set, 
additonally controlling for crop variety and plot size, and also find evidence against the 
monitoring hypothesis. 
 A different approach is taken by Bell et al. (1995). They investigate whether the 
differences in resource allocation under share leases and self-cultivation are systematically 
related to the characteristics of the contracting parties. Their findings also favor the 
Marshallian hypothesis: In their study area, input intensities, yields and value added per 
hectare were all much lower on sharecropped than on owner-operated holdings, after 
controlling for sample selectivity in the choice of a contracting partner and differences in 
endowments, and even after ridding the data of fixed effects. But they also find that what they 
call 'matching' (finding a suitable partner to contract with) had the effect of alleviating the 
agency problems connected with a share lease, and that households made use of such 
matching to achieve an improvement in contractual performance. 
 Analyzing a household survey of rice-cultivating farmers from the Philippines, 
Sadoulet, de Janvry and Fukui (1997) find evidence that supports their hypothesis that 
sharecroppers who have a kinship relationship with their landlord behave efficiently in 
applying the socially optimum level of inputs and effort on their land, despite the disincentive 
effects caused by the sharing of output. But since the results of this study are not based on 
comparisons of the input and output intensities of households which cultivate both owned and 
                                                 
33 Hayami and Otsuka (1993) suggest that the studies of Bell (1977) and Shaban (1987) 
represent strong evidence for the inefficiency of share tenancy under institutional constraints 
on tenancy choice rather than evidence for the inefficiency of share tenancy in general. See 
Hayami and Otsuka (1993), pp.101-102 for details. 
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sharecropped plots, the authors are not able to control for unobserved household 
characteristics. Also, the authors did not investigate the question why some of the 
sharecroppers had a kinship relationship to their landlord, and why some of them did not. This 
could cause a sample selection problem. 
 The aim of the present paper is to make a contribution to the existing literature in the 
following respects. First, we reestimate Shaban's model, using data from a survey of 14 
villages in Andhra Pradesh, India. A novel feature of these data is that, for each sharecropping 
contract, they contain the accompanying cost-sharing rules, so that we do not have to rely on 
village dummies if we aim to measure the effect of the contractual arrangement on input and 
output intensities. In an important extension of Shaban's model, we include crop dummies 
into the analysis. If one wants to compare an owner-sharecropper's performance on his owned 
and on his sharecropped plots, one has to average over the inputs and the output on all his 
sharecropped and on all his owned plots, with the side-effect that one also averages over 
different crop types. But this seems to be undesirable, since it is natural to assume that 
different crop types are produced with different technologies, as was already mentioned 
above. This fact would not cause a problem if all types of crops were grown in the same 
proportions on owned and sharecropped land. But if, as in this dataset, some crops are more 
extensively grown on sharecropped plots than on owned plots and vice versa, then not 
controlling for the crop type will lead to a distortion of the estimation results. In the light of 
this argument, Shaban's technique of using village dummies in order to control for the effect 
of share tenancy seems to be questionable, since instead of reflecting only the different cost-
sharing rules across the villages, these dummies could just as well reflect different 
distributional pattern of crop types on owned and sharecropped plots between different 
villages. Indeed, we find that at least part of the differences between input intensities on 
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owned and sharecropped land can be ascribed to different crops grown on these two 
arrangements. 
 We then extend our analysis of the differences between input intensities on owned and 
sharecropped plots to the class of owner-fixed-rent tenants in order to investigate whether 
there are also differences between input intensities under the latter pair of arrangements, and 
if there are differences, whether part thereof can be ascribed to the effects of tenancy, or 
whether the total differences can be explained by plot-specific factors or by different cropping 
patterns on owned and leased-in land. In this case, too, we find that different cropping 
patterns are one reason for different input intensities. 
 There is, however, a fundamental difficulty. If we employ indicator variables in the 
estimation for whether or not a crop is grown on a particular plot of a particular household, 
we encounter the problem that this set of crop dummy variables is not exogenously given, but 
is rather the result of an endogenous choice. If the choice of crops is endogenous and if the 
factors which determine it enter into the error terms in the estimation of the equations for the 
input differences (all unobserved household heterogeneity which influences owned and 
leased-in plots differently34), then not controlling for the endogeneity of crop choice will lead 
to inconsistent estimates for the parameters in the input-difference estimation. This 
presumption is confirmed by the data at least for the class of owner-sharecroppers: In the 
model which assumes that the crop variables are exogenous, the estimated coefficients for the 
                                                 
34 Two papers which deal with the influence of the tenant's and the landlord's characteristics 
on the choice of the crop type grown and on the choice of the contract form are Bandiera 
(2000) and Ackerberg and Botticini (2002). The latter find out that different landlords and 
tenants match on different crop types, since different crops show different degrees of 
riskiness. 
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crop dummy variables are highly significant, whereas the coefficients for the cost share 
variable are not significant at all. By contrast, in the model which takes into account the 
endogeneity of crop choice, the influence of the crop dummy variables becomes less 
significant, whereas a statistically significant influence of the cost share variables can now be 
detected. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two describes the data and 
contains some descriptive statistics; in section three we lay out some known theoretical results 
on costsharing in sharecropping contracts and present an extension to them; section four 
describes the estimation methods and discusses the results; and section five concludes the 
paper. 
 
4.2 Description of the data 
The data we use come from a survey which was canvassed between November 1980 and May 
1982 in Andhra Pradesh, India, covering two kharif seasons and one rabi season.35 First, five 
districts were selected purposively. Then from these districts altogether 14 villages were 
selected, again purposively. Two villages are located in West Godavari district, four in 
Nalgonda district, two in Mahbubnagar district, two in Kurnool district, and four in Chittoor 
district. Further, "a census of all households in each village was carried out at the start of the 
survey period. Data were collected on each household's demographic and social 
characteristics, its primary and secondary occupations, its endowments of land, livestock and 
machinery, and the amount of land it was leasing in or out. 
                                                 
35 The next three paragraphs describing the sampling process draw heavily on Bell, Raha and 
Srinivasan (1995), who use data for the Punjab from the same survey. 
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 At the third stage of the sampling process, the census was used to assign all 
households to one of ten socio-economic categories, from which a total of forty households 
was drawn from each village. Owner-cultivators, owner-tenants and pure tenants were first 
ranked in order of their operational landholdings, and each category was then divided into 
three, three and two subgroups of equal size, respectively. One landlord and two owner-
cultivators, two owner-tenants and two pure tenants were then drawn from each subgroup, all 
with probability proportional to the size of the landholding. The first household selected from 
each subgroup was assigned to a group of households whose activities in cultivation were 
followed in detail throughout the rabi season." (see Bell et al., pp. 3-4). This sub-sample 
comprises 213 households. 
 "The farm management questionnaire canvassed information on the crops grown, the 
inputs used and the resulting outputs, the unit of observation being the individual plot, as 
perceived and described by the respondent. The inputs fell into the following categories: seed, 
fertilizers and pesticides, family labor, hired labor, and draft power services (animals and 
tractors), each further subdivided by operation where appropriate. Inputs were valued at their 
transaction value if they were purchased. If they were supplied by the household itself and if 
the household had a closely related market transaction, the household's transaction unit value 
was used to make the imputation. Failing such a closely related transaction, the imputation 
was made on the basis of the prevailing rate in the village. The former imputation applied 
mostly to family labor; the latter to draftpower services – though the markets for these were 
very thin. The same method of valuation was also applied to the resulting output." (Bell et al., 
p. 5) 
 Next we present some summary statistics concerning the tenancy status and the 
operational landholdings of the households in the crop production schedule. There are 111 
pure owner-cultivators, 39 owner-sharecroppers, 55 owner-tenants (farmers cultivating own 
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land and having a fixed rent lease), 7 pure tenants, and only 1 pure sharecropper. Table 1 
shows the average operational landholdings of households under different tenancy regimes. 
There are two things which attract attention: first, the own holdings of the owner-
sharecroppers are smaller on average than their leased holdings, whereas for the owner-
tenants this relation is the other way round. However, this difference is statistically significant 
only for the holdings of the owner-tenants (the p-value for the paired t-test is 0.0021 for the 
owner-tenants and 0.1862 for the owner-sharecroppers)36. Comparing the own holdings of 
owner-sharecroppers with the own holdings of owner-tenants one observes that the latter are 
bigger than the former, the difference being significant at the 5 percent level (p-value 0.0416). 
The comparison of the leased-in holdings of owner-sharecroppers and owner-tenants yields 
the opposite picture: owner sharecroppers seemed to lease in on average larger amounts of 
land than owner-tenants, but the difference is not significant at conventional levels (p-value 
0.1444). The second striking feature is the similar 'farm size', i.e. the total operational 
landholdings, across the three different categories pure owners, owner-sharecroppers, and 
owner-tenants (the three respective hypotheses of equal farm sizes cannot be rejected). By 
leasing in and out land the households in the crop production schedule on average manage to 
reach an operational holding size between 4 and 4.5 acres which indicates that this amount of 
land represents something like an optimal farm size for a wide variety of circumstances. Of 
course, the exact individual farm size will depend on the particular household characteristics 
such as family labour, draught power, irrigation facilities, and risk taking behaviour. One may 
ask, why on average farmers with smaller own holdings end up with sharecropping contracts 
leasing in a larger amount of land than they own, whereas farmers with larger own holdings 
                                                 
36For all the following t-tests, non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon signed rank, Wilcoxon rank 
sums) yield the same results. 
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end up with fixed rent contracts, leasing in a smaller amount of land than they own by 
themselves. One explanation for this pattern may be, that if tenants with larger own 
landholdings are also generally wealthier than tenants with smaller landholdings, and wealth 
can be seen as a proxy for the tenant's risk aversion37, then theory predicts that more risk 
averse tenants will choose share contracts because these contracts serve as a risk sharing 
device, whereas less risk averse or risk neutral tenants will end up with fixed rent contracts 
because they provide superior incentives from the landlord's point of view. Another 
explanation could be that sharecropping contracts are predominant in some districts, and 
leasing under fixed rent in others. If these districts show different climatical or environmental 
conditions, these conditions could be the reason for the different amounts of land owned and 
leased-in. In our sample, fixed rent contracts are predominant in the two mechanized villages 
which are fully irrigated by a canal system and in which almost solely paddy is grown. In the 
less mechanized and less irrigated villages sharecropping is the most frequent contract form. 
But is it hard to find an explanation why in a better irrigated environment households should 
lease in less land than in a sparsely irrigated environment. 
 The irrigation status of a plot will play a crucial role in the decision which crop should 
be grown on this particular plot, and therefore will have an influence on the amount of inputs 
applied. It will also influence the amount of output produced if the crop is sensitive to water 
scarcity. Table 2 gives an overview of the irrigation status of the plots of the three subgroups 
pure owners, owner-sharecroppers, and owner-tenants. For all plots in the sample, the 
percentages for irrigated and unirrigated plots are not too far from one half, but the hypothesis 
that there are equal proportions of irrigated and unirrigated plots is rejected at the 1-percent 
level. Likewise, this hypothesis is rejected for all other categories at the 1-percent level, 
                                                 
37 See Ackerberg and Botticini (2002). 
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except for the category of shared plots of the owner-sharecroppers, where it can be rejected 
only at the 5-percent level. For the plots of the owner-sharecroppers, a slightly higher 
percentage of the shared than of the owned plots is irrigated, in both categories the unirrigated 
plots being in the majority. In contrast, the principal share of the plots in both categories for 
the owner-tenants is irrigated, but also a higher percentage of the leased than of the owned 
plots being irrigated. After having leased in some plots, the irrigation situation on the total 
landholdings of the owner-sharecroppers is more equalized than before leasing in, whereas for 
the total landholdings of the owner-tenants the proportion of irrigated to unirrigated plots is 
driven apart in favor of the irrigated plots. If a landlord wants his share-tenant to grow a 
water-intensive crop like paddy, which is often the case, than he must provide the tenant with 
a plot with a reliable source of irrigation, especially if sharecropping contracts are normally 
used in areas where not all land is irrigated by a canal system. 
Table 2a describes the irrigation situation in the sample based on areas. Comparing the 
average irrigated and unirrigated farm areas for the different categories, we find a slightly 
different picture than for the plot-based comparisons. For all categories except the owner-
fixed-rent categories the results do not change much. For the plot-based comparisons, the 
hypothesis of equal proportions could be rejected at the 1% level for all three owner-fixed-
rent categories, whereas for the area-based comparisons, the hypothesis of equal irrigated and 
unirrigated farm areas cannot be rejected for any of these three categories. Further, on average 
19 % of the area of the own holdings of owner-sharecroppers are irrigated, whereas on 
average 32 % of their sharecropped holdings are irrigated. Using a paired t-test, the 
hypothesis that these percentages are equal can be rejected only at the 10% level. For the 
owner-fixed-renters, on average 48 % of their own holdings and 56 % of their leased-in 
holdings are irrigated. The hypothesis that these percentages are equal cannot be rejected. 
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 Table 3 and Table 4 list the main crops cultivated by owner-sharecroppers and owner-
tenants, respectively, and reports the frequency with which the different crops are grown on 
owned and leased-in plots. Employing a chi-square-test to test whether there is a difference 
between owned and leased plots with respect to cropping patterns, we find that for the 
subgroup of owner-sharecroppers the null hypothesis of equal cropping patterns on owned 
and shared plots is rejected at the 5-percent level (p-value 0.0498), whereas for the owner-
tenants the null hypothesis can not be rejected even at the 10-percent level (p-value 0.6196). 
There are also some other crops grown by both owner-sharecroppers and owner-tenants , for 
example, tomatoes and sugarcane, but we excluded all crops from the tables which showed 
frequencies less than 5 for both owned and leased-in land. Table 4a shows for each subgroup 
of land the percentages of land cultivated under different crops. From both the plot-based 
table and the area-based table it is clear that paddy and groundnut are the crop types which are 
the main reason for the different cropping patterns on owned and sharecropped plots: 27 % of 
the owned plots and 10 % of the owned land area is cultivated under paddy, whereas 43 % of 
the sharecropped plots and 26 % of the sharecropped area is under paddy cultivation. On the 
other hand, on 18 % of the owned plots and on 25 % of the owned area groundnuts are grown, 
whereas only on 10 % of the sharecropped plots and on 12 % of the sharecropped land 
groundnuts are grown. For cotton there is no remarkable difference for the plot-based 
comparison, but for the area-based comparison the difference is quite clear: 16 % of the 
sharecropped area is cultivated with cotton, but only 5 % of the owned area. For the owner-
fixed-renters, the area-based table shows the same picture as the plot-based table: for none of 
the crop types there is a remarkable difference between owned and leased-in plots. 
 The preceding results are for each subgroup of plots as a whole. But for the individual 
farm, there may well be differences between the cropping patterns on owned and leased-in 
plots of the owner-fixed-rent tenants. Concerning the cropping patterns on owned and leased 
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plots of the owner-tenants, one could argue that, apart from the physical characteristics of the 
plots, there is no reason why they should choose different cropping patterns on their owned 
and leased plots, for the landlord is not involved in the production process. Most of the fixed 
rents in this sample are paid in kind, however, so that the landlord should indeed have an 
interest in what kind of crop is cultivated on his leased-out plots. Since the owner-tenants 
have the best relation of irrigated to unirrigated plots for both leased and owned land, it seems 
to be natural that the main crop is paddy, whereas other less water-intensive crops are grown 
less frequently. In general, the cropping patterns on owned and leased-in plots for both types 
of tenants will depend on the endowment with production factors of both the landlord and the 
tenant. 
 Different cropping patterns on owned and shared plots will have an impact on the 
difference of average input intensities on owned and leased-in plots only if the technologies 
with which these crops are grown are different. To see whether this is the case or not, consider 
Table 5, where the mean input intensities for the most frequently grown crops in the crop 
production schedule are reported. At a first glance, one observes that it seems to be an 
untenable hypothesis that the different crops are produced with the same techniques. In order 
to support this observation statistically, we first conducted F-tests for all six input categories 
which in all cases led to a rejection at the 1-percent level of the hypothesis that the mean input 
intensities are equal for all crops. The next step was to use a Sidak (or Bonferroni)-test to 
make multiple pairwise mean comparisons for the different crops. The results, which also 
reject the hypothesis of identical production techniques for the crops in question, are 
presented in Table 6. We will elaborate later on these differences of mean input intensities 
when we take up the regression analysis. 
 We conclude this section by emphasizing again that there are statistically significant 
differences between the cropping patterns on owned and shared land as well as between the 
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mean input intensities employed in producing different crops. Ignoring this fact can lead to 
the omission of relevant variables (i.e. crop dummies) from a regression analysis whose aim is 
to explain the differences in average input intensities on owned and sharecropped plots of the 
same household.38 
4.3 The cost sharing argument 
It is widely observed that besides the output in a share contract, the costs of at least one of the 
inputs, typically fertilizer, are shared between the landlord and the tenant. In our sample, too, 
most of the share contracts involved some cost-sharing. One question which is crucial for our 
analysis is whether there is an effect of cost-sharing on the intensity with which the inputs in 
question are applied to the crop, and how this effect works. A brief account of the relevant 
theory will help to clarify this point.39 
 It was long believed that, under certainty, a cost-sharing arrangement by which input 
costs are shared between the landlord and the tenant at the same rate as output would result in 
the optimum resource allocation, since the share tenant's disincentive to apply inputs under 
output sharing would be exactly offset by the subsidy to the input costs under the equal output 
and cost-sharing rule. But Braverman and Stiglitz (1986) make the point that if cost sharing is 
feasible, then it must be possible for the landlord to observe the level of inputs, and, if the 
level of inputs is observable, it is at least feasible that the contract specify the level of inputs. 
Given this, they show that with a linear sharecropping contract (comprising an output share, a 
                                                 
38 Shaban (1987) is aware of this potential problem. To assess its importance, he conducts a 
regression analysis for those households which cultivated Sorghum only. He finds that there is 
still an effect of tenancy. 
39 Surveys of the theoretical literature on cost-sharing are provided by Singh (1989) and 
Hayami and Otsuka (1993). 
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cost share, and a fixed payment), there is no reason for the landlord to opt for cost-sharing, 
since he does no worse and no better by specifying the input level than he does by using a 
cost-sharing contract, even if the tenant is risk averse. So why, then, do cost-sharing 
arrangements exist? Braverman and Stiglitz come up with a resolution to this paradox: 
asymmetric information between the landlord and the tenant. Since the optimal level of input 
changes in response to variations in weather and geographically, according to the nature of the 
soil and other local conditions, the tenant will often be in a better position to make decisions 
concerning the level of inputs. If these changes and differences in circumstances are 
observable to the tenant but not to the landlord, then a contract which induces the tenant to 
adjust the input to the altered circumstances will be preferred by the landlord. In this sense, a 
cost-sharing contract is a more flexible contract than a fixed-quantity contract. A further 
explanation for the existence of cost-sharing arrangements is provided by Bardhan and Singh 
(1987), using a related argument. They show that if the landlord cannot monitor the tenant's 
actions, and if the tenant is able to resell the input which is cost-shared with the landlord at a 
price lower than the landlord's opportunity costs for this input, then there is indirect cost 
sharing at the margin. Relating these results to the task of empirically settling the question of 
whether the Marshallian or the monitoring approach is the correct one, one can conclude that 
if the above theories are valid under the actually prevailing conditions, then the existence of 
cost-sharing in the data is an indicator that there are monitoring problems.40 
 Knowing now why there is cost-sharing, the next question is, how exactly does the 
presence of cost-sharing influence the tenant's decisions concerning input use. Using the 
                                                 
40 Hayami and Otsuka propose another explanation for cost sharing which has not yet been 
formalized and which makes use of the argument that the inputs supplied under cost sharing 
can be regarded as de facto production loans. 
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Braverman-Stiglitz framework, we assume that there is asymmetric information between the 
landlord and the tenant concerning some aspect of the technology which varies with the state 
of nature and which affects the productivity of an input such as fertilizer. Consider a risk 
averse tenant with a twice differentiable concave utility function defined on income, u . 
The tenant is assumed to control an input x, the amount of which can be observed by the 
landlord; but the costs of writing a contract specifying the level of input corresponding to each 
state of nature are assumed to be prohibitive. Braverman-Stiglitz show that under these 
assumptions, in general, the optimal contract will entail some degree of cost sharing. Since 
Braverman-Stiglitz do not investigate how a change in the cost sharing arrangement 
influences the tenant's input decision, we proceed by modelling the tenant's input choice. 
)(y
 The tenant maximizes his expected utility under the optimal contract by choosing the 
optimal level of input  given his output share, ox α , his cost share, β , and the price per unit 
of input, c. The level of output is made uncertain by introducing the non-negative, 
multiplicative scalar θ , which is distributed according to ( )θh  with mean [ ] 1=θE . Hence, 
the tenant's maximization problem is: 
   ({ cxxfuE
x
)}βαθ −)(axm       (33) 
where the output price is normalized to unity and the production function is assumed to be 
strictly concave in x. For the production function, we assume the lower and upper inada 
conditions to hold. The necessary and sufficient condition for an optimal x is then: 
   [ ] [ ] 0=′−′′ ucEuEf βθα       (34) 
Dividing (34) by α  and defining α
βδ ≡ , we can rewrite (34) as 
[ ] [ ] 0=′−′′ ucEuEf δθ        (35) 
For an optimally chosen x we can write the value function dependent on δ  as: 
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   ( ) ( ){ }oo cxxfuE δδαθδαδ )()()( −=V      (36) 
For the tenant's expected utility at the optimum not to change with a change in δ  we must 
have 
   ( ){ } 0)()()()( =−′−′′=∂∂ ooo cxcxxfuEV δαδδαθδαδ   (37) 
from which it follows that 
   [ ]
[ ]
0
)(
)( >
−′
′=′ δθ
αδα
o
o
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xf
uE
uE
,     (38) 
where [ ][ ] 1<′
′
uE
uE θ  by virtue of the fact that u is strictly concave. The denominator of the right-
hand side of (38) is positive, because we know from (35) that [ ][ ] c
f
uE
uE ′
′
′= θδ  and because for 
a concave production function we always have 
x
ff <′ . 
Differentiating the first-order condition in (35) with respect to δ  we obtain the comparative 
static expression which denotes the change of x in δ : 
 [ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ∆−′′′′−−′′′+′+′=∂
∂ /}{ cfufEcfucxEucEx
o
δθθδαδθδαδδαδ ]  (39) 
where [ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 02 <−′′′+′′′=∆ cfuEuEf δθδαθ . The first term in the numerator of the right-
hand side of (39) is the direct effect of a change in δ  on x, which is positive, because an 
increase in δ  raises the marginal cost of the input. The other two terms represent the indirect 
effects which arise because the tenant is risk averse (if the tenant is risk neutral, the last two 
terms are equal to zero). The second term also vanishes if the tenant's utility function shows 
constant absolute risk aversion. To see this, consider the expression ( )[ ]cfuE δθ −′′′ . For this 
expression to be equal to zero, we must have [ ][ ] f=
c
uE
uE
′′′
′′ δθ . Using the first-order condition in 
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(35) we can rewrite this expression as [ ][ ]
[ ]
[ ]uE
uE
uE
uE
′
′=′′
′′ θθ . For constant absolute risk aversion 
the left hand side equals the right hand side, which can easily be seen by inserting the utility 
function  where a denotes the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The sign of 
the third term in the case of CARA utility functions (as well as for all other utility functions) 
depends on whether 
( ) ( )θayeyu −−=
[ ]
[ ]θ
θ
u
u
′′
′′ 2
E
E Š [ ][ ]uE
uE
′
′θ . We can state the following proposition: 
 
 Proposition1. If the tenant's utility function satisfies CARA, and if θ  is uniformly 
distributed on the interval [ θ,0 ], then the optimal amount of input chosen by the tenant 
decreases with increasing δ : 
  [ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 0/}{ <∆−′′′′−′=∂
∂ cfufEucEx
o
δθθδαδ . (Proof see appendix) 
 
 That is, given CARA and a uniformly distributed θ , the change in the optimal amount 
of input caused by a change in the ratio of costshare to outputshare is stronger for a risk 
averse tenant than for a risk neutral tenant. The second term in (39) is the effect which arises 
because the change in the costshare changes the tenant's income. For CARA this term is zero, 
since in this case the tenant's risk aversion does not change with changing income. The third 
term in (39) is the effect which arises because, for example, the outputshare has to rise to 
compensate the tenant for a higher costshare, and therefore the risk averse tenant receives a 
bigger share of the risky output. If then the tenant is sufficiently risk averse, he will employ 
less of the input to make his stakes at risk smaller. 
For utility functions other than CARA utility functions the second term will be usually 
different from zero, the sign depending on whether [ ][ ]uE
uE
′′
′′θ Š [ ][ ]uE
uE
′
′θ . That is, 
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( )[ ]cfuE δθ −′′′ ˜0  ⇔ [ ][ ]uE
uE
′′
′′θ ˆ [ ][ ]uE
uE
′
′θ  and ( )[ ]cfuE δθθ −′′′ ˜0 ⇔  [ ][ ]θθuEuE ′′′′
2
ˆ [ ][ ]uE
uE
′
′θ . If 
, which is the case for utility functions showing CARA or DARA, then 0>′′′u [ ][ ] 1<′′
′′
uE
uE θ  and 
[ ]
[ ] 1
2
<′′
′′
θ
θ
uE
uE . For DARA we can say that the stronger absolute risk aversion is decreasing with 
increasing income, the smaller are these last  two expressions. If the indirect effects are small 
in magnitude compared with the direct effect, then the optimal input amount chosen by the 
tenant will fall with a raising δ , that is 0<∂
∂
δ
ox . 
1β
( )21, xxf
){ }222 xc11xc1,xuE β−
δ
[ ]′u uEθ
[ ]′u 2Eθ
Since on a real world farm not only one input will be used in production, but several 
inputs are used simultaneously in the production of a crop, the question arises whether a 
change in the costshare-outputshare relation for one input (say fertilizer) has an effect on the 
amount of another input (say labour) applied by the tenant to his sharecropped plots. 
Therefore we extend in the following our model to the case of two different inputs,  and . 
It is assumed that the tenant's costshares for the two inputs are 
1x 2x
 and 2β , respectively. 
Further we assume that the production function, , is strictly concave and that the 
lower and upper inada-conditions hold for both inputs. Then the tenant's maximization 
problem is: 
 ( 12 )(max xfx βαθ − . 
Again define α
β1
1 ≡  and α
βδ 22 ≡ , such that the necessary and sufficient conditions 
can be written as 
 [ ] 0111 =′− cEf δ ,       (40) 
 [ ] 022 =′− ucEf δ .       (41) 
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For optimally chosen  and  the value function dependent on 1x 2x 1δ  and 2δ  is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }oooo xcxcxxfuEV 2222111121212121 ,,,,, δδδαδδδαθδδαδδ −−= . (42) 
To save space, we will derive the following results only for the costshare-outputshare 
relation of input , but the results can be easily extended to the costshare-outputshare 
relation of input . Differentiating (42) with respect to 
1x
2x 1δ , setting the result equal to zero, 
and using (40) and (41), we can derive 
( )
[ ]
[ ]
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α .   (43) 
 The sign of (43) hinges on the sign of the term in parentheses in the denominator. 
Employing Euler's Formula we can state that 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ooooooo oo xxxxfxxfx xxf 122122111 21 ,,
, −− š0 ⇔  . 



IRS
CRS
DRS
 Therefore 
1δ
α
∂
∂ ˜0  . For constant returns to scale, (43) is not defined. 
Totally differentiating (40) and (41) with respect to 
⇔ 

IRS
DRS
1δ  we obtain 
  [ ] [ ] ( )[ ]{ }∆ +−−′′+′′=∂∂ 1221
2
222221
1
1 BDBDcfuEuEfuEcx
o δθαθ
δ   (44) 
and 
  [ ] [ ] ( )( )[ ]{ }∆
+−−−′′+′′−=∂
∂ 2112222111211
1
2 ADADcfcfuEuEfuEcx
o δθδθαθ
δ , (45) 
with  since the maximization problem of the tenant is strictly concave. 
(For  see appendix). The first term in the numerator of (44) is negative 
since . If the other terms in the numerator, the indirect effects, are small in magnitude 
or cancel out, then again the amount of the input chosen in the optimum by the tenant will 
01221 >−=∆ BABA
212121 ,,,,, DDBBAA
02 <B
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decrease with an increase in its own costshare-outputshare relation, that is 0
1
1 <∂
∂
δ
ox . For 
equation (45) the sign is not clear, even if we assume that the indirect effects are small in 
magnitude or cancel out. The first term in the numerator of (45) consists of two parts, the first 
of which is negative if the cross product of the two inputs is positive, whereas the second part 
is positive, since 111 cf δθ −  and 222 cf δθ −  will have the same sign in each state of nature. To 
see this, consider (40) and (41), from which it follows that [ ][ ] 12
22
1
11 <′
′==
uE
uE
f
c
f
c θδδ . Thus, an 
increase in the costshare-outputshare relation of another input has a negative effect on the 
amount of the input in question because of the positive cross product, but it has also a positive 
effect, since the tenant will substitute this input for the input which becomes relatively more 
costly and the use of which becomes relatively riskier. Therefore, the sign of (45) will depend 
on whether the cross product effect or the substitution effect is stronger. 
 These findings represent testable hypotheses which we will test in the next section. If 
the results are right, then a tenant whose cost share raises relative to his output share will use a 
lower amount of the respective input on his sharecropped plot, whereas he will not change his 
input on his owned plots, so the difference of average input intensities between owned and 
sharecropped plots will become larger. If there is a monitoring problem, then a raising cost 
share relative to the output share will have a positive effect on the difference of average input 
intensities. This argumentation assumes that the tenant cannot divert resources from his 
tenancy to his owned plots and the other way round, i.e. the production on his leased-in plots 
is strictly separated from the production on his owned plots. But this may not be the case on 
real world farms. Bell et al. (1995) identify what they call the 'dilution effect', an effect which 
arises because some resources are imperfectly tradable, and the tenant therefore must divert 
such resources, in part, from his own holdings to his tenancy. This effect also extends to 
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tradable resources which are (net) Hicksian complements with non-tradable resources. In our 
case the presence of this effect would mean that the tenant diverts the non-tradable resource 
the costshare-outputshare relation of which rises from his tenancy back to his own land, since 
it becomes relatively more costly to use the respective input on the tenancy. This in turn 
would imply that in this case the difference between average input intensities on owned and 
sharecropped plots would even become larger than in the case were no dilution effect is at 
work. 
4.4 Estimation methods and empirical results 
In this section we turn to the question of whether there are differences in the amount of inputs 
supplied per unit of land on owned field plots and plots cultivated under a tenancy, examining 
both share and fixed rent tenancies. This is done in subsection 4.4.1. If there are differences, 
we investigate in subsection 4.4.2 whether these differences can be explained by factors 
which are different on owned and leased-in plots, such as irrigation status or the crop grown, 
or whether the difference or part of the difference can be attributed to incentive problems 
which are caused by the form of the tenancy contract. Since a potential problem arises in 
controlling for the crop type grown on plots of different tenancy status because the crop 
grown on a particular plot by a particular household may be the outcome of an endogenous 
choice process rather than exogenously given, we present in subsection 4.4.3 an econometric 
model which enables us to deal with this problem of endogeneity. 
4.4.1 Comparison of average input intensities on owned and leased-in plots 
Since each household in the subsample of owner-tenants has several owned and leased-in 
plots, we will make the comparison on the basis of the weighted averages of input intensities 
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over the different plots, using the plot areas as weights.41 There were two cultivation seasons 
in which a household could be observed to grow crops on his owned and leased-in plots, but 
not all households cultivated in both seasons. A household which cultivated in both seasons 
was dealt with as two separate observations, that is, we assume that the fixed effects for each 
household are independent of the season. It seems not too unrealistic to assume that, for 
example, the households risk aversion and its managerial ability do not change from one 
cultivating season to the other. Thus, in this and the following sections we have 43 
observations for households cultivating both owned and sharecropped plots, and 75 
observations for households cultivating both owned plots and plots leased in against a fixed 
rent payment. 
 For the owner-sharecroppers we examine the differences in average input intensities 
for six input categories: seedlings, fertilizer and pesticides, farm yard manure, preharvest 
labour, harvesting labour, and bullock-pair days. In the case of owner-fixed-renters, there is 
the additional category 'tractor hours', since in contrast to sharecropping contracts, fixed-rent 
contracts are common in the two villages where tractors are used frequently instead of draught 
animals. The differences in average output intensities are also examined for both types of 
owner-tenants. 
 In order to take into account the possibility that the covariance between the differences 
in average input intensities for a given household is not necessarily equal to zero, we use the 
method of seemingly unrelated regression equations to regress the differences in average 
input intensities on owned and leased-in land on an intercept. The estimated covariance 
                                                 
41 As long as we follow exactly Shaban's method of transforming the relevant variables, we 
will not give a detailed description of the computations. The interested reader is referred to 
Shaban (1987). 
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matrix is then used to carry out a Wald test, the null hypothesis being that the differences in 
average input intensities are jointly equal to zero. The differences in average input and output 
intensities and the results of the t-tests are reported in table 7. For the owner-sharecroppers, 
the differences for seed, fertilizer and pesticides, farm yard manure, and harvesting labour are 
positive but not significantly different from zero, whereas the differences for preharvest 
labour and bullock pair days are negative but also not statistically different from zero. The 
mean difference in average output intensities is negative and not significant. Thus, looking at 
the mean differences for the particular inputs there is no evidence that these inputs are 
systematically undersupplied on sharecropped plots compared with owned plots. Following 
the predictions of the Marshallian theory there should be a positive sign for the mean 
difference in average output intensities, but there is a negative sign, leading one to the 
conclusion that if there are any negative incentive effects at work, then they are more than 
offset by other effects. Using the Wald test mentioned above, the hypothesis that all mean 
input differences are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 1%-level ( ), indicating 
that there are effects which we should control for, determining systematically the mean input 
differences. 
23.212 )6( =χ
 For the owned and leased-in plots of fixed-rent tenants the picture is much clearer. For 
all but one input the mean differences are negative, statistically significant so for fertilizer and 
pesticides, harvesting labour, and tractor hours42 at the 1%-level, for bullock-pair days at the 
5%-percent level, and for seeds at the 10%-level. The mean difference for preharvest labour is 
negative but not significant, and for farm yard manure it is positive but also insignificant. The 
mean output difference is negative as well, and significant at the 10% level. The mean input 
                                                 
42 In the case of tractor hours an interaction dummy was used to account for the fact that 
tractors are used only in two out of the fourteen villages. 
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differences are found to be jointly significantly different from zero at the 1%-level 
( ). Since there is no theory which predicts that the input intensity on plots under a 
fixed-rent contract should be systematically higher than on owner cultivated plots, we will 
have to find out empirically by which factors this phenomenon can be explained. 
13.672 )7( =χ
4.4.2 Explaining the differences in average input and output intensities 
In the preceding section we found the mean input differences for the owner-sharecroppers not 
to be individually different from zero, but the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero 
could be rejected at a high confidence level. This leads one to assume that there may be 
different effects, correlated for a particular household over the different inputs and working 
against each other, in determining the amount of a particular input applied to the household's 
own land and to its tenancy. On the other hand for the owner-fixed-renters the mean input 
differences are in most cases individually different from zero, which is unexpected, and has to 
be explained as well as the sign of the difference . 
 The aim of the following analysis is to identify the factors which systematically 
influence the differences in input intensities, and eventually to isolate the effects which can be 
ascribed to the contractual form under which a plot is cultivated. In his attempt to settle the 
question whether the actions of the tenant are perfectly monitorable or not, Shaban (1987) 
regresses the differences in average input and output intensities on plot-specific variables such 
as dummies for the soil type and the irrigation status of the plot, and on a set of village 
dummies which he such claims to be the only household-specific attributes that are expected 
to have a differential impact on input intensities on owned and sharecropped plots. He argues 
that the village dummy variables will partially reflect the variation in the cost sharing rules 
across the villages. But these village dummies may as well capture the variation in cropping 
patterns on owned and sharecropped plots across the villages. Instead of using village 
dummies, therefore, we employ as regressors the relation of the tenant's cost share to his 
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output share and a dummy for whether the application of the respective input is supervised by 
the tenant alone or by both the landlord and the tenant. These two regressors will measure the 
pure effect of tenancy, since if one or both of these variables have an effect on the input 
differences, this means that the form of the particular contract influences the tenant's decision 
of how much of the respective input to supply. Additionally, we control for different cropping 
patterns on owned and sharecropped plots, using dummies for several crops which are 
frequently cultivated. 
 In this specification of the econometric model there remains a problem with the error 
term which captures the household's particular and unobserved characteristics that lead to 
differential behavior on its owned and sharecropped land and that are not captured by the 
variables controlling for tenancy. These unobserved characteristics include the risk aversion 
of the tenant and the risk aversion of his contractual partner(s) as well as the other 
characteristics of the landlord (observed or unobserved) which are not included in the model. 
This will cause a problem if the crop choice is endogenous, i.e. if the crop chosen under a 
particular contract depends on these unobserved characteristics of the tenant and the landlord. 
Since in this case the crop type will be correlated with the error term, naive OLS (SUR) 
estimation will yield biased estimators. This problem will be dealt with in the next subsection. 
 Using Shaban's (1987) notation, the equations to be estimated are derived as follows: 
Consider an owner-sharecropper cultivating K owned and L sharecropped plots with n 
variable inputs. The input intensities (per unit area) for each input category i on the owned 
and sharecropped plots are determined by the following equations: 
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Shaban defines the term  as 'a function of deterministic and stochastic variables that 
have identical effects on the choice of intensity of input i on owned and sharecropped plots'. 
As examples of these variables he mentions family-specific shadow values of all inputs and 
outputs, its managerial ability, and a family's endowment of production resources, human 
capital, and labor resources.  and  are dummy variables which stand for whether the plot 
is irrigated or not, and the  and  are dummy variables for the M different crops which 
take on the value of one if a crop is cultivated on the respective plot, and are equal to zero 
otherwise.  is a household specific 'average' dummy variable the value of which is between 
zero and one, and is the closer to one the more closely the plots under tenancy are supervised 
by both the landlord and the tenant with respect to the input in question, that is 
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where the plot areas  are used as weights, and the  are the plot- and input-specific dummy 
variables which are equal to one if the supply of input i on plot l is supervised by both the 
landlord and the tenant, and zero otherwise. The variable  is a household- (or contract-) 
specific variable which is defined as 
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. The cs  are the plot- and input-
specific costshare to outputshare relations, that is, the cs  are the empirical counterparts to 
li
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α
βδ =  in our theoretical analysis in section 3. The error terms iε  and iη  are, as Shaban puts 
it, 'the missing variables that affect owned and sharecropped plots differentially'. As already 
mentioned above, especially the characteristics of the tenant's landlord will be captured by 
these error terms. Under this specification, the error terms are assumed to be identical across 
different plots of the same tenure status for each household. It is assumed that the error terms 
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have zero means and finite variances, but it is not assumed that there is zero correlation 
between the error terms of different input categories. 
 Because each household normally cultivates several owned and sharecropped plots, 
and because the comparison of input intensities cannot be done on the plot level (since it is 
not possible to assign a certain owned plot to a certain sharecropped plot), one has to 
somehow average over the different plots of the same tenure status of a given household. This 
averaging is done, again following Shaban, by using the plot areas as weights. Thus define: 
 ∑
∑
∑
∑
−≡∆
l
l
l
l
s
li
k
k
k
k
o
ki
i t
tx
t
tx
x , ∑
∑
≡
k
k
k
kk
o
t
tI
I , ∑
∑
≡
l
l
l
ll
s
t
tI
I , ∑
∑
≡
k
k
k
kmk
o
m t
tC
C ,
 ∑
∑
≡
l
l
l
lml
s
m t
tC
C , , si
o
ii ααα −≡ iii 111 γγθ ′−≡ , iii 222 γγθ ′−≡ , and iii ηευ −≡ . 
Then we can write the differences in average input intensities on owned and sharecropped 
plots for each household as 
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The equation for the differences in average output intensities is similar to equation (48) apart 
from the fact that instead of the supervision dummy, a dummy variable is used which is equal 
to one if the landlord decides on the cropping pattern on the respective plot, and which is 
equal to zero if the tenant decides on the cropping pattern. For this dummy variable, too, we 
take the average over all plots of the same tenancy status. 
 In the estimation equation for the differences in average input intensities on the owned 
and leased-in plots of fixed-rent tenants we drop the supervision dummy and the costshare 
variable since in all cases the input supply is supervised only by the fixed-rent tenants 
themselves, and the cost share to output share relation is always equal to one. Instead of these 
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variables we include a dummy variable which is equal to one if the landlord is a friend or a 
relative of the tenant, and which is zero otherwise.43 We included also a dummy variable to 
control for whether the rent is paid in kind after the harvest or not, but this variable was not 
significant in any of the input equations. Since, in contrast to sharecropping contracts, fixed-
rent contracts are present in the two sample villages in which tractors are frequently used, we 
have an additional equation for the input category 'tractor hours'. In this equation we multiply 
each regressor with an interaction dummy which is equal to one if the observation is from the 
two villages where tractors are used, and zero otherwise. In this way, we take into 
consideration that the input 'tractor hours' is used only in these two villages. Further we 
include an intercept village dummy in the equation for 'bullock-pair days'. 
The n equations in (48) are estimated by seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), since 
it is reasonable to assume that the error terms of the same household are correlated with each 
other over the different input categories. This assumed correlation can be understood by the 
above argument that the error terms capture the unobserved characteristics of the household 
which influence owned and sharecropped plots differently. The equation for the differences in 
average output intensities is estimated separately by OLS. Unlike in Shaban's work, the 
regressors are not the same in all equations (because not the same crop dummies are used in 
the different equations), which results in the fact that the use of the SUR method not only has 
an effect on the test results but also on the estimates for the coefficients, which in this case are 
different from the OLS estimates. 
 Tables 8 and 9 contain the estimation results for the SUR estimation for the six input 
categories for the cultivators of owned and sharecropped land and for the cultivators of owned 
                                                 
43 This relationship dummy was also employed in the estimation of equation (48), but in no 
case was it significant. 
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and leased-in land, respectively. The OLS estimates for the two output equations are reported 
in the respective tables as well. 
 First we estimated equations (48) without the costshare variables. Table 8 reports the 
results. For the six input categories all estimated intercepts are positive, for farm yard manure 
and harvest labour they are significantly different from zero at the 5% level, for preharvest 
labour and fertilizer and pesticides they are significant at the 10% level, and for seeds and 
bullock pair days they are not significantly different from zero. The intercept for the output 
equation is negative but not significant. Using a Wald test, the hypothesis that all six intercept 
parameters in the input equations are jointly equal to zero is again rejected at the 1% level 
( ). This is a different picture from that obtained by regressing the differences only 
on an intercept. In this latter case, no intercept was significantly different from zero, and two 
of the intercepts had even negative signs. Controlling for other factors which may potentially 
influence the amount of inputs supplied, however, we find for four of the six inputs a 
systematically higher input supply on the owned plots. The intercept for the output equation is 
now positive, but still insignificant. 
( ) 13.1826 =χ
All coefficients for the irrigation dummy variable are positive, and for all inputs 
except harvesting labour they are significant at the 1% level. According to the Wald test, the 
hypothesis that all irrigation coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 1% level 
( ). Since there is a strong positive correlation between irrigated plots and plots 
cultivated with paddy
( ) 73.7126 =χ
44, we can draw the conclusion that if, on average, more of the farmer's 
owned plots than of his sharecropped plots are devoted to irrigated paddy, then the difference 
between the average input intensities on owned and sharecropped plots will increase for all 
                                                 
44 Pearson's correlation coefficient is 8725.0=ρ . 
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inputs and for output. Because of this correlation, we did not include an extra dummy for 
paddy, so that now unirrigated paddy forms part of the omitted category.45 
For the crop dummies for grams, groundnut, and castor seed, the parameter estimates 
in most cases have negative signs, except for groundnut in the equations for seed and 
fertilizer, and for castor seed in the equation for bullock labour. One of these crop dummies is 
significant at the 10% level, two are significant at the 5% level, and four at the 1% level. 
Testing the hypothesis that the coefficients for all crop dummies in all input equations are 
jointly equal to zero, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level ( ). 
Additional Wald tests to test the hypothesis whether the coefficients for all crop dummies in 
the same input equation are jointly equal to zero show the following results: for the input 
categories seed, farm yard manure, preharvest labour, and bullock pair days this hypothesis is 
rejected at the 1% level, for harvest labour it is rejected at the 5% level, and for the category 
fertilizer and pesticides it cannot be rejected. All this provides strong evidence that the crop 
mixture grown on different plots of the same tenancy status has in fact a non negligible effect 
on the differences in average input intensities. We included crop dummies in the output 
equation, too, but none was found to be significant. This suggests that only irrigated paddy 
has a significant influence on the difference between average output intensities. 
( ) 67.152213 =χ
Turning to the estimated coefficients for the supervision dummies we find that they 
have a negative sign, except for the input category harvest labour. For the category fertilizer 
                                                 
45 The other crops belonging to the omitted category are cereals, cotton, and chilies. These 
crops had no significant influence in any of the seven equations. The dummies for grams, 
groundnut, and castor seed were not included in all equations; the choice was made on the 
basis of table 5: if a certain crop was expected from table 5 to have a strong influence on the 
size of the input category in question, it was included in the equation. 
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and pesticides, the corresponding parameter is significant at the 5% level, and the positive 
coefficient in the harvest labour equation is significant at the 10% level. The hypothesis that 
all coefficients are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected in this case ( ). In most 
cases, the coefficients have the sign that one would expect: If the supply of an input is 
supervised by both the landlord and the tenant rather than by the tenant alone, then the 
difference in average input intensities on owned and sharecropped plots decreases. The 
significantly positive parameter in the harvest labour equation is certainly unexpected. These 
findings hardly allow one to draw the conclusion that joint supervision by the landlord and the 
tenant leads to an improved input supply on the sharecropped plots. In the output equation, 
the coefficient for the cropping pattern decision dummy is negative and not significant. Note 
that for the output equation we have a relatively high adjusted R-square (0.78), despite the 
fact that there are only the intercept and two explanatory variables. A very large proportion of 
the difference in average output intensities seems to be explained by the irrigation status of 
the plots. 
( ) 43.926 =χ
 If we include the cost-share variables in the estimation equations we get the results 
reported in table 8a. Consider first the estimates for the variable cost share itself: The 
coefficients have a negative sign for seed, farm yard manure, preharvest labour, and bullock 
pair days, and a positive sign for fertilizer and for harvest labour, but only the coefficients for 
seed and fertilizer are significant at conventional significance levels. The hypothesis that all 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero can be rejected at the 5% level ( ). Following 
our theoretical considerations in section 3, one should expect the signs of the coefficients for 
the cost share variables to be positive, since a higher cost share to output share relation for the 
tenant will induce the latter to supply less of the respective input according to the predictions 
of the theory. But there is only one positive coefficient which is significant at the 5% level, 
( ) 04.1326 =χ
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though. Thus there is only weak evidence that this particular contractual characteristic, the 
cost-sharing arrangement, has an influence on the farmer's input decisions.46 The effect of 
including the cost-share variable on the estimated coefficients for the irrigation, crop and 
supervision dummies is negligible; no sign is reversed, and only for farm yard manure the 
irrigation coefficient moves from the 1% significance level to the 5% level, and for fertilizer 
the supervision dummy moves from the 5% to the 10% significance level. The effect on the 
intercepts is stronger: all coefficients except that one for fertilizer retain their positive sign, 
but the coefficients for fertilizer, preharvest labour, harvest labour, and bullock-pair days 
become insignificant, and the hypothesis that all intercept coefficients are jointly equal to zero 
can now be rejected only at the 5% level instead at the 1% level as before. This is interesting, 
since the coefficients for the cost-share variables are not found to be individually significantly 
different from zero (except one), but they seem to explain nevertheless part of the difference 
in average input intensities which was before captured by the intercept. One reason for this 
may be that the data are not very rich (only 43 observations in the case of owner-
sharecroppers). Another possible reason is that the crop dummies as well as the dummies for 
supervision and the cost-share variables are not exogenous variables, but are endogenously 
determined by the characteristics of the tenant and the landlord, which are captured by the 
error terms in this setting. We will control for such endogeneity in the next section. 
 According to our theoretical considerations, we should include the cost-shares of the 
other inputs as regressors in the estimation equation for a certain input, but here we meet with 
the problem of multicollinearity, since in nearly all cases the cost-shares for different inputs 
                                                 
46 The six cost-share variables were also included in the output equation, but none was found 
to be significant. 
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are the same in a contract. Thus, it is not possible to test the hypotheses of positive cross-
effects. 
 Another point on which we should remark is the relation between the supervision 
dummies and the cost share variables: One would expect cost-sharing to be highly correlated 
with supervision in order to avoid cheating by the tenant; that is, one would expect the 
supervision to be the closer, the higher the cost share of the landlord. We computed Pearson's 
correlation coefficient for the six cost-sharing variables and the five supervision dummies, 
which all had a negative sign as expected, but the correlation was significant only in four 
cases, twice at the 5% level (the bullock-pair days cost share with the supervision of bullock-
pair days and seeds) and twice at the 10% level (the bullock-pair days cost share with the 
supervision of fertilizers and preharvest labour). 
 From these findings the answer to the initial question whether there is evidence in 
favor of the Marshallian hypothesis is not quite clear. The two variables which stand for two 
characteristics of the respective contract, the supervision dummy and the cost-share variable, 
are either not jointly significantly different from zero, as in the case of the supervision 
dummies, or they are not individually different from zero and have the wrong sign, as in the 
case of the cost-share variable. This implies that the tenant's decision of how intensely to 
supply inputs on his sharecropped plots is not, in general, influenced by the contractual 
arrangements concerning the supervision of the inputs, and is only weakly influenced by the 
contractual arrangements concerning the costs of the inputs. But this means that the 
predictions of the theory under the assumption of imperfect monitoring are only weakly 
supported by the evidence of the present data set. There remains the fact that most of the 
intercepts are positive, and that they are jointly significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level. But since the data are lacking, we are not able to control for soil quality and plot 
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value47, two factors which can be different on owned and sharecropped plots, and which are 
likely to influence the input supply on both types of plots in the same way, we cannot 
interpret the positive intercept as the effect of tenancy alone without reservation. In the 
present data set, the differences in average input intensities seem to be explained mostly by 
different cropping patterns and by the different extent of irrigation on owned and 
sharecropped plots. 
 In table 9 the results for the owner-fixed-rent tenants are reported. Comparing the 
estimated intercepts in table 9 with the mean differences in table 7, one finds that four out of 
seven intercepts are now positive; before only one intercept had a positive sign. Also, among 
the mean differences, three were significantly different from zero at the 1% level, one at the 
5% level, and one at the 10% level, all of them being negative. Among the intercepts in table 
9 only two are significantly different from zero at the 1% level and at the 5% level, the 
intercept for farm yard manure which is positive and the intercept for tractor hours which is 
negative, respectively. The intercept for farm yard manure was insignificant before. Thus, as 
in the case of sharecropping tenancy, including additional explanatory variables leads to some 
significant changes in the mean differences in average input intensities. But the hypothesis 
that all intercept coefficients are jointly equal to zero is still rejected at the 1% significance 
level ( ). The intercept in the output equation is still negative and insignificant. ( ) 13.2527 =χ
 The coefficient of the irrigation dummy is positive and significant for four out of the 
seven inputs, for fertilizer and farm yard manure at the 1% level, and for preharvest labour 
and tractor hours at the 5% level. It is positive and insignificant for output. Again the 
hypothesis that all irrigation coefficients in the seven input equations are jointly equal to zero 
                                                 
47 Shaban controls for these variables and finds a significant influence on the differences in 
average input intensities. 
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can be rejected at the 1% level ( ). Because of the correlation between irrigated 
plots and plots cultivated under paddy, which is also in this case strongly positive
( ) 69.3827 =χ
2
3χ
48, the 
irrigation dummy variable stands for irrigated paddy; that is, also for the plots of owner-fixed-
rent tenants the significantly positive coefficients for the irrigation dummy variable can be 
interpreted to the effect that the higher the proportion of owned plots cultivated under 
irrigated paddy compared with the proportion of leased-in plots cultivated under irrigated 
paddy, the larger is the difference between average input intensities on owned and leased-in 
plots for the respective input. Among the other crop categories included in the regression, 
cereals, groundnut, and cotton had a significant influence on the differences in average input 
intensities. Another crop which is not cultivated by owner-sharecroppers, but which is found 
to have a strong significant effect on the input category seed and on output, is sugarcane. 
Testing some joint hypotheses on the coefficients of the crop dummies, we find the following: 
the cross-equations restriction that all crop coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected at 
the 1% level ( ), and the hypothesis that for each input category the coefficients 
of the included crop dummies are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 1% level for seed, 
bullock labour, and harvest labour ( , , and , 
respectively), at the 5% level for fertilizer ( ), and it cannot be rejected for 
preharvest labour ( ). In the output equation, the crop dummy for sugarcane and the 
irrigation dummy are highly significant. That is, the differences in average input intensities of 
cultivators of owned plots and plots leased in under a fixed-rent contract can also be explained 
partly by the differences in cropping pattern on owned and leased-in plots. 
( ) 75.198214 =χ
( ) 68.423 =χ
( ) 63.49=
( ) 722 =χ
( ) 60.10523 =χ ( ) 35.5022 =χ
75.
                                                 
48 Pearson's correlation coefficient is 9331.0=ρ , which is even higher than in the case of 
owner-sharecroppers. 
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 Noteworthy is the fact that the relationship dummy variable is negative for all seven 
input equations, and significantly so for seed at the 5% level, and for preharvest labour and 
for harvest labour at the 10% level. The hypothesis that the coefficients for the relationship 
variables in all seven input equations are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 5% level 
( ). Thus we can draw the conclusion that when the landlord is a friend or a 
relative of the tenant, this works to increase the latter's input supply on his leased-in plots 
compared to his owned plots. This result is a surprising one from a theoretical point of view, 
since theory predicts that in the case of a fixed-rent contract, the efficient input supply on the 
leased-in plots does not depend on the contracting parties' characteristics (the relationship to 
the landlord is a contract characteristic in a broader sense). Contract theory predicts that a 
contract which includes a fixed rent payment from the tenant and no cost sharing has no 
negative incentive effects. But if one assumes that the input supply on the owned plots is 
efficient, then the negative coefficients of the relationship dummies imply that there is an 
inefficient input supply on the leased-in plots which is less inefficient if the landlord is a 
friend or a relative of the tenant. 
( ) 81.1427 =χ
 There is a theoretical argument by which a different input supply on the owned and 
leased-in plots of a fixed-rent tenant can be explained: If the contractual arrangement is such 
that the tenant has to make the fixed rent payment in kind after the harvest (which can be seen 
as a de facto production loan), then for a risk averse tenant who in the case of a crop failure 
will not be able to pay the rent there is a 'leverage' effect. This leverage effect is caused by the 
fact that in the case of a good harvest the tenant gets the whole surplus, whereas in the case of 
a crop failure his loss is limited to his input costs. This effect can lead to a higher input supply 
on the leased-in plots. We included a dummy variable in all seven input equations and in the 
output equation to control for whether the rent is paid in kind after the harvest or in cash 
before, but the coefficients were not significant for any input category and not for output. 
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 In all input equations except in the equation for tractor hours a village dummy is 
included which is equal to one if the observation is from the two villages where tractors are 
used, and is zero otherwise. In these two villages, almost all plots are irrigated and cultivated 
under paddy, a fact which, together with the higher level of mechanization, could have an 
influence on the input differences. The village dummy coefficient is significant at the 5% 
level for seed having a negative sign, and at the 10% level for bullock pair days having a 
positive sign. For the other input categories the coefficients are not significant, but the 
hypothesis that all six village dummy coefficients are jointly equal to zero can be rejected a 
the 1% level ( ). Thus, the fact that an observation is from the two mechanized 
villages has a statistically measurable influence on the input differences, but the direction of 
this influence is not clear. 
( ) 58.1726 =χ
 We conclude from these results that also for the owned and leased-in plots of fixed-
rent tenants there are differences in the average input intensities which cannot be ascribed to 
different plot characteristics or to different cropping patterns on owned and leased-in plots. 
There are factors such as the relationship between the landlord and the tenant which are linked 
with the tenancy contract and which determine the amount of inputs supplied to the plots 
cultivated under this contract. 
4.4.3 Endogenous crop choice 
In the preceding section we examined how the differences in average input intensities can be 
explained by plot-specific factors, by the cropping pattern, and by the characteristics of the 
individual contract. To this end, we have assumed so far that the cropping pattern and the 
characteristics of the individual contract were exogenously given. But this is not a very 
realistic assumption, since the decision of which crop to cultivate as well as the fixing of the 
contractual parameters such as the cost-share will probably be endogenously determined by 
the observed and unobserved characteristics of the tenant, and – where the plots under tenancy 
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are concerned – by the observed and unobserved characteristics of the respective landlord. As 
was already mentioned, the error terms in equations (48) capture all unobserved heterogeneity 
among households which influences the average input intensity on owned and sharecropped 
or on owned and leased-in plots differently. Examples of this unobserved heterogeneity are 
the risk aversion of the tenant and the risk aversion of the related landlord, and all other 
characteristics of the landlord, since the characteristics of the landlord will almost certainly 
influence the tenant's input decision on his sharecropped-in or leased-in plots on the one hand 
and on his owned plots on the other hand differently. The problem which now arises is that 
the crop choice of the tenant and the agreement between the tenant and the landlord on the 
contractual parameters may be determined among other things by exactly these unobserved 
characteristics of the tenant and the landlord. Then the crop variables as well as the variables 
standing for the contract characteristics are correlated with the error term, with the 
consequence that the estimates for the related coefficients will be inconsistent. In the 
following, we will focus only on the endogeneity of the crop variables. Concerning the 
possible endogeneity of contract characteristics such as the cost share, who supervises the 
production process, and the relationship between the landlord and the tenant, one can argue 
based on evidence from the data set that the cost share used for a certain crop and a certain 
input is determined by its common use in the respective village rather than lying within the 
discretion of the landlord and the tenant. For the other two variables, the supervision and the 
relationship dummy, it is hard to find an argument against their endogeneity, but we will 
neglect it in order to not overload the following empirical analysis, which already suffers from 
data constraints. 
 The econometric model which takes into account the endogeneity of crop choice can 
be formulated as follows. The system of equations explaining the differences in average input 
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intensities on owned and leased-in land of the two groups of tenants is still represented by the 
n equations in (48): 
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Now, however, the crop dummies for the crops cultivated on owned and leased-in land, C  
and , respectively, are no longer assumed to be exogenously given, but rather to be the 
outcome of some kind of agreement between the landlord and the tenant if the respective plot 
is cultivated under a tenancy, or to depend on the observed and unobserved characteristics of 
the tenant alone if the plot is under owner cultivation. Let the total number of plots an owner-
sharecropper or an owner-fixed-rent-tenant cultivates be Q
mk
mlC
LK += , Qq ,...,1= . Then C  is 
a dummy variable which is equal to one if crop m is cultivated on plot q of household h 
( ), and which is equal to zero otherwise. Now define the latent variable underlying 
the crop choice process, V , as the net benefit from growing crop m on plot q of household 
h. That is, the individual plot of a certain household cultivating both owned land and leased-in 
land will be the unit of observation in our crop choice model. Assume that the net benefit is 
given by 
qhm
Hh = ,...,1
qhm
  V qhmqhqhqhLhTqhpmaqhm uJyJxpa ++′+′+′+′= δγγββ ,   (49) 
where  is the vector of characteristics of crop m,  is the vector of characteristics of plot 
q of household h,  is the vector of characteristics of household h,  is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if plot q of household h is cultivated under a tenancy, and is equal to 
zero otherwise,  is the vector of characteristics of the landlord belonging to plot q of 
household h if the plot is cultivated under a tenancy, and u  refers to the effects of 
ma qhp
hx
qh
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y
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unobserved heterogeneity. Then the choice of crop m on plot q by household h can be 
described as follows: 
   if V1=qhmC mnVqhnqhm ≠∀≥ ,   
   otherwise.       (50) 0
                                                
=qhmC
Equations (49) and (50) describe a multinomial logit model which will be estimated 
separately for owner-sharecroppers and for owner-fixed-renters, using all owned and leased-in 
plots of the households we used in the estimations of equations (48) in section 4.4.2. 
Employing the characteristics of the landlords belonging to a particular plot cultivated under a 
tenancy in the estimation, we meet with two problems. First, we do not know the 
characteristics of all landlords, since some of the landlords are not resident in the sample 
villages and therefore are not recorded in the census. Second, it is reasonable to assume that a 
particular tenant matches with a particular landlord dependent on their observed and 
unobserved characteristics49. Thus, the landlord's characteristics would then be endogenously 
determined variables which are potentially correlated with the error term. We deal with these 
problems by first using only the subset of tenants and landlords for which we know the 
characteristics of the landlords, regressing each particular landlord characteristic on all tenant 
characteristics50. Then we employ the estimated parameters from this regression to predict the 
characteristics of all landlords in the total sample of owner-tenants. That is, we take the 
tenant's characteristics as exogenously given and uncorrelated with the error term, using them 
 
49 See Bell, Raha, and Srinivasan (1995). 
50 Again the SUR method is used to estimate the system of equations which link the landlord 
characteristics with the tenant characteristics, since it is reasonable to assume that for each 
landlord the error terms are correlated over the different characteristic equations. 
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as instruments to instrumentalize the endogenous landlord characteristics which we wish to 
use in the crop choice regression. At the same time, we obtain predicted values for the 
missing landlord characteristics. The question may arise whether the fact that the landlord is 
resident or not has a bearing on the choice of contract, for non-resident landlords may find it 
hard to supervise, and will therefore probably prefer to offer a fixed-rent contract. In table 10a 
the frequencies of absent landlords are reported for all tenants in the core transaction 
schedule. There is no evidence that the landlords of fixed-rent tenants are more often absent 
than the landlords of the sharecroppers: 27 % of the share tenants' landlords and 28 % of the 
fixed-rent tenants' landlords were absent. The hypothesis of equal proportions cannot be 
rejected ( ). ( ) 008.021 =χ
 Putting these things together, the econometric model to be estimated is given by the 
following simultaneous-equations model: 
  (48) ( ) ( ) nishareSCCIIx iiiiiM
m
s
m
o
mmi
so
iii ,....,1     ,21
1
=+++−+−+=∆ ∑
=
υθθβδα
 qhmqhqhqhLhTqhpmaqhm uJyJxpaV ++′+′+′+′= δγγββ ,    (49) 
 1 if V=qhmC mnVqhnqhm ≠∀  ≥ , 
 0  otherwise,        (50) =qhmC
where V  is the latent variable underlying the average crop dummy variables C  and C , 
and where the error terms 
qhm
o
m
s
m
iυ  and u  are correlated. Maddala (1983, pp.120-121) proposes a 
two-stage estimation method to estimate this kind of model: First estimate equation (49) (in 
our case by a multinomial logit model), get the estimates of all parameters in (49), and derive 
the predicted probabilities for the crop choices. Then equation (48) can be estimated by SUR 
after substituting the predicted probabilities for the C  underlying the C  and C  in (48). 
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m
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 Table 10 contains the estimation results for the multinomial logit estimation of the 
crop choices of owner-sharecroppers and owner-fixed-renters. There are seven crop categories 
for the owner-sharecroppers (paddy, cereals, grams, groundnut, cotton, castor seed, and 
others, including vegetables and chilies), and eight crop categories for the owner-fixed-renters 
(paddy, cereals, grams , groundnut, cotton, chilies, sugarcane, and others, including 
vegetables, castor seed, coconut, tobacco). The category 'others' contains in both cases the 
crops which were grown in only a few cases by the respective group of owner-tenants. We 
will not comment on each of the estimated coefficients, but some results are worth 
mentioning. First, there are not many landlord characteristics which have a statistically 
measurable influence on the crop choice. We included all landlord characteristics in both 
estimations which turned out to be at least significant at the 10% level for a particular crop in 
one of the estimations.51 We also included a set of dummy variables for whether a particular 
plot is cultivated under a tenancy or not, but none of these coefficients was found to be 
significant at any conventional significance level in both estimations. An explanation for this 
could be that all the effects of tenancy are captured by the characteristics of the landlord and 
by the match between the landlord and the tenant. The coefficients for famsizl.paddy are 
positive and significant at the 10% level in both estimations, that is, for both owner-
sharecroppers and owner-fixed-renters the size of the landlord's family has a positive 
influence on the probability that paddy is grown on a leased-in plot. This is what one would 
expect since paddy is the main food crop, and a larger family needs more of it. Also, a larger 
landlord family means that there are more persons who can monitor the tenants actions, an 
important task when paddy is concerned. The coefficients for famlabml.paddy are negative in 
                                                 
51 Due to the not very large number of observations, it will not produce very convincing 
results if we include all possible regressors in the estimation. 
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both estimations, but only the coefficient in the owner-fixed-renters estimation is significant 
at the 5% level, whereas the coefficient for the owner-sharecroppers is just not significant at 
the 10% level. Thus, we find evidence at least for the owner-fixed-renters that the number of 
adult male workers in the landlord's family reduces the probability that paddy is grown on a 
leased-in plot. If a landlord has in his own family more workers to produce the relatively 
labour intensive crop paddy, he will be less interested in receiving his fixed rent payment in 
the form of paddy.52 For the tenants the results for these paddy related coefficients are more 
puzzling. The number of adult male workers in an owner-sharecropper's family has a negative 
effect (significant at the 1% level) on the probability that paddy is cultivated on a plot (owned 
or sharecropped-in), and for the owner-fixed-rent tenants the respective coefficient is positive, 
but not significant at conventional significance levels. The total number of family members in 
an owner-sharecropper's family has a negative but not significant influence on the choice 
probability for paddy, whereas the respective coefficient is negative and highly significant for 
the owner-fixed-rent tenants. It is hard to find a convincing explanation for why the number 
of family members should induce a farmer to grow less of the main food crop on his owned 
and leased-in plots. Other variables of interest are the total asset values of the tenant and the 
landlord. These variables are potential proxy variables for the unobserved risk aversion of the 
tenant and the landlord. The coefficients of the asset variable for paddy, cereals, and grams 
are all (except the coefficient for assett.cereals) significant at least at the 10% level for both 
groups of tenants, indicating that the wealth of a tenant has an influence on his crop choice. In 
contrast, among the estimated assetl. coefficients for both groups of tenants only the 
coefficient for assetl.grams is significant at the 10% level. That is, there is only weak 
evidence that the landlord's wealth influences the cropping pattern on the plots under tenancy. 
                                                 
52 In most cases the fixed rent is paid in kind, if paddy is grown under tenancy. 
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Summarizing, one can say that besides the tenant’s characteristics, the landlord characteristics 
seem to have a non-negligible influence on the crop chosen on a particular plot cultivated 
under a tenancy. 
 The next step is to use the predicted probabilities for the crop choices in the SUR 
estimation of equations (48). The estimated parameters for the SUR estimation using the 
predicted probabilities are set out in tables 12 and 14 for owner-sharecroppers and owner-
fixed-renters, respectively. In section 4.4.2 we used only the crop dummies in the regressions 
which we expected from tables 3-6 to have a noticeable influence on the differences in 
average input intensities, since we wanted to save degrees of freedom in order to obtain more 
precise estimates for the coefficients of interest. In this section, we use in the SUR regressions 
crop dummies for all the crop categories which were present in the multinomial logit 
estimation in order to maintain the consistency of the argument. Equations (48) were also 
reestimated using the actual values for the crop dummies for all crop categories in the 
multinomial logit model. This provides us with the benchmark with which we can compare 
the results from the estimations with the predicted crop dummies. The results of these 
estimations are set out in tables 11 and 13 for the owner-sharecroppers and the owner-fixed-
renters, respectively. In the case of owner-sharecroppers we could not use the crop dummies 
for the categories 'castor seed' and 'others', since they turned out to be collinear with other 
crop dummies when using the predicted probabilities instead of the actual values. 
 Before turning to the testing of some hypotheses, something should be said about 
statistical inference in two-stage methods. It is incorrect to use the standard errors from the 
second stage of the two-stage procedure in judging whether or not the coefficients are 
significant, since this procedure ignores the fact that some of the explanatory variables are 
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estimated.53 For two-stage estimation of reduced-form equations, however, the standard errors 
for the second stage are normally not far off from the correct standard errors (see Maddala, 
1983, p.238). In the following, we will use the standard errors from the second stage. 
 Comparing the two tables for the owner-sharecroppers, one can see that the parameter 
estimates for the irrigation dummies and for the supervision dummies do not change their 
signs, and that, in most cases, these estimates are as precise as those arising from the use of 
the actual crop dummies. There is, however, a change in the result of the test of one of the 
joint hypotheses. For the joint hypotheses that all coefficients for the irrigation dummies are 
jointly equal to zero there is no difference between the actual values and the predicted values 
estimation: In both cases the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level (  and 
, respectively). Testing the joint null hypotheses for the coefficients of the 
supervision dummies, one finds that the hypothesis cannot be rejected for the actual-values 
estimation ( ), whereas it is rejected at the 5% level ( ) for the predicted-
values estimation. That is, controlling for the endogeneity of the crop choice, we can now 
reject the hypothesis that there is no influence of the supervision arrangement on the 
differences in average input intensities. For the intercepts there are some changes in the signs 
and in the significance levels, but the joint null hypotheses are rejected at the 5% level for 
both the actual-values and the predicted-values estimation (  and , 
respectively). 
( ) 21.4126 =χ
( ) 1526 =χ
( ) 13.3826 =χ
( ) 44.826 =χ ( ) 04.1526 =χ
( ) 05.1326 =χ 65.
 However, there are quite a lot of changes in the signs as well as in the levels of 
significance of the parameter estimates for the crop dummies and for the cost-share variables. 
The coefficient for the cost-share variable for the input category 'seed' changes its sign from 
                                                 
53 See Pagan (1984) for a detailed discussion of this problem. 
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negative to positive and becomes significant at the 5% level; the cost-share coefficient for the 
category 'fertilizer and pesticides' keeps its positive sign, but becomes significant at the 1% 
level instead of at the 5% level. For these two coefficients we now obtain the result that we 
would expect if we followed the predictions of the theory: a cost share which is larger than the 
tenant's crop share has a positive influence on the difference between average input intensities 
on owned and sharecropped plots. Somewhat puzzling is the negative sign of the cost-share 
coefficient for the category 'farm yard manure', which is now significant at the 5% level. The 
other three cost share coefficients have a negative sign, but are not significantly different from 
zero. 
 Again carrying out some joint hypotheses tests, we find that for the estimation which 
uses the predicted crop dummies the hypothesis that all cost-share coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero can now be rejected at the 1% level ( ), whereas for the estimation 
using the actual crop dummies it could only be rejected at the 10% level ( ). 
Controlling for the endogeneity of the crop choice has the consequence that now the effects of 
the contractual arrangement on the differences in average input intensities can be identified 
more clearly. The direction of this influence, however, is not clear. Testing for each of the 
input equations whether all crop dummy coefficients are jointly equal to zero, this hypothesis 
is rejected only for the categories 'seed' ( ) and 'fertilizer' ( ) for the 
estimation using the predicted values, whereas it is rejected for the categories 'seed', 'farm 
yard manure', 'preharvest labour', and 'bullock labour' at different significance levels 
( , , , and , respectively) for the estimation 
using the actual values. These results indicate that failing to take into account the endogeneity 
of the crop choice leads to an overestimation (with no implication for the direction of the 
overestimation) of the influence of the crop types cultivated on owned and sharecropped plots 
( ) 57.2326 =χ
73.
08.12=
( ) 31.1226 =χ
37.10( ) 1424 =χ
( )24χ
( )24 =χ
( ) 90.5024 =χ ( ) 87.724 =χ ( ) 87.1824 =χ
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on the difference in average input intensities (except for the input category 'fertilizer and 
pesticides'), and to an underestimation (no implication for the direction of the underestimation 
as well) of the influence of the contractual arrangements related with the tenancy. 
 Table 15 shows the results for the OLS estimation of the output difference equation, 
using both the actual and the predicted crop dummies. There are some changes in the signs 
and in the significance levels of the coefficients for the crop dummies, but the most important 
change is, that in the estimation which uses the predicted values the intercept is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, whereas in the estimation using the actual values the intercept is 
not significantly different from zero. Thus, for output, too, a positive difference between the 
average output intensities on owned and sharecropped land which cannot be ascribed to 
different irrigation or cropping pattern can be detected if one controls for the endogeneity of 
crop choice. That is, for output we find evidence for the Marshallian hypothesis. We also 
included all cost-share variables in the output difference estimation, but none of them was 
significant at any conventional significance level. 
 The joint hypothesis tests we have carried out so far test only whether a certain set of 
parameters is jointly significantly different from zero. Therefore, we could not say anything 
about the direction of the joint influence (if any) of the respective variables. But since for the 
variables connected with the contractual arrangement we are interested in the direction of 
their joint significance, we now proceed to test some inequality restrictions on sets of 
parameters. To test nonlinear cross-equations restrictions for a system of equations, Gallant 
and Jorgenson (1979) propose a test which is an analog of the likelihood ratio test, and which 
is based on the change in the least-squares criterion function. The test procedure is as follows: 
First estimate the unrestricted model (in our case by SUR), then estimate the restricted model 
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(by SUR) using the same estimated variance-covariance matrix for the error terms as in the 
unrestricted model. Then the suggested test statistic is54 
  T 

 −= SSn ~~~0  
where S
~~  is the value of the objective function of the restricted model, S~  is the value of the 
objective function of the unrestricted model, an n is the number of observations used in the 
estimations. When the sample is in accord with the null hypothesis, 0T  will be near zero, and 
when it is not, 0T  will be large. It can be shown, that 0T  is distributed asymptotically as a 
chi-square with m degrees of freedom when the null hypothesis is true, where m is the number 
of parameter restrictions. 
 We now test several joint hypotheses using this method, testing each hypothesis twice, 
once using the actual crop dummies and once using the predicted crop dummies in the 
estimation. Testing whether all intercepts are jointly smaller than or equal to zero, we find that 
the hypothesis cannot be rejected for the actual values (p-value 0.1093) and that it is rejected 
for the predicted values at the 10% level (p-value 0.0889). That is, only for the estimation 
using the predicted values we find evidence that the vector of mean differences in average 
input intensities on owned and sharecropped plots is positive in all its elements, even after 
controlling for other factors. That is, there is a generally lower input supply on the 
sharecropped plots than on the owned plots. The hypothesis that all supervision dummy 
coefficients are jointly bigger than or equal to zero cannot be rejected for the actual values (p-
value 0.4989) and for the predicted values (p-value 0.3545). Therefore we cannot conclude 
that the supervision of input use by both the tenant and the landlord in general reduces the 
differences in average input intensities in either of the two models. The hypothesis that all 
                                                 
54 See Gallant and Jorgenson (1979, p.279). 
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cost-share coefficients are jointly smaller than or equal to zero cannot be rejected for the 
actual values (p-value 0.5405), but it is rejected at the 1% level for the predicted values (p-
value 0.0044). Thus, in the model which takes into account the endogeneity of the crop choice 
there is strong evidence that a cost-share-output-share relation of the tenant which is bigger 
than one has in general a positive influence on the differences in average input intensities on 
owned and sharecropped plots. That is, if the cost-share of a tenant rises relative to his output-
share, he will reduce the intensity of the respective input on his sharecropped plots by more 
than on his owned plots. In the model which assumes that the crop type cultivated on a 
particular plot is exogenously given, no influence of the cost-sharing rule on the differences in 
average input intensities can be identified. 
 Turning to the comparison of the results of the two models for the owner-fixed-renters, 
it is noticeable that for all variables and for all input categories there are some changes in the 
signs and in the significance of the coefficients.55 The most dramatic changes are in the 
category 'seed': The intercept moves from positive significance to negative insignificance, 
some crop dummies change their sign and their level of significance, and the relationship 
dummy and the village dummy becomes insignificant. Also, in the estimation using the actual 
crop dummies, the hypothesis that the coefficients of all variables are jointly equal to zero for 
the respective input category could be rejected at the 1% level for all seven input categories. 
However, for the model which uses the predicted crop dummies, this hypothesis cannot be 
rejected for the category 'harvest labour' and can only be rejected at the 10% level for the 
category 'bullock labour'. That is, there is less explanatory power in the model which uses the 
predicted values. A reason for this could be that one loses variation in the explanatory 
                                                 
55 For the category 'tractor hours' there is only a crop dummy for 'chilies', since in the two 
villages where tractors are used, only paddy and chilies are cultivated. 
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variables if one uses the predicted values, so that the parameters cannot be estimated with 
much precision. 
 We find that the hypothesis that all intercept parameters are jointly equal to zero is 
rejected at the 1% level (  for the actual values and  for the predicted 
values) for both models. It is not, however, possible to establish a general direction of the 
mean difference in average input intensities in either of the two models: Using the test method 
of Gallant and Jorgenson, the hypothesis that all intercepts are jointly smaller than or equal to 
zero cannot be rejected for either the model using the actual values (p-value 0.1570) or the 
model using the predicted values (p-value 0.2871). This is not surprising, since some of the 
intercepts are positive and significant, and some of them are negative and significant. Thus, 
for the owner-fixed-renters there seems to be no evidence for a generally lower input supply 
on the leased-in plots. The hypothesis that all relationship dummy coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero is rejected at the 5% level ( ) for the model using the actual values, 
but it cannot be rejected ( ) for the model which uses the predicted values. Again 
employing the Gallant-Jorgenson test method, the hypothesis that all relationship dummy 
coefficients are jointly bigger than or equal to zero is rejected at the 5% level (p-value 0.0426) 
for the model using the actual values, whereas for the model using the predicted values it 
cannot be rejected (p-value 0.5430). Thus, for the owner-fixed-renters there is exactly the 
opposite effect of the model which takes into account endogenous crop choice as in the case 
of owner-sharecroppers: The coefficients for the variable which captures an aspect of the 
tenancy contract are jointly significant in the model which takes the crop choice as 
exogenously given, and become jointly insignificant if the crop choice is considered 
endogenous. 
( ) 05.2827 =χ
( ) 97.527 =χ
( ) 54.2327 =χ
( ) 67.1727 =χ
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 Table 16 shows the results for the OLS estimation of the output difference equation. 
Worth mentioning is, that for both the actual and the predicted values estimation the intercepts 
are not significantly different from zero and that the coefficients for the relationship dummy 
are negative but not significant in both cases. Thus, there is no evidence that tenancy has any 
effect on the differences in average output intensities in the case of the owner-fixed-rent 
tenants. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Making predictions on the efficiency of risk sharing and on productive efficiency under 
different tenancy contracts often depends crucially on the assumption whether the actions 
taken by the tenant can be perfectly (costlessly) monitored by the landlord or not. If the 
landlord is capable to stipulate the amounts of all inputs to be applied to the tenancy in the 
contract because he can control the tenant's actions at reasonable costs, then there is no reason 
why there should be different input intensities between owned plots, sharecropped plots, and 
plots cultivated under a fixed-rent contract. But if this control over the tenant's action is not 
possible for whatever reason, one would expect lower input intensities on sharecropped plots 
compared with owned plots and plots leased-in under a fixed-rent contract according to the 
predictions of the theory: Why should a rational farmer devote the same effort to the 
cultivation of a crop from the output of which he receives only one half as to the cultivation of 
a crop the surplus of which accrues wholly to him? 
 To assess empirically whether the Marshallian or the monitoring approach is valid, we 
used the method proposed by Shaban (1987), extending his analysis by introducing variables 
controlling for the crop types grown and for different aspects of the tenancy contract, such as 
the cost-sharing arrangement, the rules concerning the supervision of the production process, 
and the relationship between the landlord and the tenant. We studied both owner-
sharecroppers and owner-fixed-rent tenants in order to clarify whether lower input intensities 
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are the consequence of the sharecropping contract, or whether this is a phenomenon which 
can be ascribed to the effects of tenancy itself. Our main findings in the econometric model 
which takes the crop indicator variables as exogenously given are: (i) the hypothesis that all 
intercepts are jointly equal to zero is rejected for the owner-sharecroppers at the 5% level; but 
the hypothesis that these intercepts are jointly smaller than or equal to zero cannot be rejected, 
(ii) for the owner-fixed-renters, the hypothesis that all intercepts are jointly equal to zero can 
also be rejected at the 1% level, but no general direction for the differences can be 
established, (iii) for the owner-sharecroppers, the hypothesis that all cost share coefficients 
are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 10% level and the hypothesis that all supervision 
dummy coefficients are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected, (iv) for the owner-fixed-
renters the hypothesis that all relationship dummy coefficients are jointly equal to zero can be 
rejected at the 5% level, but again no general direction of the influence can be established, (v) 
for the output difference estimation the intercept is significantly different from zero neither 
for the owner-sharecroppers nor for the owner-fixed-rent tenants. 
 We further estimated a model which takes into account the possibility that the crops 
grown on plots of different tenancy status are the outcome of an endogenous choice which is 
influenced amongst other things by the observed and unobserved characteristics of the tenant, 
and, as far as the crops cultivated under a tenancy are concerned, by the observed and 
unobserved characteristics of the landlord, too. In this case our main findings are: (i) the 
hypothesis that all intercepts are jointly equal to zero is rejected for the owner-sharecroppers 
at the 5% level; moreover, the hypothesis that these intercepts are jointly smaller than or equal 
to zero can be rejected at the 10% level, (ii) for the owner-fixed-renters, the hypothesis that all 
intercepts are jointly equal to zero can also be rejected at the 1% level, but no general 
direction for the differences can be established, (iii) for the owner-sharecroppers, the 
hypothesis that all cost share coefficients are jointly equal to zero can now be rejected at the 
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1% level and the hypothesis that all supervision dummy coefficients are jointly equal to zero 
can now be rejected at the 5% level; for the supervision dummies we cannot say in which 
direction the influence runs, whereas for the cost-share variables the hypothesis that they are 
jointly smaller than or equal to zero is rejected at the 1% level, (iv) for the owner-fixed-
renters the hypothesis that all relationship dummy coefficients are jointly equal to zero cannot 
be rejected, (v) in the output difference estimation the intercept is significantly positive at the 
5% level for the owner-sharecroppers, whereas it is not significant for the owner-fixed-rent 
tenants. 
 That is, in the model which uses the predicted values for the class of owner-
sharecroppers the mean differences (the intercepts) between average input intensities on 
owned and sharecropped plots are positive for all inputs even after controlling for other 
factors, a finding which can be interpreted as evidence for the Marshallian approach. 
Controlling for the endogeneity of crop choice, we find also evidence for a positive difference 
between average output intensities on owned and sharecropped plots, again a finding which is 
in favor of the Marshallian hypothesis. For the tenants cultivating owned plots and plots 
leased-in under a fixed-rent contract the mean differences are also jointly different from zero, 
but they have no uniform direction concerning their sign. Thus, we cannot conclude from 
either of the two models for this group of tenants that inputs are systematically undersupplied 
on their leased-in plots. Concerning the differences in average output intensities, we find in 
the case of the owner-fixed-rent tenants no evidence for a systematically lower output 
intensity on the leased-in plots. However, for the model which does not account for 
endogenous crop choice we find evidence that a kinship relation between the landlord and the 
tenant leads to higher input intensities on the leased-in plots of the owner-fixed-rent tenants, 
indicating that also fixed rent contracts may not be perfectly efficient. For both groups of 
tenants, different cropping patterns on owned and leased-in plots explain part of the 
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differences between average input intensities on owned and leased-in plots. But for the 
owner-sharecroppers, in the model which takes into account the endogeneity of crop choice 
the influence of the cropping patterns on the input differences becomes less clear, whereas 
instead of this there is strong evidence that a higher cost-share relative to the output-share of 
the tenant has a stronger negative influence on the input intensities on the sharecropped-in 
plots than on the input intensities on his owned plots. This is in accordance with our 
theoretical predictions and has again the implication that the tenant's actions can be only 
imperfectly monitored. Otherwise, the characteristics of the contract would not have an 
influence on the difference in average input intensities. 
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 Appendix 
Proof of proposition 1: 
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[ ]( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( )fafafafafa θαθαθαθαθα −−+−−−− exp12expexp12 2 ˆ
 [ ]( ) [ ]( )2expexp1 fafafa θαθαθα −−−−  
⇔  
[ ] ( )( )21exp1 fafa θαθα +−− ˆ0  ⇔ fa θα ˆ ( )[ ]21ln fa θα+ . Define faz θα≡ . Since , 
and since 
0≥z
( ) [ ]21ln zzg +=  is strictly convex on the interval [ )1,0 , strictly concave on the 
interval , and touches the function ( )+∞,1 ( ) zzg =  at 0 and 1, it follows that 
fa θα ≥ ( )[ ]21 fa θα+ln . Therefore in this case ( )[ ] 0≤−′′′ cE fu δθθ . 
 
Explanations to equations (44) and (45): 
[ ] ( )[ ] 02111111 <−′′+′= cfuEuEfA δθαθ , 
[ ] ( )( )[ ]222111212 cfcfuEuEfA δθδθαθ −−′′+′= , 
[ ] ( )( )[ ]222111121 cfcfuEuEfB δθδθαθ −−′′+′= , 
[ ] ( )[ ] 02222222 <−′′+′= cfuEuEfB δθαθ , 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ]111
1
11111222
1
111
1
1 cfufEcfuExcxcxcD δθθδ
αδθαδδ
αδδ
α −′′∂
∂+−′′



 +∂
∂+∂
∂−= , 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]222
1
22211222
1
111
1
2 cfufEcfuExcxcxcD δθθδ
αδθαδδ
αδδ
α −′′∂
∂+−′′



 +∂
∂+∂
∂−= . 
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 Table 1: Total operational landholdings of households by tenancy status (in acres) 
 
 mean std.dev. min max Number of 
households 
pure owners 4.062973 6.57121 
(p<0.0001) 
0.20 40.61 111 
owner/sharecropper 
owned plots 
1.812308 1.65025 
(p<0.0001) 
0.20 7.86 39 
owner/sharecropper 
shared plots 
2.402051 2.97836 
(p<0.0001) 
0.11 14.82 39 
owner/sharecropper 
total holdings 
4.308462 3.97277 
(p<0.0001) 
0.53 19.03 39 
owner/fixed-rent 
owned plots 
2.665091 2.35017 
(p<0.0001) 
0.24 11.44 55 
owner/fixed-rent 
leased plots 
1.617818 1.70932 
(p<0.0001) 
0.18 10.01 55 
owner/fixed-rent 
total holdings 
4.468364 3.36182 
(p<0.0001) 
0.63 16.30 55 
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 Table 2: Irrigation of plots by tenancy status 
 
 irrigation 
status 
frequency percent chi-square test 
for eq. prop. 
all plots irrigated 
unirrigated 
274 
341 
44.55 
55.45 
7.2992 
(p=0.0069) 
pure owners irrigated 
unirrigated 
85 
171 
33.20 
66.80 
28.8906 
(p<0.0001) 
owner/sharecr. 
owned plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
23 
60 
27.71 
72.29 
16.4940 
(p<0.0001) 
owner/sharecr. 
shared plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
21 
39 
35.00 
65.00 
5.4 
(p=0.0201) 
owner/sharecr. 
all plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
44 
99 
30.77 
69.23 
21.1538 
(p<0.0001) 
owner/fixed-r. 
owned plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
85 
52 
62.04 
37.96 
7.9489 
(p=0.0048) 
owner/fixed-r. 
leased plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
48 
19 
71.64 
28.36 
12.5522 
(p=0.0004) 
owner/fixed-r. 
all plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
132 
71 
65.02 
34.98 
18.3300 
(p<0.0001) 
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 Table 2a: Area irrigated under different tenancy contracts (in acres) 
 
 irrigation 
status 
average 
farm area 
total 
area 
paired t-test 
(equal irr. and 
unirr. farm area 
all plots irrigated 
unirrigated 
0.49 
1.40 
97.73 
281.84 
-3.67 
(p=0.0003) 
pure owners irrigated 
unirrigated 
0.28 
1.42 
28.12 
142.88 
-2.77 
(p=0.0067) 
owner/sharecr. 
owned plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
0.07 
0.65 
2.77 
25.17 
-4.24 
(p=0.0001) 
owner/sharecr. 
shared plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
0.36 
1.04 
13.41 
38.41 
-1.75 
(p=0.0889) 
owner/sharecr. 
all plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
0.42 
1.63 
16.18 
63.58 
-3.26 
(p=0.0024) 
owner/fixed-r. 
owned plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
0.61 
0.90 
31.64 
46.54 
-0.88 
(p=0.3823) 
owner/fixed-r. 
leased plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
0.43 
0.35 
20.43 
16.80 
0.51 
(p=0.6110) 
owner/fixed-r. 
all plots 
irrigated 
unirrigated 
0.94 
1.15 
51.79 
63.34 
-0.53 
(p=0.5994) 
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 Table 3: Frequency table of crops by tenancy status (owner/sharecropper) 
 
 owner/sharecropper 
owned plots 
owner/sharecropper 
shared plots 
total 
paddy 50 
46.73 
26.60 
57 
53.27 
42.54 
107 
33.23 
cereals 38 
61.29 
20.21 
24 
38.71 
17.91 
62 
19.25 
grams 46 
63.01 
24.47 
27 
36.99 
20.15 
73 
22.67 
groundnut 34 
72.34 
18.09 
13 
27.66 
9.70 
47 
14.60 
castor seed 13 
65.00 
6.91 
7 
35.00 
5.22 
20 
6.21 
cotton 7 
53.85 
3.72 
6 
46.15 
4.48 
13 
4.04 
total 188 
58.39 
134 
41.61 
322 
100.00 
The order of the cell entries form top to bottom is: frequency, row percent, and column 
percent. The overall chisquare is . ( ) 08.1125 =χ
 
 159
 Table 4: Frequency table of crops by tenancy status (owner/fixed-rent) 
 
 owner/fixed-rent 
owned plots 
owner/fixed-rent 
leased plots 
total 
paddy 221 
69.28 
69.94 
98 
30.72 
65.33 
319 
68.45 
cereals 36 
65.45 
11.39 
19 
34.55 
12.67 
55 
11.80 
grams 23 
62.16 
7.28 
14 
37.84 
9.33 
37 
7.94 
groundnut 19 
67.86 
6.01 
9 
32.14 
6.00 
28 
6.01 
chilies 10 
76.92 
3.16 
3 
23.08 
2.00 
13 
2.79 
others 7 
50.00 
2.22 
7 
50.00 
4.67 
14 
3.00 
total 316 
67.81 
150 
32.19 
466 
100.00 
The order of the cell entries form top to bottom is: frequency, row percent, and column 
percent. The overall chisquare is . ( ) 53.325 =χ
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 Table 4a: Proportions of land grown under different crops 
 
 pure owners owner-sharec.
owned plots 
owner-sharec.
sharec. plots 
owner-fix 
owned plots 
owner-fix 
leased plots 
paddy 0.20 0.10 0.26 0.50 0.49 
cereals 0.24 0.32 0.25 0.15 0.17 
grams 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.05 
groundnut 0.21 0.25 0.12 0.10 0.16 
castor seed 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.04 
cotton 0.11 0.05 0.16 0.09 0.04 
chilies 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 
sugarcane 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.002 0.004 
others 0.05 0.003 0.00 0.007 0.03 
total area 431.26 80.80 104.37 171.84 100.90 
Total area is measured in acres. Total areas differ from total areas in table 2a, since in this 
table we use observations from both seasons, whereas in table 2a each plot appears only once 
in the computations. 
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 Table 5: Mean input intensities for different crops (all plots in crop production schedule) 
 
 preharvest
labour 
harvest 
labour 
bullock-
pair days 
seedlings farm yard 
manure 
fertilizer/ 
pesticides 
number of
plots 
paddy 479.43 
(341.52) 
p<0.0001 
114.70 
(96.19) 
p<0.0001 
116.81 
(158.22) 
p<0.0001 
2177.19 
(2064.36) 
p<0.0001 
598.09 
(897.60) 
p<0.0001 
1546.57 
(2248.33) 
p<0.0001 
284 
cereals 32.53 
(56.47) 
p<0.0001 
37.82 
(68.39) 
p<0.0001 
20.62 
(29.63) 
p<0.0001 
34.64 
(64.64) 
p<0.0001 
50.62 
(148.22) 
p<0.0001 
18.04 
(64.29) 
p<0.0001 
270 
grams 3.63 
(7.83) 
p<0.0001 
55.68 
(68.69) 
p<0.0001 
2.90 
(5.99) 
p<0.0001 
152.80 
(136.41) 
p<0.0001 
6.02 
(27.55) 
p=0.0009 
7.24 
(44.82) 
p=0.0132 
239 
groundnut 60.58 
(36.17) 
p<0.0001 
38.23 
(28.79) 
p<0.0001 
16.84 
(8.68) 
p<0.0001 
592.90 
(333.70) 
p<0.0001 
100.85 
(156.03) 
p<0.0001 
172.21 
(259.71) 
p<0.0001 
204 
castor 
seed 
17.05 
(7.31) 
p<0.0001 
27.42 
(21.57) 
p<0.0001 
15.58 
(6.29) 
p<0.0001 
41.24 
(24.91) 
p<0.0001 
29.59 
(60.33) 
p=0.0001 
7.81 
(23.13) 
p=0.0065 
69 
cotton 27.93 
(23.51) 
p<0.0001 
15.37 
(9.60) 
p<0.0001 
11.34 
(4.85) 
p<0.0001 
29.30 
(4.57) 
p<0.0001 
15.29 
(51.40) 
p=0.0640 
40.92 
(92.70) 
p=0.0073 
41 
chilies 303.34 
(230.77) 
p<0.0001 
109.47 
(67.84) 
p<0.0001 
39.61 
(39.49) 
p<0.0001 
245.49 
(217.52) 
p<0.0001 
590.25 
(784.10) 
p=0.0001 
668.33 
(698.87) 
p<0.0001 
34 
sugarcane 235.43 
(308.28) 
p<0.0001 
135.11 
(292.81) 
p=0.0052 
24.60 
(33.13) 
p<0.0001 
1155.68 
(1588.07) 
p<0.0001 
151.79 
(301.71) 
p=0.0025 
735.28 
(522.60) 
p<0.0001 
41 
Preharvest labour, harvest labour, and bullock-pair days are measured in days per acre, the 
other inputs are in rupees per acre. Standard deviations are in parentheses and p represents the 
p-value for the t-statistic. 
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 Table 6: Results of the Sidak-test 
 
 paddy cereals grams groundn. castor s. cotton chillies sugarc. 
paddy  se,fp,fy,
pl,hl,bp 
se,fp,fy,
pl,hl,bp 
se,fp,fy,
pl,hl,bp 
se,fp,fy,
pl,hl,bp 
se,fp,fy,
pl,hl,bp 
se,fp,pl,
bp 
se,fp,fy,
pl,bp 
cereal    se   fy,pl,hl se,fp,pl,
hl 
grams    se   fy,pl se,fp,pl,
hl 
groundn.     se  fy,pl,hl pl,hl 
castor s.       fy,pl,hl se,pl,hl 
cotton       fy,pl,hl se,pl,hl 
chillies        se,fy 
sugarc.         
The same table results if a Bonferroni-test is employed. Pl stands for preharvest labour, hl for 
harvest labour, bp for bullock-pair days, se for seedlings, fy for farm yard manure, fp for 
fertilizer and pesticides. In the table, all inputs are listed for which the respective pair of crops 
shows a statistically significant difference at the 1-percent level for the mean input intensities. 
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 Table 7: Mean differences in average input and output intensities 
 
 owner-sharecropper owner-fixed-rent 
 mean differences
in average input
intensities
(std. error)
t-value
(p-value)
mean differences 
in average input 
intensities 
(std. error) 
t-value
(p-value)
seedlings 33.65
(29.59)
1.14
(0.2619)
-86.25 
(47.02) 
-1.83
(0.0707)
fertilizer/ 
pesticides 
3.64
(17.72)
0.21
(0.8381)
-107.72 
(33.97) 
-3.17
(0.0022)
farm yard 
manure 
8.99
(21.10)
0.43
(0.6723)
11.34 
(8.31) 
1.36
(0.1765)
preharvest labour -10.01
(8.83)
-1.13
(0.2631)
-8.89 
(5.69) 
-1.56
(0.1223)
harvesting labour 7.06
(4.24)
1.67
(0.1032)
-12.76 
(4.40) 
-2.90
(0.0049)
bullock pair days -2.94
(3.53)
-0.83
(0.4100)
-7.55 
(3.31) 
-2.28
(0.0253)
tractor hours - - -52.98 
(8.31) 
-6.37
(<0.0001)
output -301.28
(289.65)
-1.04
(0.3045)
-857.80 
(481.52) 
-1.78
(0.0797)
2χ -value 21.23  67.13
Preharvest labour, harvest labour, and bullock-pair days are measured in days per acre, the 
other inputs and output are in rupees per acre. 
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 Table 8: Differences on owned and sharecropped land of owner-sharecroppers, without 
controlling for the cost share (n=43) 
 
Variable 
seed fertilizer 
and 
pesticides 
farm yard 
manure 
preharv. 
labour 
harvest 
labour 
bullock 
pair days 
output 
intercept 21.41 
(21.43) 
[0.3240] 
29.14 
(14.91) 
[0.0580] 
47.87 
(19.58) 
[0.0192] 
9.90 
(5.55) 
[0.0823] 
10.05 
(4.17) 
[0.0208] 
3.30 
(2.98) 
[0.2753] 
182.33 
(147.61) 
[0.2243] 
irrigation 189.15 
(40.02) 
[<0.0001] 
134.55 
(28.19) 
[<0.0001] 
93.31 
(34.19) 
[0.0096] 
68.04 
(10.31) 
[<0.0001] 
12.71 
(7.79) 
[0.1107] 
19.29 
(5.62) 
[0.0015] 
3062.39 
(269.35) 
[<0.0001] 
grams -353.35 
(583.70) 
[0.5485] 
-471.35 
(412.90) 
[0.2608] 
- -254.72 
(125.90) 
[0.0502] 
-171.65 
(105.70) 
[0.1127] 
-127.78 
(81.07) 
[0.1235] 
- 
groundnut 360.06 
(52.64) 
[<0.0001] 
38.30 
(37.24) 
[0.3102] 
-150.28 
(47.09) 
[0.0028] 
-52.97 
(13.79) 
[0.0005] 
-14.65 
(10.35) 
[0.1650] 
-17.17 
(7.40) 
[0.0259] 
- 
castor 
seed 
- - -81.69 
(36.67) 
[0.0319] 
- - 16.30 
(4.88) 
[0.0019] 
- 
super- 
vision 
-42.92 
(67.93) 
[0.5313] 
-125.49 
(59.41) 
[0.0413] 
-31.66 
(79.84) 
[0.6939] 
-20.83 
(19.14) 
[0.2832] 
29.17 
(16.57) 
[0.0863] 
-11.96 
(8.31) 
[0.1586] 
- 
decision 
cropping 
pattern 
- - - - - - -867.40 
(617.07) 
[0.1679] 
adjusted 
R-square 
0.60 0.44 0.32 0.68 0.27 0.43 0.78 
2χ -value 71.07 
[<0.0001] 
38.34 
[<0.0001] 
27.16 
[<0.0001] 
102.25 
[<0.0001] 
21.41 
[0.0007] 
47.30 
[<0.0001] 
- 
F-value - - - - - - 68.17 
[<0.0001] 
Preharvest labour, harvest labour, and bullock-pair days are measured in days per acre, the 
other inputs and output are in rupees per acre. Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values are 
in brackets. 
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 Table 8a: Differences on owned and sharecropped land of owner-sharecroppers, 
controlling for the cost share (n=43) 
 
Variable 
seed fertilizer 
and 
pesticides 
farm yard 
manure 
preharv. 
labour 
harvest 
labour 
bullock 
pair days 
output 
intercept 144.12 
(62.23) 
[0.0262] 
-77.47 
(47.25) 
[0.1095] 
115.44 
(59.87) 
[0.0615] 
12.50 
(13.25) 
[0.3518] 
11.98 
(12.91) 
[0.3595] 
9.73 
(8.02) 
[0.2334] 
182.33 
(147.61) 
[0.2243] 
irrigation 163.03 
(40.92) 
[0.0003] 
157.46 
(28.91) 
[<0.0001] 
80.82 
(35.30) 
[0.0278] 
67.89 
(10.63) 
[<0.0001] 
12.51 
(8.21) 
[0.1361] 
19.16 
(5.60) 
[0.0016] 
3062.39 
(269.35) 
[<0.0001] 
grams -470.57 
(572.60) 
[0.4165] 
-364.01 
(403.40) 
[0.3727] 
- -244.13 
(128.10) 
[0.0644] 
-167.24 
(107.50) 
[0.1281] 
-125.46 
(81.13) 
[0.1308] 
- 
groundnut 410.98 
(56.79) 
[<0.0001] 
-7.02 
(40.70) 
[0.8639] 
-122.98 
(51.64) 
[0.0225] 
-52.37 
(14.55) 
[0.0009] 
-14.13 
(11.23) 
[0.2158] 
-16.75 
(7.38) 
[0.0293] 
- 
castor 
seed 
- - -76.64 
(37.00) 
[0.0453] 
- - 15.39 
(5.09) 
[0.0046] 
- 
cost share -100.61 
(48.39) 
[0.0446] 
88.04 
(37.12) 
[0.0230] 
-55.79 
(46.60) 
[0.2388] 
-2.02 
(9.57) 
[0.8340] 
-1.52 
(9.55) 
[0.8754] 
-3.76 
(4.39) 
[0.3972] 
- 
super- 
vision 
-46.75 
(65.77) 
[0.4817] 
-109.09 
(57.47) 
[0.0655] 
-41.95 
(79.99) 
[0.6032] 
-21.67 
(19.59) 
[0.2758] 
29.15 
(17.02) 
[0.0952] 
-14.52 
(8.78) 
[0.1068] 
- 
decision 
cropping 
pattern 
- - - - - - -867.40 
(617.07) 
[0.1679] 
adjusted 
R-square 
0.62 0.48 0.33 0.67 0.22 0.43 0.78 
2χ -value 80.33 
[<0.0001] 
47.45 
[<0.0001] 
29.05 
[0.0001] 
100.53 
[<0.0001] 
20.79 
[0.0019] 
47.26 
[<0.0001] 
- 
F-value - - - - - - 68.17 
[<0.0001] 
Preharvest labour, harvest labour, and bullock-pair days are measured in days per acre, the 
other inputs and output are in rupees per acre. Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values are 
in brackets. 
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 Table 9: Differences on owned and leased-in land of owner-fixed-rent tenants, (n=75) 
 
Variable 
seed fertilizer 
and 
pesticides 
farm 
yard 
manure 
preharv. 
labour 
harvest 
labour 
tractor 
hours 
bullock 
pair days 
output 
intercept 94.09 
(57.23) 
[0.1048] 
17.80 
(39.58) 
[0.6543] 
36.38 
(12.06) 
[0.0036]
6.97 
(7.42) 
[0.3503]
-2.62 
(5.81) 
[0.6527]
-30.09 
(13.25) 
[0.0262] 
-3.12 
(3.12) 
[0.3201] 
-25.13 
(256.53) 
[0.9223] 
irrigation 65.79 
(68.17) 
[0.3379] 
254.26 
(59.44) 
[<.0001] 
51.28 
(14.07) 
[0.0005]
31.33 
(11.88) 
[0.0103]
-3.45 
(7.81) 
[0.6594]
42.96 
(17.04) 
[0.0139] 
3.18 
(3.64) 
[0.3854] 
4356.95 
(818.95) 
[<.0001] 
cereals -177.71 
(124.10) 
[0.1566] 
-180.55 
(83.00) 
[0.0330] 
- -31.67 
(17.93) 
[0.0818]
- - - - 
grams - - - - - - -187.79 
(28.84) 
[<.0001] 
- 
groundnut 400.43 
(178.00) 
[0.0277] 
- -60.64 
(31.73) 
[0.0601]
-41.60 
(22.49) 
[0.0687]
-105.99 
(15.47) 
[<.0001]
- -35.56 
(8.20) 
[<.0001] 
- 
cotton - -317.35 
(142.00) 
[0.0287] 
- -39.94 
(27.44) 
[0.1502]
-46.24 
(15.57) 
[0.0041]
- - - 
chilies - - - - - - -35.84 
(14.12) 
[0.0134] 
- 
sugarcane 1857.07 
(285.00) 
[<.0001] 
- - - - - - 19061.00 
(1930.84) 
[<.0001] 
relation- 
ship 
-214.31 
(88.39) 
[0.0180] 
-66.20 
(63.25) 
[0.2989] 
-23.43 
(18.56) 
[0.2110]
-20.22 
(11.83) 
[0.0918]
-17.72 
(9.08) 
[0.0551]
-19.02 
(18.02) 
[0.2946] 
-7.94 
(4.83) 
[0.1049] 
- 
village -166.06 
(76.58) 
[0.0336] 
-59.46 
(56.08) 
[0.2927] 
-8.04 
(15.93) 
[0.6153]
4.52 
(10.77) 
[0.6760]
-0.42 
(7.97) 
[0.9587]
- 7.65 
(4.12) 
[0.0677] 
- 
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 Table 9 continued 
 
Variable 
seed fertilizer 
and 
pesticides 
farm 
yard 
manure 
preharv. 
labour 
harvest 
labour 
tractor 
hours 
bullock 
pair days 
output 
adjusted 
R-square 
0.37 0.40 0.17 0.22 0.37 0.21 0.47 0.75 
2χ -value 68.35 
[<.0001] 
80.01 
[<.0001] 
21.07 
[0.0008]
36.51 
[<.0001]
67.64 
[<.0001]
37.58 
[<.0001] 
117.40 
[<.0001] 
- 
F-value - - - - - - - 91.14 
[<.0001] 
Preharvest labour, harvest labour, and bullock-pair days are measured in days per acre, the 
other inputs and output are in rupees per acre, and tractor hours are in hours per acre. Standard 
errors are in parentheses, p-values are in brackets. 
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 Table 10: Multinomial logit estimates for the crop choice equations 
 owner-sharecropper owner-fixed-rent 
irrigation.paddy 34.20 (13.60) 
[0.0119] 
13.81 (2.59) 
[<0.0001] 
irrigation.cereals -1.17 (0.80) 
[0.1423] 
-16.17 (1331) 
[0.9903] 
irrigation.sugarcane - 24.71 (7.86) 
[0.0017] 
irrigation.others 30.68 (13.83) 
[0.0266] 
0.78 (0.55) 
[0.1503] 
famlabmt.paddy -1.44 (0.48) 
[0.0028] 
0.16 (0.36) 
[0.6523] 
famlabmt.groundnut -0.52 (0.23) 
[0.0232] 
-0.16 (0.20) 
[0.4212] 
famlabft.chillies - -0.56 (0.35) 
[0.1102] 
famlabml.paddy -3.34 (2.04) 
[0.1012] 
-4.67 (2.02) 
[0.0206] 
famsizt.paddy -0.36 (0.24) 
[0.1323] 
-0.59 (0.13) 
[<0.0001] 
famsizt.cereals 0.04 (0.06) 
[0.5126] 
-0.002 (0.08) 
[0.9781] 
famsizl.paddy 1.08 (0.59) 
[0.0659] 
1.01 (0.57) 
[0.0749] 
draughtt.paddy 0.80 (0.42) 
[0.0582] 
1.03 (0.44) 
[0.0196] 
draughtt.cotton 0.40 (0.29) 
[0.1588] 
0.27 (0.17) 
[0.1023] 
machint.paddy 2.80 (1.63) 
[0.0864] 
-3.09 (0.62) 
[<0.0001] 
machint.grams -1.25 (0.78) 
[0.1101] 
-1.37 (0.46) 
[0.0030] 
wellt.cotton -15.89 (1217) 
[0.9896] 
-2.88 (0.82) 
[0.0004] 
landownt.paddy 0.12 (0.29) 
[0.6665] 
-0.64 (0.20) 
[0.0015] 
landownt.cereals 0.11 (0.11) 
[0.3148] 
0.06 (0.07) 
[0.4178] 
Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values are in brackets. 
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 table 10 continued 
 owner-sharecropper owner-fixed-rent 
aget.groundnut 0.002 (0.02) 
[0.9226] 
-0.02 (0.02) 
[0.1988] 
aget.chillies - 0.05 (0.03) 
[0.0656] 
aget.sugarcane - -0.12 (0.08) 
[0.1057] 
assett.paddy 2.34 (1.17) 
[0.0449] 
1.97 (0.61) 
[0.0011] 
assett.cereals -0.66 (0.92) 
[0.4714] 
-1.36 (0.73) 
[0.0618] 
assett.grams 1.64 (0.55) 
[0.0029] 
0.95 (0.51) 
[0.0600] 
assett.chillies - 0.48 (0.54) 
[0.3779] 
assetl.paddy 0.86 (0.96) 
[0.3685] 
0.63 (0.65) 
[0.3330] 
assetl.cereals -0.02 (0.48) 
[0.9601] 
0.61 (0.39) 
[0.1228] 
assetl.grams -0.91 (0.55) 
[0.0990] 
0.59 (0.37) 
[0.1103] 
labourcosts -0.41 (0.18) 
[0.0215] 
-0.03 (0.02) 
[0.0851] 
othercosts 0.03 (0.01) 
[0.0119] 
-0.009 (0.006) 
[0.1103] 
number of observations 282 431 
log likelihood -336.11 -329.67 
Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values are in brackets. 
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 Table 10a: Residence status of landlords 
 
 resident landlord non-resident landlord total 
sharecroppers 53 
72.60 
33.97 
20 
27.40 
33.33 
73 
33.80 
fixed-rent tenants 103 
72.03 
66.03 
40 
27.97 
66.67 
143 
66.20 
total 60 
27.78 
156 
72.22 
216 
100.00 
The order of the cell entries form top to bottom is: frequency, row percent, and column 
percent. The overall chisquare is . ( ) 008.021 =χ
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 List of variables in the multinomial logit model 
Variable Description 
irrigation. dummy variable (=1 if the plot is irrigated, =0 otherwise) 
famlabmt. number of adult male workers in the tenant's family 
famlabft. number of adult female workers in the tenant's family 
famlabml. number of adult male workers in the landlord's family 
famsizt. number of individuals in the tenant's family 
famsizl. number of individuals in the landlord's family 
draughtt. number of the tenant's draught animals 
machint. number of agricultural machines owned by the tenant 
wellt. number of wells owned by the tenant 
landownt. total land owned by the tenant (in acres) 
aget. age of the tenant 
assett. total asset value of the tenant (in 100,000 rupees) 
assetl. total asset value of the landlord (in 100,000 rupees) 
labourcosts average amount of working hours used in the cultivation of a 
particular crop (in hours) 
othercosts total average costs of other inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, farm 
yard manure) used in the cultivation of a particular crop (in 
rupees) 
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 Table 11: Differences on owned and sharecropped land of owner-sharecroppers, actual 
crop dummies (n=43) 
 
Variable 
seed fertilizer 
and 
pesticides 
farm yard 
manure 
preharv. 
labour 
harvest 
labour 
bullock 
pair days 
intercept 141.86 
(65.44) 
[0.0371] 
-77.71 
(51.30) 
[0.1388] 
132.93 
(63.30) 
[0.0430] 
12.31 
(13.50) 
[0.3684] 
12.94 
(13.41) 
[0.3412] 
10.35 
(8.04) 
[0.2065] 
irrigation 165.41 
(54.82) 
[0.0047] 
156.15 
(39.03) 
[0.0003] 
108.23 
(50.54) 
[0.0393] 
66.35 
(14.43) 
[<.0001] 
10.26 
(11.06) 
[0.3597] 
10.69 
(7.63) 
[0.1699] 
cereals -13.03 
(51.71) 
[0.8025] 
-10.46 
(36.72) 
[0.7775] 
70.95 
(47.76) 
[0.1464] 
1.87 
(13.95) 
[0.8944] 
-1.90 
(10.55) 
[0.8580] 
-14.63 
(7.47) 
[0.0581] 
grams -23.95 
(107.90) 
[0.8257] 
-30.51 
(71.90) 
[0.6739] 
4.32 
(93.81) 
[0.9636] 
-37.78 
(27.82) 
[0.1831] 
-22.69 
(20.94) 
[0.2858] 
-21.17 
(15.66) 
[0.1850] 
groundnut 390.17 
(60.62) 
[<.0001] 
-24.50 
(42.84) 
[0.5710] 
-87.28 
(55.46) 
[0.1245] 
-63.38 
(15.76) 
[0.0003] 
-22.01 
(11.99) 
[0.0748] 
-28.56 
(8.40) 
[0.0017] 
cotton 9.63 
(150.10) 
[0.9492] 
13.27 
(107.00) 
[0.9020] 
-63.44 
(138.90) 
[0.6507] 
11.77 
(39.76) 
[0.7690] 
-17.56 
(29.97) 
[0.5617] 
-8.39 
(21.36) 
[0.6967] 
super- 
vision 
-45.45 
(72.38) 
[0.5341] 
-111.32 
(60.09) 
[0.0724] 
-69.35 
(79.03) 
[0.3862] 
-25.32 
(20.12) 
[0.2166] 
25.71 
(17.46) 
[0.1497] 
-12.60 
(9.68) 
[0.2019] 
cost share -97.86 
(51.15) 
[0.0640] 
89.22 
(40.73) 
[0.0352] 
-70.20 
(49.98) 
[0.1689] 
-0.86 
(9.80) 
[0.9305] 
-1.82 
(9.97) 
[0.8559] 
-3.92 
(4.37) 
[0.3759] 
adjusted 
R-square 
0.60 0.44 0.33 0.65 0.18 0.37 
2χ -value 74.26 43.19 28.47 95.20 18.53 35.52 
Preharvest labour, harvest labour, and bullock-pair days are measured in days per acre, the 
other inputs are in rupees per acre. Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values are in 
brackets. 
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 Table 12: Differences on owned and sharecropped land of owner-sharecroppers, predicted 
crop dummies (n=43) 
 
Variable 
seed fertilizer 
and 
pesticides 
farm yard 
manure 
preharv. 
labour 
harvest 
labour 
bullock 
pair days 
intercept -117.24 
(94.59) 
[0.2234] 
-98.41 
(48.05) 
[0.0481] 
220.28 
(75.51) 
[0.0061] 
18.12 
(16.49) 
[0.2792] 
21.31 
(14.53) 
[0.1513] 
17.06 
(9.87) 
[0.0927] 
irrigation 122.63 
(79.73) 
[0.1330] 
146.07 
(41.84) 
[0.0013] 
171.31 
(70.08) 
[0.0197] 
83.33 
(19.57) 
[0.0001] 
19.22 
(13.29) 
[0.1571] 
13.55 
(10.57) 
[0.2085] 
cereals 576.56 
(380.10) 
[0.1383] 
234.14 
(199.80) 
[0.2493] 
-129.92 
(332.40) 
[0.6983] 
76.23 
(90.97) 
[0.4077] 
-74.78 
(63.68) 
[0.2482] 
-24.24 
(47.46) 
[0.6127] 
grams -484.77 
(216.80) 
[0.0318] 
-279.89 
(112.80) 
[0.0181] 
45.57 
(190.00) 
[0.8119] 
-9.88 
(54.00) 
[0.8559] 
19.68 
(36.92) 
[0.5974] 
-35.92 
(29.51) 
[0.2317] 
groundnut -102.45 
(352.60) 
[0.7731] 
-232.72 
(189.40) 
[0.2275] 
31.35 
(315.40) 
[0.9214] 
-169.54 
(85.37) 
[0.0549] 
11.65 
(60.55) 
[0.8486] 
-17.23 
(44.11) 
[0.6985] 
cotton -1866.50 
(1308.50) 
[0.1626] 
326.08 
(689.00) 
[0.6390] 
2094.80 
(1157.10) 
[0.0788] 
287.44 
(327.30) 
[0.3858] 
288.12 
(224.60) 
[0.2079] 
156.13 
(176.50) 
[0.3824] 
super- 
vision 
-83.46 
(88.85) 
[0.3540] 
-96.02 
(58.06) 
[0.1071] 
-92.99 
(96.96) 
[0.3441] 
-7.74 
(22.44) 
[0.7322] 
27.26 
(18.49) 
[0.1493] 
-13.42 
(10.08) 
[0.1916] 
cost share 147.62 
(67.31) 
[0.0350] 
121.31 
(34.06) 
[0.0011] 
-126.95 
(52.87) 
[0.0218] 
-7.78 
(10.55) 
[0.4658] 
-8.31 
(9.86) 
[0.4053] 
-6.57 
(5.27) 
[0.2210] 
adjusted 
R-square 
0.37 0.56 0.30 0.56 0.17 0.22 
2χ -value 31.64 65.29 24.45 68.59 17.13 23.11 
Preharvest labour, harvest labour, and bullock-pair days are measured in days per acre, the 
other inputs are in rupees per acre. Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values are in 
brackets. 
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 Table 13: Differences on owned and leased-in land of owner-fixed-rent tenants, actual crop 
dummies (n=75) 
 
Variable 
seed fertilizer 
and 
pesticides 
farm 
yard 
manure 
preharv. 
labour 
harvest 
labour 
tractor 
hours 
bullock 
pair days 
intercept 98.66 
(58.81) 
[0.0983] 
18.74 
(42.14) 
[0.6580] 
36.54 
(12.44) 
[0.0046]
6.61 
(7.78) 
[0.3987]
-2.97 
(6.02) 
[0.6235]
-27.55 
(13.36) 
[0.0429] 
-5.16 
(3.58) 
[0.1541] 
irrigation -57.56 
(102.00) 
[0.5744] 
293.98 
(75.41) 
[0.0002] 
17.49 
(21.23) 
[0.4130]
27.71 
(14.13) 
[0.0542]
7.93 
(10.62) 
[0.4581]
49.59 
(17.91) 
[0.0072] 
0.78 
(6.10) 
[0.8984] 
cereals -453.76 
(211.30) 
[0.0355] 
-72.27 
(152.50) 
[0.6371] 
-85.65 
(44.53) 
[0.0589]
-42.26 
(28.23) 
[0.1393]
39.30 
(21.70) 
[0.0748]
- 12.31 
(12.81) 
[0.3401] 
grams 549.63 
(849.80) 
[0.5201] 
12.80 
(607.00) 
[0.9832] 
51.93 
(180.00)
[0.7739]
-38.40 
(111.80)
[0.7324]
-0.13 
(86.77) 
[0.9988]
- -144.69 
(51.78) 
[0.0069] 
groundnut 151.51 
(227.70) 
[0.5082] 
31.67 
(163.90) 
[0.8474] 
-129.50 
(48.06) 
[0.0090]
-50.56 
(30.31) 
[0.1002]
-82.19 
(23.35) 
[0.0008]
- -28.63 
(13.82) 
[0.0423] 
cotton -343.40 
(243.90) 
[0.1641] 
-236.61 
(177.50) 
[0.1872] 
-91.72 
(51.21) 
[0.0780]
-52.07 
(32.99) 
[0.1194]
-23.69 
(25.17) 
[0.3501]
- -10.49 
(14.72) 
[0.4788] 
chilies -58.41 
(363.20) 
[0.8727] 
255.17 
(259.90) 
[0.3300] 
-59.77 
(76.84) 
[0.4394]
10.23 
(47.93) 
[0.8317]
34.59 
(37.13) 
[0.3550]
91.99 
(238.80) 
[0.7012] 
-64.54 
(22.10) 
[0.0048] 
sugarcane 1812.59 
(336.00) 
[<.0001] 
-105.96 
(240.00) 
[0.6603] 
-22.08 
(71.15) 
[0.7573]
-10.30 
(44.20) 
[0.8164]
-11.60 
(34.30) 
[0.7363]
- -24.23 
(20.47) 
[0.2409] 
others -214.40 
(202.10) 
[0.2928] 
155.63 
(145.20) 
[0.2877] 
-85.96 
(42.70) 
[0.0483]
-14.24 
(26.81) 
[0.5972]
33.21 
(20.70) 
[0.1136]
- -2.54 
(12.28) 
[0.8367] 
relation- 
ship 
-212.68 
(90.03) 
[0.0212] 
-73.05 
(65.88) 
[0.2717] 
-21.79 
(18.85) 
[0.2519]
-20.76 
(12.28) 
[0.0958]
-18.72 
(9.32) 
[0.0488]
-22.08 
(18.19) 
[0.2289] 
-3.56 
(5.41) 
[0.5131] 
village -204.57 
(82.15) 
[0.0154] 
-46.49 
(60.40) 
[0.4443] 
-18.20 
(17.16) 
[0.2928]
3.97 
(11.29) 
[0.7261]
3.51 
(8.53) 
[0.6824]
- 7.25 
(4.93) 
[0.1462] 
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 table 13 continued 
 
Variable 
seed fertilizer 
and 
pesticides 
farm 
yard 
manure 
preharv. 
labour 
harvest 
labour 
tractor 
hours 
bullock 
pair days 
adjusted 
R-square 
0.35 0.36 0.16 0.19 0.34 0.20 0.34 
2χ -value 60.81 
[<.0001] 
77.43 
[<.0001] 
26.71 
[0.0051]
36.04 
[0.0002]
67.45 
[<.0001]
38.78 
[<.0001] 
52.01 
[<.0001] 
Preharvest labour, harvest labour, and bullock-pair days are measured in days per acre, the 
other inputs are in rupees per acre, and tractor hours are in hours per acre. Standard errors are 
in parentheses, p-values are in brackets. 
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 Table 14: Differences on owned and leased-in land of owner-fixed-rent tenants, predicted 
crop dummies (n=75) 
 
Variable 
seed fertilizer 
and 
pesticides 
farm 
yard 
manure 
preharv. 
labour 
harvest 
labour 
tractor 
hours 
bullock 
pair days 
intercept -11.15 
(63.75) 
[0.8618] 
22.82 
(45.05) 
[0.6142] 
37.24 
(13.26) 
[0.0066]
3.17 
(7.69) 
[0.6812]
-11.61 
(7.94) 
[0.1483]
-34.46 
(13.68) 
[0.0140] 
-3.43 
(4.44) 
[0.4435] 
irrigation 49.44 
(99.14) 
[0.6197] 
319.84 
(72.27) 
[<.0001] 
44.73 
(20.39) 
[0.0319]
25.36 
(12.67) 
[0.0496]
2.77 
(12.43) 
[0.8247]
44.61 
(18.01) 
[0.0156] 
-0.34 
(6.83) 
[0.9603] 
cereals 510.21 
(515.90) 
[0.3264] 
-364.92 
(365.50) 
[0.3218] 
27.84 
(107.20)
[0.7960]
-119.74 
(62.51) 
[0.0599]
-13.58 
(64.26) 
[0.8333]
- -73.41 
(35.91) 
[0.0450] 
grams -2116.09 
(912.20) 
[0.0236] 
676.69 
(645.70) 
[0.2986] 
-154.89 
(189.70)
[0.4171]
83.58 
(110.30)
[0.4516]
5.49 
(113.60)
[0.9616]
- 184.35 
(63.52) 
[0.0051] 
groundnut 532.30 
(2970.3) 
[0.8583] 
3851.44 
(2095.3) 
[0.0707] 
723.13 
(618.30)
[0.2465]
-140.14 
(356.90)
[0.6959]
-467.02 
(369.60)
[0.2110]
- -54.57 
(207.10) 
[0.7930] 
cotton 971.08 
(1231.9) 
[0.4334] 
-693.16 
(869.90) 
[0.4285] 
-459.04 
(256.30)
[0.0781]
-110.48 
(148.30)
[0.4591]
115.41 
(153.30)
[0.4544]
- -108.53 
(85.86) 
[0.2108] 
chillis 3714.11 
(1527.3) 
[0.0178] 
-7.10 
(1108.6) 
[0.9949] 
204.09 
(314.60)
[0.5189]
-173.17 
(193.70)
[0.3746]
19.05 
(191.30)
[0.9210]
-217.53 
(265.00) 
[0.4145] 
-33.42 
(105.30) 
[0.7521] 
sugarcane 2902.78 
(1442.1) 
[0.0483] 
1604.02 
(1017.3) 
[0.1198] 
311.02 
(300.20)
[0.3041]
-94.91 
(173.30)
[0.5858]
-23.51 
(179.40)
[0.8962]
- -110.50 
(100.50) 
[0.2759] 
others -4400.59 
(2506.1) 
[0.0839] 
-3235.99 
(1780.6) 
[0.0738] 
-406.20 
(520.30)
[0.4379]
178.68 
(305.30)
[0.5605]
223.02 
(312.40)
[0.4778]
- 66.62 
(174.30) 
[0.7035] 
relation- 
ship 
-93.41 
(94.88) 
[0.3286] 
-76.81 
(68.49) 
[0.2662] 
-14.82 
(19.59) 
[0.4520]
-15.73 
(11.91) 
[0.1912]
-11.73 
(11.87) 
[0.3269]
-13.34 
(19.01) 
[0.4850] 
-7.74 
(6.56) 
[0.2426] 
village -128.81 
(86.40) 
[0.1409] 
-25.84 
(62.72) 
[0.6817] 
-16.43 
(17.80) 
[0.3595]
4.47 
(10.96) 
[0.6845]
8.13 
(10.82) 
[0.4554]
- 9.92 
(5.96) 
[0.1008] 
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 table 14 continued 
 
Variable 
seed fertilizer 
and 
pesticides 
farm 
yard 
manure 
preharv. 
labour 
harvest 
labour 
tractor 
hours 
bullock 
pair days 
adjusted 
R-square 
0.20 0.32 0.17 0.22 -0.05 0.21 0.06 
2χ -value 36.98 
[0.0001] 
68.53 
[<.0001] 
26.47 
[0.0055]
43.20 
[<.0001]
15.29 
[0.1695]
38.86 
[<.0001] 
18.28 
[0.0753] 
Preharvest labour, harvest labour, and bullock-pair days are measured in days per acre, the 
other inputs are in rupees per acre, and tractor hours are in hours per acre. Standard errors are 
in parentheses, p-values are in brackets. 
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 Table 15: Output differences (owner-sharecroppers) 
 
 output (actual values) output (predicted values) 
intercept 58.86 (149.12) 
[0.6957] 
499.12 (190.22) 
[0.0132] 
irrigation 1531.34 (864.65) 
[0.0861] 
-7840.22 (2649.82) 
[0.0058] 
cereals -2396.46 (1181.33) 
[0.0509] 
-1040.51 (4439.96) 
[0.8162] 
grams -3687.41 (1327.07) 
[0.0091] 
-13856.00 (3310.88) 
[0.0002] 
groundnut -125.72 (836.61) 
[0.8815] 
-12661.00 (6575.38) 
[0.0631] 
cotton -2518.49 (1489.44) 
[0.1006] 
-234.44 (12528.00) 
[0.9852] 
castor seed -2079.57 (1227.99) 
[0.1001] 
-27169.00 (20533.00) 
[0.1952] 
others -2937.08 (1476.26) 
[0.0552] 
49896.00 (13611.00) 
[0.0009] 
decision cropping pattern -534.50 (564.59) 
[0.3509] 
-789.21 (579.43) 
[0.1827] 
adjusted R-square 0.83 0.83 
F-value 25.90 25.89 
Output is measured in rupees per acre. Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values are in 
brackets. 
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 Table 16: Output differences (owner-fixed-rent tenants) 
 
 output (actual values) output (predicted values) 
intercept 264.70 (345.10) 
[0.4466] 
-480.44 (610.12) 
[0.4347] 
irrigation 5656.17 (1920.38) 
[0.0049] 
9530.50 (10247.00) 
[0.3567] 
cereals 2437.02 (1958.85) 
[0.2191] 
4217.55 (16317.00) 
[0.7971] 
grams 784.90 (5261.73) 
[0.8820] 
-12290.00 (12958) 
[0.3474] 
groundnut 3969.36 (1804.31) 
[0.0324] 
57643.00 (50998.00) 
[0.2636] 
cotton -67.19 (2049.55) 
[0.9740] 
23832.00 (12758.00) 
[0.0675] 
chilies 3096.61 (1891.23) 
[0.1077] 
75341.00 (29732.00) 
[0.0144] 
sugarcane 21517.00 (1889.76) 
[<0.0001] 
18302.00 (21179.00) 
[0.3915] 
others 2503.94 (1237.83) 
[0.0483] 
-115717.00 (42310.00) 
[0.0086] 
relationship -844.83 (505.26) 
[0.1006] 
-405.00 (853.29) 
[0.6371] 
village -101.69 (446.43) 
[0.8207] 
391.71 (732.96) 
[0.5954] 
adjusted R-square 0.82 0.51 
F-value 28.79 7.34 
Output is measured in rupees per acre. Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values are in 
brackets. 
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5 Conclusion 
The aim of this dissertation was to make a contribution to the literature on contract choice in 
rural economies. Above all, the hitherto theoretically rather neglected field of informal 
groundwater markets has been paid special attention. In addition, one of the fundamental 
questions in the theory of contract choice in agrarian economies, whether the assumption that 
the tenant's actions are costlessly monitorable and can be enforced by the landlord is valid or 
not, has been readdressed. 
 In chapter 2, I presented the results from of a field study on groundwater transactions 
conducted by myself during January and February 2001 in Tamil Nadu, India. The main 
purpose of this study had been to fill the gaps left by the existing empirical literature on 
informal groundwater markets, especially as far as details of the process of choosing the 
contractual form were concerned. The insights gained by looking at this empirical evidence 
were very useful in setting up the model presented in chapter 3. Therefore, this study has been 
an important first step on the way to a better understanding of the functioning of informal 
groundwater markets. 
In order to assess the claims made in chapter 2 on a more general level, however, one 
would have to estimate a model of contract choice. The data set appropriate for this task 
should contain the following information which was not covered by the survey underlying 
this chapter: First of all, it would be important to cover a larger number of households for a 
completed cultivation season. This would allow to gather data on such questions as: How 
much water was sold and purchased? What amount of inputs other than water has been 
applied to the crop? How much output was produced? What were the costs of extracting the 
groundwater? Information which is essential if one wants to assess the earnings and costs of 
farmers involved in groundwater transactions. Also required would be exact information on 
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the area irrigated, on the time in the season when no more tank water was available, and on 
the time in the season when the farmer first bought groundwater from a wellowner, in order to 
find out how these facts influence the choice of the contract form. The number of wellowners 
from whom a farmer could possibly buy water will also have a bearing on the contract choice. 
Further, data would be needed on household characteristics such as household wealth, number 
of family members working, assets owned, etc., since these characteristics would help to 
quantify the households attitude towards risk and since they provide information on the 
households endowment with productive assets. It would also be interesting to identify 
matching pairs of sellers and buyers, although the choice of a contract partner is more 
restricted than in the case of a tenancy contract due to the restricted transportability of 
groundwater. Finally, it would be useful to have a time series of several cultivation seasons 
and data from different areas to see how differences in rainfall and differences in agro-
climatic and groundwater conditions influence contract choice in groundwater transactions. 
 In chapter 3, I developed a model of contractual choice in informal groundwater 
markets. In a bargaining framework I showed that – depending on the shape of the utility 
functions of the buyer and the seller - important determinants of the choice of the contract 
form are the degrees of absolute risk aversion of the contracting parties in the case of 
exponential utility and factors that influence the contract-dependent as well as the contract-
independent income of the parties, such as the distribution of the amount of rainfall, the 
marginal costs of groundwater extraction and the certain incomes of the buyer and the seller. 
My results underline the fact that sharecropping arrangements in the context of informal 
groundwater markets, which in the empirical literature dealing with this phenomenon are 
often condemned as exploitative, are a powerful instrument to overcome inefficiencies which 
arise in a risky environment when there are incomplete or missing markets for the allocation 
of a scarce resource and for the allocation of risk, an imperfect water market, or a missing 
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insurance market on the village level. My results also show, that under certain conditions even 
productive efficiency can be achieved by the use of groundwater share contracts. 
 The analysis of chapter 3 is an important first step in understanding the choice of 
contracts in an agricultural economy where water is scarce and opens an entire research 
agenda in the field of agricultural contracts. Future research has to address questions such as 
how the allocation of groundwater is related to the allocation of land. How does the 
availability of irrigation water influence a farmer’s decision to rent in or rent out land? What 
are the effects of an increasing density of wells in a village on the contract form chosen? How 
can the possibility of an overexploitation of the local groundwater resources be taken into 
account? What are the effects of wealth or credit constraints on the side of the water buyer? 
Most closely related to the research of this chapter is the question how the timing of the 
farmer's decision on when to approach a wellowner for additional irrigation water can be 
endogenized and how this matters for the contract choice and for the efficiency achieved by 
the contract. The farmer's decision how long to wait before entering a contract potentially 
depends on his beliefs about the quantity of rainfall during the remainder of the growing 
season. If he decides to wait for future rainfall without entering a contract he has to take into 
account that the condition of his crop may worsen in the meantime because of a lack of water, 
which may negatively influence his future bargaining power. This timing consideration plays 
no role in the context of tenancy contracts, and addressing it may help to deepen the general 
understanding of how and under which circumstances share contracts can balance risk sharing 
considerations and incentive problems when markets are incomplete or missing. 
 In chapter 4, I reconsidered the issue whether the monitoring or the Marshallian 
approach is more supported by empirical evidence. Estimating a model which takes the 
cropping pattern as given as well as a model which assumes that the crops grown on plots of 
different tenancy status are the outcome of an endogenous choice, I found that in the case of 
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owner-sharecroppers the Marshallian approach is supported by both models. In the case of 
owner-fixed-rent tenants there is no evidence for the Marshallian approach in the endogenous 
crop choice model, whereas in the model that takes cropping patterns as exogenously given 
there is an indication that fixed rent contracts may be as well not perfectly efficient. 
 Since the econometric analysis of these models suffers from certain data constraints, it 
would definitely be rewarding to reestimate both models using a richer data set. This would 
also allow to reestimate the endogenous crop choice model using the full information 
maximum likelihood method instead of the two-stage estimation method employed here, the 
former providing more efficient parameter estimates. Finally, although controlling for 
endogenous crop choice may partially make allowances for the fact that certain tenants match 
with certain landlords (as far as the preferences for certain crops are concerned), the 
estimation of a model which explicitly allows for endogenous matching between landlords 
and tenants based on their characteristics will depict the real world more closely and may lead 
to results different from those obtained in chapter 4. 
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